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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
DEMOCRACIES ALMOST NEVER GO TO WAR WITH EACH OTHER. NOTHING, IT SEEMS, CAN 
BRING THEM TO BLOWS – EXCEPT, PERHAPS, FISH. FIRST CAME THE ‘COD WARS’ OF 20 YEARS 
AGO AND MORE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ICELAND. THEN, EARLIER THIS YEAR, BRITTANY’S 
HISTORIC PARLIAMENT WAS BURNED DOWN AFTER VIOLENT PROTESTS AGAINST CHEAP 
IMPORTS AND SPAIN WAS THREATENING TO VETO THE AGREEMENT BY WHICH NORWAY WILL 
BE ABLE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: NOW, SPANISH FISHERMEN MASS THEIR VESSELS 
AGAINST ENGLISH AND FRENCH INTERLOPERS. THERE IS TALK OF AXE-WIELDING SEAMEN 
AND SABOTAGED NETS (…) MEANWHILE, NORWAY SEIZES A COD-SEEKING ICELANDIC 
TRAWLER WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY FIRED SOME SHOTS AT NORWEGIAN COAST GUARDS. 
WHAT IS IT ABOUT FISH THAT MAKES DEMOCRACIES SEND GUNBOATS? THE ANSWER IS THAT 
THE DEMAND FOR FISH FAR OUTSTRIPS SUPPLY. THE SHOALS ROUND EUROPE ARE SHRINKING 
INEXORABLY. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM NATIONALLY FAIL BECAUSE 
FISH DEFY BOUNDARIES, WHILE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY THAT MIGHT HAVE A SOLUTION 
(THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHICH WANTS TO REDUCE CATCHES) CANNOT IMPLEMENT IT: 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS VETO THIS FOR FEAR OF FISHERMEN’S POLITICAL CLOUT. 
(THE ECONOMIST OF 13 AUGUST 1994) 
 
In 2007, the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties was celebrated.  In the 
area of fisheries, however, there did not seem to be much to celebrate. Ever since the 
Community laid the foundations for a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1957, the 
amount of cod in the North Sea, an important region in which the policy attempts to 
manage the Community’s fisheries, has decreased by over 83%. (ICES, 2008: 68f) Most 
other commercially exploited fish stocks share the faith of the cod.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that the CFP rarely makes any positive headlines. Widely 
regarded as an example for policy failure, first and foremost by the Commission itself, it 
is blamed for being the main cause for both the depletion of fish stocks in Community 
waters and the slow decline of traditional coastal communities.     
 
This paper looks at the CFP from a different angle than most other works that have been 
written about the policy. The author agrees with Conceição-Heldt (2004: 29) that 
previous research has often been too normative or descriptive. Most notably, the 
majority of existing literature on the subject is neither an exhaustive evaluation of the 
policy or one of its elements, nor should it be seen as a purely historical work. It is 
rather a general analysis of the policy on a meta-level that focuses on its evolution in the 
context of European integration and on the nature of the resource it seeks to manage.  
 
Only very few works have connected the CFP to the overall European integration 
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process. (Particularly Leigh 1983; Symes & Crean 1995 and Arason 2003) However, 
that the CFP is an excellent case study for European integration, is something that 
Michael Leigh (1983: 4f) already certified:  
 
The CFP, though relatively marginal to the Community’s economic life, demonstrates 
many of the possibilities for and limits on Community action and so has implications 
that go beyond the sector directly concerned. 
 
Also, to look beyond the topics of policy failure or policy prescriptions makes it 
possible to understate statements such as the one made by the former head of the 
Conservation Unit Mike Holden, who claimed that the conservation policy of the CFP 
“must be adjudged a brilliant political success but a conservation policy in name only.” 
(Holden, 1996: 125) 
 
Special attention should be given to the nature of the resource. As a so-called common-
pool resource, a type of common goods, fish considerably differ from the vast majority 
of goods and services in its economic characteristics. But broad studies on the commons 
only started after Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work was published in the early 
1990s, decades after Garrett Hardin’s famous article in Science, and decades after the 
adoption of the first Common Fisheries Policy. For that reason, this paper also focuses 
on whether and how the special characteristics of fish as a common-pool resource play a 
role in the evolution of the policy, especially the conservation policy.   
 
Therefore, this paper aims, in the light of the above, to address the following question: 
 
HOW DID THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY AS A COMMUNITY TOOL FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF A COMMON-POOL RESOURCE EVOLVE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? 
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To answer this question, a theoretical framework consisting of three concepts focussing 
on each of the three different levels of analysis of public policy outlined by Howlett and 
Ramesh (2003: 20ff) is being used:  
 
a) European Integration theories, focussing on the largest level of social structures; 
b) Charles’ framework of fisheries management, focussing on the aggregate 
collection of individual actors; and 
c) The concept of Common Goods, explaining behaviour and motivations of 
individual actors.  
 
Therefore, instead of focussing only on specific parts of the policy, the evolution of the 
policy is being looked at through these specific angles. It also encompasses the classical 
stages of the policy cycle, from agenda setting to evaluation, as for instance described 
by Héritier (1987).  
 
In order to concisely answer the research question, the scope of this paper is limited. For 
instance, it also does not cover developments in the Baltic Sea or the Mediterranean 
since the policy there is still in its infancy since it focussed on the North Atlantic and 
North Sea for the longest time as over two thirds of EU catches are taken there. Also, it 
does not focus on the role of non-governmental actors in the policy-making process, 
especially since lobbying in the sector on the European level has been very limited.  
 
The paper is structured in a way that first, the three theoretical angles used for the 
analysis, namely the grand theories of European integration, the framework of fisheries 
management and common-pool resources, will be introduced. The empirical part falls 
into four chronological chapters, which analyze the four main phases of development of 
the policy. The subsequent conclusion connects the different empirical parts with each 
other and with the theoretical foundation and answers the research question. Finally, a 
short outlook on the future of the policy is given.  
Before starting with the theoretical part, a short introduction to the fisheries sector in 
Europe seems appropriate.  
 
The European Union is now the third largest fisheries “nation” in the world. (European 
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Communities, 2008; European Communities, 2007) As of 2005, it ranks behind China 
and Peru in terms of catches by weight, with 5 632 045 tonnes or 6.01 per cent of the 
worldwide total volume. 910 650 tonnes or 16.17 per cent are caught by Denmark 
alone. More than half of the EU catch, in terms of volume, is made by four Member 
States alone: Spain, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. However, Denmark, as 
the EU’s largest fishing nation comes only third in Europe at large, after Norway and 
Iceland. The total catch volume of these two Nordic states amounts to 4 053 667 tons or 
71.98 per cent of total EU catches.   
 
 Catches 
(1000 t) 
Trade balance 
(million !) 
Employment 
(total) 
Employment 
(% of pop.) 
Consumption 
(kg/year/capita) 
EFF-allocation 
(%) 
EU-
27 
5 632 -13 679 415 851 0,083 21.4 100 
ES 768 - 2 807 87 310 0,19 44.7 26.29 
DK 911 795 14 060 0,26 23.1 3.16 
FR 595 - 2 719 64 712 0,10 33.6 5.02 
UK 669 - 1 569 33 534 0,06 20.0 3.2 
IS 1 661 1 374 6 100 1,91 91.4 - 
NO 2 393 3 726 20 094 0,42 47.7 - 
Figure 1: Fisheries Statistics for Europe’s six largest fishing nations (in terms of catch volume) comparing catches, trade balance, 
employment, consumption and EFF-allocation1. Sources: European Communities (2008) and European Communities (2007) 
 
Approximately 415 851 people were employed in the EU fisheries sector in 2003, 
mainly in Spain and France with 87 310 and 64 712 people respectively. Methods of 
collecting and compiling employment data for the sector, however, vary throughout the 
Member States so great care needs to be taken when using these numbers. They do, 
however, demonstrate that the number of people employed in the fisheries sector 
compared to the general population is rather insignificant. It is above average in 
Denmark and Spain, the two largest EU fishing nations, and of some significance in the 
two largest European fishing nations, Iceland and Norway. (European Communities, 
2008) 
 
Human consumption in the EU averages 21.4 kg of fisheries products per capita and 
year, with Portugal leading the list with 56.9 kg, followed by Spain, Latvia, France, 
Finland, Malta and Sweden. Portugal also ranks third worldwide in consumption of 
fisheries products after Iceland with 91.4 kg and Japan with 65.7kg.  
During the 2000-2006 period, most Community aid through the Common Fisheries 
                                                
1 Data on catches for 2005, on employment and consumption for 2003, on trade balance for 2006 and on EFF-allocation as of 2008. 
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Policy was used for processing and marketing, followed by scrapping of vessels and the 
construction and modernisation of existing vessels. Spain alone received 44.4 per cent 
of the total amount of 4 billion Euro, followed by Italy with 10.2 per cent and France 
with 6.9 per cent. Under the new European Fisheries Fund, Spain is still set to receive 
the largest share with 26.3 per cent of the 4.6 billion Euro pot for the 2007-2013 
programming period, followed by Poland (17.1%), Italy (9.9%), Portugal (5.7%), 
Romania (5.4%) and France (5.0%). (European Communities, 2008) 
 
Of concern is the European Union’s negative trade balance in fisheries products with a 
trade deficit of almost 14 billion Euro in 2006. Spain, France and Italy alone produce a 
deficit of roughly 3 billion each. (European Communities, 2007)  
 
 
Fisheries are counted as part of the primary sector of the economy. Despite the fact that 
its contribution to employment and GNP, which is below one per cent in all EU Member 
States, fisheries is nonetheless a politically sensitive subject due to a concentration in 
rural costal regions and the image of fisheries as ancient, traditional activity that is 
persistent to change. The field of fisheries policy per se is functionally limited but spills 
over into many matters bordering on high policy.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The theoretical background encompasses first, the two grand theories of European 
integration, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism for a structural account; 
second, Charles’ framework for fisheries management for collective implications and 
finally, the characteristics of common-pool resources explaining behaviour of individual 
actors. 
 
1. THE GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
Of the two main theories of European Integration, neo-functionalism will be introduced 
first since historically, it was also the first one to evolve.  
 
1. NEO-FUNCTIONALISM 
 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION IS THE PROCESS WHEREBY POLITICAL ACTORS IN SEVERAL 
DISTINCT NATIONAL SETTINGS ARE PERSUADED TO SHIFT THEIR LOYALTIES, 
EXPECTATIONS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES TOWARD A NEW CENTRE, WHOSE 
INSTITUTIONS POSSESS OR DEMAND JURISDICTION OVER THE PRE-EXISTING NATIONAL 
STATES. THE END RESULT OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION IS A NEW POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY, SUPERIMPOSED OVER THE PRE-EXISTING ONES.  
(HAAS, 1968: 16)  
 
Neo-functionalism is based on the work of Ernst Haas, who used this definition of 
political integration as a process in his theories. This process emerges from a network of 
actors who pursue their interests within a political environment. It is fostered by three 
key coalition-forming mechanisms that potentially produce a growth-inducing outcome: 
spillover, actor socialization and feedback. (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970: 116ff)  
 
Spillover is defined by Lindberg (1963: 10) as a “situation in which a given action, 
related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured 
only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for 
more action and so forth.” Haas (1968: xxxiii) argued about his study on European 
integration that “the chief finding is that group pressure will spill over into the federal 
sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse.” His key argument was that through 
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the economic integration within single sectors, in this case the coal and steel sectors of 
the ECSC, significant economic benefits for the economic actors involved would be 
created. However, to maximize these economic benefits, further integration in related 
sectors of the economy must be pursued.  
 
Schmitter (1969: 162) defines spillover based on an institutional understanding of 
integration and characterizes the two commonly used dimensions of spillover:  
 
Spillover refers (…) to the process whereby members of an integration scheme – 
agreed on some collective goals (…) but unequally satisfied with their attainment of 
these goals – attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration 
in another related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by 
intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual 
commitment) or both.  
 
The number of social groups or policy sectors that are potentially involved and the 
importance of the respective policy sectors for the achievement of certain goals 
constitute the scope of commitment, which is increased by functional spillover.  It is 
important to understand that economic actors are not primarily interested in enlarging 
the scope of a supranational system; they rather see integration as means to their ends. 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 117) describe it best when they argue: 
 
In functional spillover, actors are brought in because they find that tasks are functionally 
related to one another. That is, because of the nature of the task involved, actors 
discover that they cannot do A without also doing B or perhaps C (…) 
 
It is therefore impossible to limit integration to single areas. Integration, rather, bears an 
inherent dynamic and it “was this functional dynamic or linkage mechanism that the 
concept of spillover” (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970: 118) describes.  
 
The most prevalent example made by Haas was the interpretation of the founding of the 
EEC as a spillover from the ECSC. Success and the acceptance of the ECSC are based 
on “the convergence of demands within and among the nations concerned, not by a 
pattern of identical demands.” (Haas, 1968: 286) He describes the integration process 
on a supranational level as “the expansive logic of sector integration” (Haas 1968: 
283ff) and argues that from the coal and steel sectors, expectations among interest 
groups in other areas emerged that would lead to further economic integration mainly 
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through trade liberalization but subsequently also to political parties and governments 
and other areas.  
The autonomy of functional contexts “the autonomy of functional contexts can be 
overcome by means of log-rolling and side-payments. (…) Log-rolling refers to 
bargaining exchanges within a given decision area, while side-payments involve their 
extension to other (often functionally unrelated) areas.” (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970: 
118f; see also: Schmitter, 1969: 163) 
 
The extent of commitment to mutual decision-making both in terms of continuity and in 
terms of techniques constitutes the level of commitment, which is increased through 
political spillover. Continuity refers e.g. to the obligation to meet frequently and 
evaluation mechanisms and technique refers to the supranationality of decision-modes. 
(Schmitter, 1969: 163f; see also: Falkner, 1998: 9)  
 
Political spillover is closely related to actor socialization, which describes the 
transformation of actors through constant involvement in supranational policy-making, 
as they shift their loyalties from national polity to supranational governance. The actors 
are brought closer together through joint problem solving and develop new perspectives 
for and identifications with the supranational system, regardless if they value these 
perspectives for distinct rewards or for the system itself. (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970: 
119) Loyalty in that sense is more concretely defined by Haas (1968: 5) as a necessary 
attribute for a political community that is a ”condition in which specific groups and 
individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other 
political authority (…)”  
 
So, loyalty from the level of member states is therefore shifted to loyalty to 
supranational organizations like the ECSC, EEC etc. An important consequence of elite 
socialization is that in policy-making processes, ideological reasoning fades into the 
background and more technocratic aspects would dominate international negotiations. 
However, it is especially this argument that in the light of rising French nationalism 
during the De Gaulle period contributed strongly to the decline of neo-functionalism in 
the 1960s. (Rosamond, 2005: 67)  
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Jensen (2007: 91ff) makes the distinction between socialization of the political elite and 
the formation of supranational interest groups. He pointed out that spillover and the 
forming of a political elite causes interest groups to “match this development through a 
process of reorganization, to form their own supranational organizations.”  
 
Falkner (1998: 9) extends the logic of Schmitter (1969) and argues that including his 
externalisation hypothesis would constitute geographical spillover as a third dimension 
of spillover that increases the area covered by commitment. Schmitter’s externalization 
hypothesis basically says that governance on the supranational level will create the need 
to adopt common policies vis-à-vis third parties – or, using Schmitter’s words: 
“Members will be forced to hammer out a collective external position.” (Schmitter, 
1969: 165) Enlargement of the Community and side effects of Community policies on 
non-members (notably EEA, EFTA and other countries) constitute the dimensions of 
geographical spillover. (Falkner, 1998: 9f; Schmitter, 1969: 165) 
 
It was only a few years after Haas first published 'The Uniting of Europe” that neo-
functionalist thinking was heavily challenged. Rosamond (2005: 247ff) identified three 
aspects that questioned the neo-functionalist dynamic: First it was empirical challenges 
that shook the foundations of neo-functionalism. In the mid-1960s, a new nationalism 
evolved in France under Charles De Gaulle and European institutions were boycotted 
under his rule. Political integration in Western Europe took a more cautious approach 
and slowed down considerably. Explanations were provided by Hoffmann, who argued 
that in areas of so-called high politics, functional integration was far less likely than in 
areas of so-called low politics like the economic sphere (Rosamond, 2005: 249); and 
Hansen, who argued that neo-functionalism neglected “the role of external structural 
imperatives in shaping member-state preferences in the direction of positive sum 
integration bargains.” (Rosamond 2005: 248) Haas acknowledged these arguments in 
the preface to the second edition of The Uniting of Europe, published in 1968.  
 
Second, neo-functionalist scholars engaged in self-critique as a result of the empirical 
challenges of the original neo-functional reasoning. It was even stated that the 
integration process had been reversed; a fact that is reflected by an extension of neo-
functionalist theory by theories of disintegration. (See Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) 
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Jensen (2007: 93ff) summarizes that the main set of objections were aimed at:  
 
1) The theses advanced by neo-functionalists; 
2) The theories formulated by Haas himself - Haas stated in the 1970s that 
dynamics like spillover did not manage to reflect the reality of European 
integration and that European institutions should be analyzed against the 
background of international interdependencies, and 
3) The focus of neo-functionalism on the political elite and on interest groups 
rather than on the general public (partly acknowledged by Lindberg and 
Scheingold's (1970: 119) classification of feedback as a key factor).  
With the considerably intensified progress of European integration since the late 1980s, 
neo-functionalism has seen a revival. Schmitter (2005: 264) identifies two factors that 
triggered a more rapid advancement of European integration: First, a “vague, subjective 
feeling that Europe as a whole was destined to decline in competitiveness” and second, 
“an objective demonstration by the Social Democratic government of Francois 
Mitterand that measures taken independently by national policy-makers were incapable 
of attaining desired macro-economic outcomes and could even lead to perverse 
outcomes in terms of growth and monetary stability.”  
 
On a level of theoretical advancements, Jensen (2007: 96f) specifically mentions 
contributions made by Stone Sweet and Sandholz (1998), who made the case for a 
transaction-based view of European integration that bears strong similarities with neo-
functionalism. Burley and Mattli (1993), who amongst others, pointed out that 
European integration has seen considerable progress through the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ that resembles integration as explained by neo-functionalists:  
 
The founding member states of the Community had no intention of giving the court 
supremacy over national legal systems. However, the European Court was able to 
develop its doctrine over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. (...) The Court has also 
been able to advance political integration by using technical and apolitical arguments in 
the legal area... (Jensen, 2007: 96f) 
 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
12 
In a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, renowned scholars revisited 
the legacy of Ernst Haas. There, Rosamond (2005 237ff) argues that neo-functionalism 
should be reinstated within the theories of comparative regionalism. Farell and Héritier 
(2005: 272ff) seek to do exactly that by viewing regional integration as endogenous 
institutional change, using a negotiation-centred approach.  
 
!" #$%&'(#)$*+&',-.&'*/&*+(#$0/))
 
NEO-FUNCTIONALISTS ARGUE THAT THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST IS THE 
FUNDAMENTAL FORCE UNDERLYING INTEGRATION, BUT THEY OFFERED ONLY A VAGUE 
UNDERSTANDING OF PRECISELY WHOSE THOSE INTERESTS ARE, HOW CONFLICTS AMONG 
THEM ARE RESOLVED, BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE TRANSLATED INTO POLICY, AND WHEN 
THEY REQUIRE POLITICAL INTEGRATION. THIS IN TURN REFLECTED THE LACK OF A 
GENERALISABLE MICRO-FOUNDATIONAL BASIS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT PRECONDITIONS 
ABOUT VARIATION IN SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION ACROSS ISSUES, COUNTRIES AND TIME 
(…)  
(Moravcsik, 1993: 479)  
 
The second grand theory of European integration is liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Andrew Moravcsik developed the approach in the early 1990s. Like the work of 
previous intergovernmentalists, e.g. Stanley Hoffmann, he made the case for 
intergovernmentalism as a theory of European integration and largely rejected the ideas 
of neo-functionalism.  
 
While Moravcsik claimed that his approach was not an “evaluation of – let alone a 
wholesale rejection of – neo-functionalism or any other classical theory” (Moravcsik 
1993: 513), he clearly pointed out the shortcomings of neo-functionalism. On an 
empirical level, he argued, European integration has been characterized by ups and 
downs instead of steady evolvement and uniformly stronger centralized institutions had 
not been created. On a theoretical level, neo-functionalism remained ambiguous, as it is 
dependent on embedding it into a multi-causal framework to explain European 
integration, making concrete theory testing and development impossible. Also, 
according to Moravcsik, neo-functionalism is not actor-oriented, as it relies on the 
analysis on endogenous dynamics without taking external limitations into account.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on elements of realism and liberalism 
(Rosamond, 2000: 136) and focuses on the interaction between the national and 
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supranational level. European integration is, according to liberal intergovernmentalists, 
the outcome of national preference formation creating international demand for 
integration and interstate bargaining delivering the supply of European integration. 
(Cini, 2007: 110f)  
In the tradition of liberal international relations theories, the relationship between 
government and society is a principal-agent one. Groups in society, their respective 
interests and influences on domestic policy enunciate preferences and governments 
aggregate them. Since it is a primary interest of governments to remain in office, they 
are required to gain the support of these domestic groups by acting on their favourable 
preferences. A set of national interests is formed and it is this set that national 
governments bring to the bargaining table of supranational negotiations. The underlying 
factor for the demand for integration is therefore pressure from domestic societal actors 
as represented in political institutions. (Moravcsik, 1993: 484f)  
 
Supranational bargaining takes place because countries, based on the principle of 
comparative advantage, draw benefits out of economic interdependence and free flow of 
goods and services amongst them. International policy externalities are being created 
when policies of a government affect societal actors in other countries by producing 
costs and benefits for them. When these externalities play a role in reaching domestic 
policy goals, interdependencies and policy externalities are created. The main 
motivation for national governments to engage in supranational negotiations is then for 
negotiations to enable them to reach domestic policy goals. Often this is not the case 
when positive externalities occur, but rather with negative economic policy 
externalities. Protectionist measures like customs shall be mentioned here as the most 
important example as they directly influence policy goals of other countries. 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 486) 
 
Market liberalization and policy harmonization can be identified as the two main 
purposes for policy-coordination in the European Union. Respectively, Moravcsik 
identifies three categories based on policy objectives: Liberalization of the exchange of 
private goods and services, provision of socio-economic collective goods and provision 
of non-economic collective goods. In each three of these cases, “the magnitude, 
distribution and certainty of net expected costs and benefits to private groups (...) 
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predict policy preferences of governments, as well as their range of relative autonomy 
vis-à-vis those domestic groups that oppose cooperation.” (Moravcsik, 1993: 488) In 
this way, national preferences reflecting the demand for European integration are 
formed. 
 
EU decisions are viewed as a bargaining game over terms of co-operation. When 
negotiating a policy on a supranational level, governments collectively select a common 
policy. The selection has distributional consequences and governments are rarely 
completely indifferent between the available options. Negotiations are therefore a 
reconciliation of conflicting interests. Each government is bargaining for outcomes – to 
understand this process it is necessary to understand the factors that account for the 
relative power. The underlying factors on the supply side of European integration are 
rather political than societal like on the demand side and are influenced by bargaining 
power and the intensity of national preferences. This view is largely based on 
intergovernmentalist theories of interstate relations. (Cini, 2007: 111)  
 
For the prediction of outcomes, Moravcsik (1993: 500ff) places three assumptions: 
First, that cooperation between states in the EU is voluntary; second, that information 
deficits hardly exist; third, that transaction costs of bargaining are relatively low. Under 
these assumptions, conflicting viewpoints are resolved Pareto-optimally. Given these 
assumptions, interstate bargaining power according to Moravcsik (1993: 502ff) is 
visible in three aspects:  
 
1) Unilateral alternatives and threats of non-agreement 
In order to accept a negotiated agreement, governments make sure that it is more 
beneficial than the best viable alternative to it. “The simple, but credible threat of non-
agreement – to reject cooperation in favour of a superior alternative – provides national 
governments with their most fundamental form of bargaining power.” Usually, this 
requires finding compromises with those governments who act in the least complaisant 
way and leads to agreements being decided upon on a lowest common denominator 
basis.  
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2) Alternative coalitions and the threat of exclusion 
This approach is used when the alternatives to an agreement do not only comprise 
unilateral policies but multilateral options that are defined by the exclusion of certain 
member states. “The existence of opportunities to form attractive alternative coalitions 
(or deepen existing ones), while excluding other parties, strengthens the bargaining 
power of potential coalition members vis-à-vis those threatened with exclusion.” There 
is a tendency that large states acquire more profits since their participation in an 
agreement is more likely to be necessary than smaller member states. This approach can 
be seen as powerful since countries, which are worse off than the status quo by 
accepting an agreement might be even worse off if they are excluded from a multilateral 
agreement between other member states. Then, negative policy externalities are being 
created. Positive externalities, however, are possible in the same way. According to 
Moravcsik, this also helps to explain the geographical enlargement of the EU since 
countries that see negative policy externalities seem more likely to join the Union than 
countries that see positive policy externalities.  
 
 
3) Compromise, side payments and linkage at the margin 
Liberal Intergovernmentalists, like Neo-Functionalists, see the linkage of policy-making 
areas as defined by political spillover, as essential in the bargaining process. Whereas in 
neo-functionalism this resembles a core concept (see above), Liberal 
Intergovernmentalists point out that logrolling and side payments are a strategy that is 
best pursued on the margin. Also, linkages are seen as a “politically costly, second-best 
strategy for integration.” Integration is viewed as a zero-sum game, although it is 
somewhat accepted that occasionally positive-sum outcomes can occur. (Cini, 2007: 
111) Moravcsik (1993: 504ff) sees the limitation of linkage strategies mainly with 
domestic distributional consequences and makes a number of assumptions: 
 
a) The less intense preferences of domestic actors are, the more likely linkages 
occur. Thus, issues seen as minor are more likely to be sacrificed. 
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b) In the final stage of bargaining, linkages are most likely to occur. They 
balance gains and losses amongst issues where most parties experience 
moderate gains. 
c) The more closely related issues are, the more likely linkages occur. Linkages 
between disparate sectors only occur when compromises on a single issue or 
linkages between related issues failed.  
d) Linkages for sectors where large losses on domestic groups are being 
decided upon are likely to occur if they are accompanied by domestic side-
payments to those groups.  
Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a two-step model: Interstate bargaining follows 
national preference formation. Later, institutional choice was added as what can be seen 
as third step. Therein, the motivations for governments to delegate or pool decisions in 
international institutions are analyzed. (Laursen, 1995: 13) Indeed, Moravcsik (1998: 
3f) argued that European institutions are set up to make interstate bargaining more 
efficient:  
 
To secure the substantive bargains they had made (...) governments delegated and 
pooled sovereignty in international institutions for the express purpose of committing 
one another to cooperate.  
 
One of the main arguments of liberal intergovernmentalism is that supranational 
institutions actually strengthen the power of national governments. They do so in two 
ways: First, by increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining through providing a 
framework of negotiation forums, decision-making procedures etc., and second, by 
those institutions strengthening domestic agenda-setting power. By increasing the 
legitimacy of common policies, the Community structures a two-level game, where the 
autonomy and initiative of the domestic political elite is strengthened. (Moravcsik, 
1993: 507)  
 
Like neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism has also been subject to criticism. 
Cini (2007: 112f) sums up three major points: First, that Moravcsik had been too 
selective when attempting to demonstrate the validity of liberal intergovernmentalism 
by only applying it to cases where it would inevitably prove correct, i.e. cases where 
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decisions were taken unanimously and economic integration was the main focus. Hence, 
liberal intergovernmentalism is often seen as being suitable for explaining e.g. major 
Treaty changes but less suitable for explaining day-to-day politics on the community 
level. Second, and probably most important, is that liberal intergovernmentalism 
“understates the constraints faced by key policy-makers” (Cini, 2007: 113) through 
both focussing on the more formal aspects of decision-making on the European level 
and neglecting and through understating the role that the ECJ and the Commission as 
supranational actors play within the process of European integration. Nugent (1999: 
510f) argues:  
 
Moravcsik’s portrayal of the Commission as exercising a role of little more than a 
facilitator in respect of significant decision-making has attracted particular criticism, 
with numerous empirically-based studies claiming to show that the Commission does 
exercise an independent and influential decision-making role, be it as (…) an 
animateur, a policy entrepreneur or a motor force.  
 
Finally, Moravcsik’s view of the state is seen as too narrow, as his conception of 
determining government preferences are based mainly on economic interests and the 
two-level game liberal intergovernmentalism suggests would not fit the Community’s 
multi-level polity.  
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WHEREAS SUSTAINABILITY IS MULTI-FACETED, EACH OF THE FISHERY PARADIGMS 
PRESENTED HERE IS UNI-DIMENSIONAL, TYPICALLY FOCUSED ON JUST ONE 
COMPONENT OF SUSTAINABILITY. WE CAN DRAW THE KEY CONCLUSION THAT AN 
OVEREMPHASIS IN POLICY FORMULATION ON ANY SINGLE PARADIGM WILL LIKELY 
LEAD TO AN UNSTUSTAINABLE FISHERY. 
(CHARLES, 1992: 393) 
 
Fisheries policy discussions have to be understood as interactions between actors with 
different sets of preferences. Charles (1992) argued that due to the limited possibility of 
increasing sustainable benefits through increasing production because of the nature of 
the resource, efficiency and allocation decisions are the only available fisheries policy 
tools, which are by nature of a very philosophical nature. The three fundamental 
objectives of the CFP represent three extreme viewpoints of underlying systematic 
priorities in this philosophical debate since each paradigm has its policy prescriptions. 
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Arranged in a triangle, they can be defined as the conservation paradigm, the 
rationalization paradigm and the social/community paradigm.  
 
The conversation paradigm is based in the belief that fisheries management is primarily 
used to take care of the fish. Fishermen act in their interest and conservation policy is 
necessary to ensure long-term sustainability of the business. The conversation paradigm 
emphasises biological studies aimed at ensuring the sustainable capacity of fish stocks. 
It therefore has a tradition among scientists and some decision-makers:   
 
The historical prevalence of this paradigm (…) is due in large part to a rare consensus 
recognizing (in words if not always in deeds) the obvious dependence of fisheries and 
fishing industry livelihoods on the state of fish stocks. (Charles, 1992: 384) 
 
Actors supporting the conversation paradigm usually use arguments complementing the 
Tragedy of the Commons described in the next chapter. They usually focus on the state 
of the stocks and their maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The MSY is characterized by 
a specific size in catch and stock population. The graph below shows the annual growth 
of a stock as a function of the stock’s population size. At any point on the function, the 
catch possibilities for the subsequent year remain intact. The graph clearly indicates that 
a small population results in a smaller growth rate. A very large population, however, 
will have the same effect, since the stock is then close to carrying capacity. This is the 
result when no fish at all is being caught. The MSY is the point on the function with the 
highest growth rate and population size. There, the material flow is the highest possible 
without jeopardising nest year’s catch. (Hegland, 2004: 47)  
 
 
Figure 2: Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), Source: fao.org 
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The rationalization paradigm focuses on wealth generation and a maximization of 
fishery rents. With the advance of neo-liberalism it has gained support amongst 
biologists and fisheries managers who claim that rationalization could serve both 
conservationist goals as well as the industry striving for increased economic efficiency. 
(Charles, 1992: 385) However, they differ from advocates of the conservation paradigm 
by seeing conservation from an economical rather than biological perspective and 
therefore focus on fishing at the resource’s maximum economic yield (MEY). In the 
simplified graph below depicting catch cost and value and fishing effort, it is visible that 
the surplus profit is the largest at MEY, the area where the difference between total 
revenue and total cost is the largest. The concept of MEY focuses on economic aspects 
rather than biological ones. (Hegland, 2004: 49) 
 
Figure 3: Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), source: fao.org 
 
The social/community paradigm focuses on fishing communities, distributional equity 
and general social and cultural fisheries benefits. It emphasizes on the fishers as 
members of coastal communities rather than individualistic firms (like the 
rationalization paradigm) or parts of a fleet (like the conservation paradigm):   
 
There is often a strong ‘advocacy’ element in this paradigm, seeking to protect the 
‘small’ fishers who are seen as being buffeted by economic forces beyond their control 
(…) (Charles, 1992: 385)  
 
For actors arguing along the lines of this paradigm, biological and economical 
considerations are of less importance than social considerations.  
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RUIN IS THE DESTINATION TOWARD WHICH ALL MEN RUSH, EACH PURSUING HIS 
OWN BEST INTEREST IN A SOCIETY THAT BELIEVES IN THE FREEDOM OF THE 
COMMONS. FREEDOM IN A COMMONS BRINGS RUIN TO ALL (…) MARITIME 
NATIONS STILL RESPOND AUTOMATICALLY TO THE SHIBBOLETH OF THE “FREEDOM 
OF THE SEAS.” PROFESSING TO BELIEVE IN THE “INEXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES OF 
THE OCEANS,” THEY BRING SPECIES AFTER SPECIES OF FISH AND WHALES CLOSER 
TO EXTINCTION. 
(HARDIN, 1968: 1244) 
 
After looking at the structural and sector level, the economics of the specific nature of 
the resource focus on behaviour of individual actors. Fish, per definition, is a common-
pool resource. And such a resource, per definition, is characterized by rivalry and non-
excludability. The classification of goods and services in terms of rivalry and 
excludability is made by Musgrave (1959), who debated the provision of public goods 
in his treatise on the theory of public finance.  
 
Non-excludability means that no individual can be excluded from the consumption of 
such a good. Every individual can theoretically argue to the same degree as another that 
the total supply and the benefit of that supply would not change significantly whether he 
had made a contribution or not. Market failure is therefore a possible consequence if 
collective action is not involved in the governance of non-excludable goods. To 
illustrate this criterion with an important example: national defence is a service where 
individuals cannot be excluded from benefiting or losing from it.  
 
The line between excludability and non-excludability cannot be drawn easily since in 
many situations, excludability is possible, but the cost of it is significant. In other cases, 
where excludability can be achieved at the cost of zero, the problem of weighing the 
gains from exclusion against the costs arises would again enforce preference revelation. 
Musgrave draws the conclusion that “exclusion technology is thus a factor in deciding 
what costs should be internalized. At the margin, the cost of internalizing should be 
equated with the gain in consumer surplus which results therefrom.“ (Musgrave, 1969: 
44) 
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Common-pool resources are also defined by the characteristics of rivalry. A priori, 
according to Musgrave (1969: 43), these types of goods are “defined as goods, the 
benefits from which are such that A’s partaking therein does not interfere with the 
benefits derived by B“. Non-rivalry in consumption means therefore that the same 
output can be enjoyed by consumer A and B at the same time. This is also called the 
existence of beneficial consumption externalities.  
 
It shall be noted that the condition of non-rivalry does not imply that the same 
subjective benefit is derived from the supply. To explain this statement, a few specific 
examples shall be provided: A and B can both enjoy the services of police or national 
defence independent of each other. However, the proximity of A to a police station 
might differ from the proximity of B to a police station and therefore alter service 
quality. An interesting aspect of the criteria of non-rivalry is that the cost to be paid by A 
is less the more is paid by B and, most important, the more consumers participate. The 
implication is that with increasing demand, the price level actually decreases. Therefore, 
in case of a non-rivalous good, it is beneficial for each consumer to have more 
individuals demanding the same goods and services as him or her. 
 
Goods, where the conditions of rivalry and non-excludability are given, are called 
private goods and can be allocated effectively by markets. For all other good types, 
collective action is required to maximize the efficient allocation of resources. Non-rival, 
excludable goods are often characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs 
which leads to inefficient competitions and monopolies. Non-rival, non-excludable 
goods are called public goods, where the free-rider problem is prevalent and positive 
externalities occur that lead to underproduction. Rivalous, non-excludable goods are 
defined as common-pool resources. Given the above logic, the results are negative 
externalities that lead to overconsumption.  
 
Hardin (1968: 1243ff) was the first to conceptualize common-pool resources. It is the 
first of three influential models identified by Ostrom (1990: 2) that can be seen as a 
starting point of today's research on common goods. Hardin describes the implications 
of the characteristics of common-pool resources as explained above as the tragedy of 
the commons. It has become a synonym for the consequences of scarce environmental 
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resources being used by many individuals in common. Harding used the example of a 
rational herder, who derives a benefit directly from his own animals and only suffers 
delayed costs from the overuse of farmland through overgrazing. To maximize his or 
her gains, each herder faces utility with a positive and a negative component:  
 
The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the 
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive 
utility is nearly +1. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing 
created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all 
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
(Hardin, 1968: 1243) 
 
The result is overconsumption of a common-pool resource leading to their extinction. In 
a larger, philosophical context Hardin (1968: 1244) concludes:  
 
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – 
in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.  
 
Hardin's solution is coercion that is mutually agreed upon. Dietz et al (2002: 11) point 
out that the implication of that has two major shortcomings: First, that it is suggested 
that effective rules cannot be created by internalized norms or obligations in users of a 
resource. Second, the conclusion that agreements have to be reached on the level of 
national governments, implying that private actors and local governments are unable to 
introduce governance that prevents the Tragedy: “If ruin is to be avoided in a crowded 
world, people must be responsive to a coercive force outside their individual psyches, a 
'Leviathan', to use Hobbes's term.“ (Hardin, 1978: 314 in Ostrom, 1990: 9) 
       
The second model mentioned by Ostrom (1990: 3) is Game Theory. Game Theory can 
be of relevance for policy analysis when modelling common-pool resource related 
situations. Even though this section can just give a brief introduction to this topic, 
policy questions for the organization of more general and more complex systems can be 
addressed.   
 
Modelling Hardin's concept results in a classical prisoner's dilemma, demonstrating that 
assuming all individuals act rationally, collectively unfavourable outcomes are being 
reached. If, using Hardin's example, L is the maximum number of animals that can 
graze on a meadow then, in a two-person-game, the dominant strategy is defecting, thus 
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not limiting the number of animals, because if both players cooperate by limiting their 
number of animals to L/2, they both obtain 10 units profit but if one cooperates, he or 
she receives 11 units whereas the other one receives -1. If both defect, the profit equals 
zero. The equilibrium is Pareto-inferior. This outcome relies, however, on the two actors 
not being able to communicate and on the game being a one-shot game without 
repetition. Using the possibilities for communication, sanctioning or repetition can 
result in overcoming the dilemma; these cases shall be discussed later on in this section.  
 
Falk et al (2002: 157ff) argued that in this standard common-pool resource game, the 
aggregate behaviour is basically characterized by the Selfish Nash equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium in Game Theory is „any pair of strategies with the property that each 
player maximizes his or her own payoff given what the other player does.“ (Ostrom et 
al, 1994: 54)  
 
Falk et al (2002: 157) define the respective proposition: „If all players have purely 
selfish preferences, the unique Nash equilibrium is symmetric (...)“. This represents 
Hardin's argument explained above. The situation is Pareto inferior since an outcome 
where both players would be better off is not chosen.  
The Pareto criterion is a good example of group rationality. Invisible Hand doctrines say 
that there is in principal no conflict between individual and group rationality. The 
prisoner's dilemma is counterexample to such doctrines. It is exactly this 
counterexample that, depending on circumstances, can be found when analyzing all 
types of goods and services classified as common goods.  
 
Falk et al (2002: 158) argue, that when there is the possibility for individuals to sanction 
each other and when there is communication allowed, the prospects for cooperative 
behaviour are strongly increased. This is due to the fact that a framework needs to be 
used that takes into account that the model of „human behaviour extends the standard 
rational choice approach and incorporates preferences for reciprocity and equity. (...) 
The model shows that when the members of a group have a preference for reciprocity or 
equity, the common-pool resource problem is transformed into a coordination game 
with efficient and inefficient equilibria.“ (Falk et al, 2002: 158) 
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Reciprocity and fairness are important determinants of human behaviour. Fairness is 
represented by inequity aversion, or best described as the desire of individuals for 
creating outcomes that are seen as equitable. Still, all fairness theories analyzed by Falk 
et al (2002) are rational choice theories because they assume that individuals act 
rationally. Given that efficient outcomes are more likely when communication and 
sanctions are possible, it implies that individuals act rationally because interdependent 
preferences produce better outcomes.  
 
Assuming the existence of inequity-averse subjects, Falk et al (2002: 167ff) found that 
in a symmetric equilibrium with inequity-averse subjects, one selfish player is enough 
for the outcome to represent the Nash equilibrium. In the asymmetric case, it takes more 
than half of the people to be non-selfish and to have “a rather high utility loss from 
advantageous inequality compared to their loss in utility that derives from 
disadvantageous inequality.“ Ostrom et al (1994) confirm that the appropriation levels 
in an empirically repeated common-pool resource game are indeed close to the Nash 
equilibrium, which therefore explains aggregate behaviour rather well.   
 
In an example of sanctioning opportunities, where in an experimental setting after each 
round, individuals receive data on other individuals' appropriation decisions, they can 
decide to sanction other players. However, this is only possible at a certain cost: 
“Because sanctioning is costly and utility depends only on their (the individuals') own 
material payoff, sanctioning is equivalent to throwing away money.“ (Falk, 2002: 170) 
 
In the examples of frequent common-pool resource games, a one-shot game is assumed. 
Games would be only played exactly once.  Reality, however, often reflects repeated 
games being played more than once, which creates additional complexities. One of 
these complexities is the proliferation of strategies. Since a strategy is basically a 
comprehensive plan of a common-pool resource game, each player does, when a game 
is played twice, not only have two strategies to chose from like in the case of the classic 
prisoner's dilemma game but actually 32. Player 1, for instance, has to decide what to 
play not only in the first round but also in the second round. His or her plan for the 
second round has to take four different contingent outcomes preceding the second shot 
into account. Options are developed for the case that the game is in disequilibrium after 
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the first round. Strategies for repeated games can be conditional or unconditional. In an 
unconditional game, the same strategy is played regardless of the outcome of previous 
rounds. Conditional strategies differ considerably. A known example for the prisoner's 
dilemma game is the tit-for-tat strategy. 
 
The tit-for-tat strategy is an example for a trigger strategy, where a player plays one way 
in a one-shot game unless the other player plays something different. If the latter occurs, 
it triggers player 1 to play a different strategy in the next round. Trigger strategies play a 
crucial role in sustaining cooperation throughout repeated games. This is the content of 
the Folk Theorem. The Folk Theorem presents the basic argument for repetition in 
common-pool resource games being theoretically capable of overcoming a common-
pool resource prisoner's dilemma:  
 
Viewing the game as finitely repeated, the standard game theory prediction is that 
individuals will repeat the equilibrium of the one-shot game. Viewing the game as 
infinitely repeated, the standard game theory prediction is embodied in the Folk 
Theorem. This basic result shows that sufficiently patient appropriators may adopt 
strategies that do not improve joint outcomes. (Ostrom, 1994: 17)  
 
Although simple game theoretical concepts enable us to address many of the policy 
questions associated with common-pool resources, other aspects have been found in 
empirical studies that these concepts fail to address: “Among these are bounded 
rationality on the part of the players, payoffs not captured by the game model or 
complicated attitudes toward risk.“ (Ostrom, 1994: 73) 
 
For common goods, the third conceptualization mentioned by Ostrom is the logic of 
collective action. This is a theory developed by Olson (1971) that connects economics 
with political science, challenging the view that if everybody in a group has the same 
interests, they will act collectively to achieve that; and that in a democratic 
environment, the biggest fear is a dictate of the majority. He points out that when trying 
to manage public goods collectively, i.e. goods characterized by non-excludability and 
non-rivalry, a free rider problem is created, which increasingly grows with the size of 
the group having the same interests. However, since this solely concerns public goods 
and not common-pool resources, this is just referred to here briefly for the sake of 
completeness.  
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3. THE ROAD TO THE FIRST COMMON FISHERIES POLICY: 
1957-1970  
 
WELL BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SUBSIDIARITY, COMMISSION MEMBERS AND OFFICIALS OFTEN BEHAVED AS POLICY 
ENTREPRENEURS IN SEARCH OF NEW POWERS. AS RAYMOND SIMONNET [FORMER 
OFFICIAL IN THE DG AGRICULTURE] POINTED OUT, ‘OUR STATE OF MIND IN 
BRUSSELS WAS MAINLY TO GET STATES TO GIVE WAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
NEW POLICY.’ 
(LEQUESNE, 2004: 19) 
 
To understand the evolution of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP), one must look at the 
situation of international fisheries management 
before the first CFP was adopted, especially in 
respect of the jurisdiction of coastal states over 
their fishing zones. 
Until the end of World War II, open access to 
fishing grounds on the high seas with little or no 
regulation on fisheries management or 
conservation was the rule. Deriving from the 
cannon-shot rule developed by Cornelius van 
Bynkershoek in the 18th century, the zones of 
jurisdiction for coastal states used to be a narrow 
3-miles band off the respective coastlines – 
approximately the distance a cannon could fire 
from the shore. (Walker, 1945: 210ff) 
 
The first steps away from open access were taken through international conventions, 
such as the European Fisheries Convention of 1964, under which signatory countries 
were able to restrict access to waters up to twelve nautical miles off their costal base 
lines. Within a zone from six to twelve miles offshore, vessels of other signatories were 
allowed to access waters providing that they demonstrated the existence of historical 
fishing activity in areas in question. Besides the European Fisheries Convention, 
unilateral actions by Iceland and Norway to extend their fishing zones to 12 miles 
proved to be a catalyst for the further evolvement of international fisheries management.  
THE FIRST COMMON FISHERIES POLICY  
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Figure 4: Summary of important facts on the 
first Common Fisheries Policy 
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The first large-scale attempt to regulate fisheries on the high seas was made in 1949 
when the first international convention, the International Convention for the North West 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was signed. Signatories to the convention established a 
commission, which was able to give recommendations that could become binding upon 
all contracting nations accepting them. A scientific committee, open to a wide range of 
participants, served as an advisory organ to the commission. Farnell and Elles (1984: 5) 
see the ICNAF in the following way:  
 
The most original feature of ICNAF was its Joint Enforcement Scheme, under which 
contracting parties accepted a system of mutual inspection of their fishing vessels at sea 
at the basis for taking judicial proceedings against any of their vessel that had broken 
the agreed rules. Thus the British government, for example, committed itself to taking to 
court a British trawler that might be found by a Portuguese inspector to have been using 
too small a mesh size off the coast of Newfoundland. 
 
In 1958, eighty-six member states participated in the first United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which was the first international convention also 
addressing conservation of living resources of the high seas, the continental shelf, the 
territorial sea and the contiguous zones. In 1959 the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention (NEAFC) was signed as the North East Atlantic counterpart to the INCAF. 
Although UNCLOS I is considered an important step in the development of 
international law of the sea, neither UNCLOS, ICNAF or NEAFC were very successful 
in the management of fish stocks. (ibd.)  
 
On the level of the European Community, the basis for the Common Fisheries Policy 
was already established in the Treaty of Rome, regarding the area of agriculture. Article 
38 (1) EEC on the Common Agricultural Policy states: 
 
The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. 
Agricultural products mean the products of the soil, of stock farming and of fisheries 
and products of first stage processing directly relating to these products.  
 
This section is in fact the only time fisheries are referred to in the whole document. But 
as a part of agriculture, the same provisions that authorized the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in the Treaty, Articles 38 – 47 EEC, also authorized a Common Fisheries 
Policy. On first glance, it seems logical to include fisheries as part of agriculture, since 
fishing is also part of the primary economic sector. Moreover, agriculture and fisheries 
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both share a strong dependence on nature. Contrary to agricultural goods, however, fish 
is a common-pool resource. It is questionable if the drafters of the Treaty had taken this 
characteristic into account. The author of this paper has neither found a single source 
that explained why fisheries were included in the Treaty at all, nor why fisheries were 
included under the agricultural heading.  
 
The main objectives of the CAP set out in Article 39 (1) EEC are quite specific:  
 
a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the 
factors of production, in particular labour 
b) this to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community (…) 
c) to stabilize markets 
d) to assure the availability of supplies 
e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices 
 
These objectives clearly appear to have been set with agriculture in mind. When 
applying them to the fisheries sector, considerable difficulties arise, due to the classified 
nature of fish as a common-pool resource. Churchill (1987: 24) elaborates on potential 
conflicts:  
 
Take objective a), for example. Productivity in fisheries, in the sense of increasing the 
catch per vessel, can certainly be increased. This can be done in the short term by 
reducing the number of fishing vessels operating. It can also be done in the longer term 
by building up depleted fish stocks; but measures to build up stocks may result in a 
temporary decline in existing productivity. Which method of increasing productivity 
does Article 39 have in mind (…)? Put another way, does ‘rational’ (…) refer to 
biological rationality or economic rationality (…)? If the emphasis in objective a) is 
biological rationality, then the objective in b) – a fair standard of living for fishermen – 
may not be met. On the other hand, if the objective is economic rationality, it is likely 
that only certain fishermen will enjoy a fair standard of living. 
 
Similar problems arise through the objective of promoting of technical progress, which 
has lead to overfishing and hence reduced productivity. Reconciling objectives d) and e) 
is similarly difficult given the natural fluctuation in fish stocks and proper resource 
conservation measures2.  
 
When looking at Article 39 EEC, one has to bear in mind that resource conservation at 
the time of the drafting of the EEC Treaty was not an issue. Neither had any of the fish 
                                                
2 For a more detailed discussion of Articles 38-47 and its implications for fisheries see Churchill (1987: 23ff). 
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stocks in the waters of the Six collapsed or even declined due to overfishing nor, as 
described above, was the area of jurisdiction of coastal Member States of considerable 
size. From this point of view it is understandable that resource management in the 
fisheries sector was not an important issue at the time. Generally, EEC member states 
“appeared to be in little hurry” (Farnell & Elles, 1984: 10) to implement a common 
policy on fisheries long after agreement on the CAP was reached in 1960. The Treaty, 
however, gave the Six some time since Article 40 (1) EEC on the development of the 
CAP stipulated 31 December 1969 as deadline.   
 
Preceding the first CFP were widely differing ways for countries to regulate market 
access, market organization, subsidies and resource management throughout the sector 
in the Community, which had only been involved in fisheries through the creation of a 
customs union. The then new Common Customs Tariff (CCT) for fisheries was low 
compared to tariffs that some member states upheld to protect their domestic fisheries 
sector. As a result, fisheries became subject to supranational politicizing for the first 
time: Whereas Germany3 or the Netherlands already had a modern and well organized 
fishing sector and saw the opportunity to profit off trade liberalization, France saw its 
industries exposed to greater competition and felt pressured to modernize their fleets 
and on-shore infrastructure. Indeed, the consequences of the progressive establishment 
of the customs union and tariff reductions in GATT created a new demand for complex, 
new policies for the sector.  
 
Prior to the application of the CCT, both price levels of and import tariffs for fisheries 
products in France had been the highest in the Community. Rapidly rising imports 
prompted the French government to demand a Common Market Organization for 
fisheries products on Community level. France’s main objective was similar to the 
CAP; they wished to channel funds to the French industry. (Wise, 1984: 88) In 1966, 
officials within the DG Agriculture, prompted by these developments, formulated the 
first proposal for a Common Fisheries Policy in a document titled Bericht über die Lage 
der Fischereiwirtschaft in den Mitgliedsstaaten der EWG und Grundsätze für eine 
gemeinsame Politik. (COM (66)250 final) This document, according to Lequesne (2004: 
18) “drafted principally owing to a French official at the fisheries administration 
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temporarily assigned to the Commission, Raymond Simonnet”, called for common 
actions resulting from the principle of non-discrimination in the areas of structural, 
market, trade and social policy.  
 
In the Council negotiations on the CFP, two main conflicts emerged, regarding the 
objectives of a Common Fisheries Policy and the principle of equal access. Indeed, the 
interests of the Six were very divergent. France’s primary objective, also supported by 
Italy, was, with the help of aid from the EEC to be able to modernize its salt cod and 
tuna fleets that could not withstand trade liberalization and technological advances. 
Additionally, the two countries demanded a structural policy that would use community 
funding to develop infrastructure, as well as a common market organization supporting 
price levels and securing income for producers.  This would have required heavy 
interventions in the market, financed by the Community.  
Germany and the Netherlands, on the other hand, not only had a fisheries sector that 
coped well with trade liberalization, but also already modern distant water fleets and a 
politically liberal laissez-faire ethics that, together with a fairly narrow coast line, led to 
opposition to France's and Italy's demands. “Germany, supported by Belgium and the 
Netherlands, preferred a structural policy limited to coordinating national measures, to 
ensure fair competition, rather than one whose main element was the provision of 
financial aid by the Community.” (Leigh, 1983: 28) Germany feared that it would have 
to contribute the most to the policy but would profit the least off it: “The German 
government was not at all in favour of a common organization of the markets that could 
possibly put a damper on its dynamic processing industry. As main contributor to the 
Community budget, nor did it want to support its competitors through a structural 
policy.” (Lequesne, 2004: 19)  
 
For years, progress was blocked in the Council through the practice of the Luxembourg 
Compromise, an informal agreement according to which the Commission would 
postpone a decision subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) when crucial national 
interests were perceived to be under threat. That means that although adoption of 
measures under Article 43 EEC on the CAP and Article 7 EEC on non-discrimination de 
jure only required a qualified majority, de facto it was unanimous agreement that was 
                                                                                                                                          
3 Pre-1990 mentioning of Germany always refers to West Germany.   
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necessary. In the end, France and Italy renounced the systematic financing of all 
withdrawals of fish products through the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which led the German and Dutch delegation to agree to a 
compromise which was not an outright victory for either side since Germany and the 
Netherlands agreed to structural aid (although in a smaller scope than what France had 
aimed for) whereas France and Italy accepted the equal access principle.  (Wise, 1984: 
89; Leigh, 1983: 32) 
 
The agreement on the provisions of the first Common Fisheries Policy was reached on 
30 June 1970, only hours before the negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and 
the United Kingdom about accession to the Community began. (Leigh, 1983: 37) It was 
the prospect of negotiations with these countries that put the Six under pressure to reach 
an agreement. A communiqué issued upon the conclusion of the 1969 Hague Summit 
made clear on which terms the negotiations with the prospective member states would 
be held:  
 
Inasmuch as the candidate States accept the treaties and their political finality, the 
decisions taken since the entry into force of the treaties and the choices made in the field 
of development, the Heads of State and government have given their agreement to the 
opening of a negotiation between the Community, on the one hand, and the candidate 
states, on the other hand. (Kitzinger, 1973: 69) 
 
Therefore, the candidate countries had to accept the acquis communautaire as of the 
start of the negotiations. In case of the Common Fisheries Policy, it meant that if no 
agreement had been reached before the opening of the negotiations with Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway and the UK. Those countries would have been provided with the 
opportunity to, ultimately, manipulate the aquis commuautaire in their favour. Leigh 
(1983: 38f) argues that the Six wanted to prevent such a scenario:  
 
A CFP that took into account the interests of the four candidates would have been less 
favourable to the original members of the Community. While the interests of the Four 
were not identical, they shared certain objectives arising from their possession of far 
richer coastal fishing grounds than the Six. Numerous coastal communities in the Four 
were primarily dependent on inshore fishing; their governments wished to negotiate for 
a CFP that reduced to a minimum the activities in these areas. While the Six also had 
coastal communities that sought protection for their fishing grounds, their major interest 
was to secure access rights to the rich fishing grounds off the coasts of Norway, the UK, 
Ireland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.   
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The agreement, codified in Council Regulations (EEC) 2141/70 of 20 October 1970 
laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry and 2142/70 on the 
common organization of the market in fishery products, established the first two of the 
four pillars of today’s EU Common Fisheries Policy4: the Structural Policy and a 
Common Market Organization. 
 
The Common Structural Policy was established with regulation 2141/70. Its aim is, 
according to Article 1 of the regulation, to 
 
(…) Promote harmonious and balanced development of this industry within the 
general economy and to encourage rational use of the biological resources of the sea 
and of inland waters. 
 
 
Article 2(1), the equal access provision, is the most crucial but was also the most 
controversial one: 
 
Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing in the maritime waters 
coming under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction shall not lead to differences in 
treatment of other Member States. Member States shall ensure in particular equal 
conditions of access to and use of the fishing grounds situated in the waters referred 
to in the preceding subparagraph for all fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member 
State and registered in Community territory. 
 
Article 2 (1) thereby provides that Member States’ legislation governing fisheries in the 
waters within their jurisdictions have to be non-discriminatory. Furthermore, it states 
that access to these waters cannot be restricted on grounds of nationality. This article 
essentially translated the principle of non-discrimination among Member States as 
introduced by the Treaty of Rome into the fisheries sector. One controversial question 
regarding the equal access provision had been if it actually had a legal basis in the EEC 
Treaty. Regulation 2141/70 cited, additionally to articles 42 and 43 of the EEC Treaty 
on the adoption of a Common Agricultural Policy and the granting of aid, also Articles 7 
and 235. Article 7 prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality and Article 235 
gives the Community authority to take action necessary to attain the objectives of the 
Treaty where such authority is not specifically provided by the Treaty5. All mentioned 
                                                
4 using the classification by Conceição-Heldt (2004: 17f) 
5 Rules authorized by Article 7 require a qualified majority to be adopted. Article 43 basically defines an initial stage for the CAP 
during which unanimity is required, but subsequent proposals would only require a qualified majority to be adopted. In practice, 
however, the Luxembourg Compromise was frequently invoked. Rules authorized by Article 235 require unanimous agreement. For 
most fisheries legislation, however, citing Article 235 as legal basis is superfluous. 
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provisions also require the consultation of the European Parliament6.  
 
Churchill (1980: 4) goes as far as to say that it is “difficult to say that a common 
structural policy for fisheries is wholly and directly authorized by the provisions of the 
EEC Treaty (…)”, especially not by Articles 42 and 43 since the principle “does not 
easily correspond with any of the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy laid down 
in Article 39.” (Churchill, 1987: 128) France, opposing the equal access provision in 
negotiations, argued that non-discrimination in the field of fisheries would be best 
guaranteed by Articles 52 to 66 of the EEC Treaty on the freedom of establishment. 
However, Leigh (1983: 27ff) believes the following:  
 
The French knew that equal access would favour their interests. So once they had 
gained satisfaction (…) the French proved willing to abandon their legalistic defence of 
an approach based on the right of establishment and to rally to the Commission’s 
proposals. In retrospect it is also clear that the French aversion to equal access was 
mainly a negotiating ploy. (…) The decision to insert the equal access principle into the 
basic structural regulation was nonetheless a political one and not a legal obligation. 
 
Exceptions from the equal access provision were embodied in Article 4 in form of a 
five-year derogation for specific fish for a zone up to three nautical miles from the 
coastal base line in areas where the population mainly lives off coastal fisheries.  
With the Common Structural Policy, access to fishing grounds was no longer a national 
matter but from now on a supranational one. Formally, this also was the case for 
conservation matters, as stated in Article 5 of the regulation:  
 
Where there is a risk of over-fishing of certain stocks in the maritime Waters referred to 
in Article 2, of one or other Member State, the Council, acting in accordance with the 
procedure provided for in Article 43 (2) of the Treaty on a proposal from the 
Commission may adopt the necessary conversation measures. 
 
At this point it is very important to point out, however, that “the full implications of 
regulation 2141/70, Article 5 went unnoticed in 1970 because the Community did not 
yet dispose of an extended fishery zone.” (Leigh, 1983: 31) In fact, conservation 
                                                
6 Until recently, the role of the European Parliament in fisheries matters was negligible. Still in the 1980s, Churchill (1987: 35f) 
pointed out that it “cannot effectively amend or prevent the adoption of draft legislation” because the “legislative process consisted 
of lengthy negotiations between Member States at Council meetings in an attempt to resolve conflicting interests and positions, with 
the Commission acting as an honest broker by providing a succession of revised proposals aimed at achieving acceptable 
compromise.” Furthermore, some of the Community legislation on fisheries provide for further implementing action to be taken by 
the Council for which decisions are taken by qualified majority, acting on a proposal from the Commission, and most importantly 
without the requirement to consult the European Parliament (contrary to Article 43 procedure). The ECJ approved of this practice 
through the judgement in the Eridania case (ECJ judgement Case 230/78 of 27 September 1979) as long as basic elements have 
been adopted in accordance with Article 43 procedure, i.e. with consulting the European Parliament. Nonetheless, the European 
Parliament has protested against this practice. (B1-0908/84 of 16 March 1984). 
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measures under Article 5 have never been introduced. 
 
Apart from equal access and resource conservation, regulation 2141/70 provided for the 
coordination of national structural policies. It effectively implemented the financing 
rules of the CAP on the fisheries industry so that common action to achieve the aims as 
stipulated by Article 39(1) of the Treaty is eligible to be financed through the EAGGF. A 
Standing Committee for the Fishing Industry was established parallel to the Standing 
Committee on Agricultural Structures authorized by Council Regulation (EEC) 17/64.  
 
The Common Market Organization was established with Council Regulation 2141/70 
and was based on a system applying to agricultural products under the CAP. As such, 
Articles 42 and 43 EEC on the CAP solely authorized it. The main objectives included 
guaranteeing producers a certain income level and securing supply to consumers. Guide 
prices and withdrawal prices for major fish species were the means used to achieve 
these objectives. Withdrawal price is the price level of the market price below which 
producers’ organizations withdraw production from the markets. Fresh fish would then 
not be sold for consumption but processed into side products like fishmeal or oil. The 
withdrawals would be financed partly through the EAGGF, partly through producers’ 
organizations. For setting up producers’ organizations, the regulation provided that half 
the cost would be paid by the Community and the other half by the respective member 
states. Marketing standards were set and trade with third countries regulated. Various 
other measures were adopted in the regulation, mainly serving the purpose of assisting 
countries feeling disadvantaged because of trade liberalization through the CCT and 
through the provisions of regulation 2141/70 with fleet modernization.  
 
Regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70 were later repealed and adopted again as Council 
Regulations (EEC) 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy 
for the fishing industry and 100/76 on the common organization of the market in fishery 
products respectively to reference the 1973 Act of Accession.   
 
From a neo-functionalist point of view, the 1970 CFP is an example par excellence of 
how integration advanced through spillover. Economic integration in one area, namely 
the common customs union as a mean to establish the free movement of goods, led to a 
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situation where strains upon the inefficient fisheries sectors in some Member States 
created the demand for a common policy in another field. The Commission, combining 
“a sympathetic understanding of the problems confronting France’s fishermen with a 
desire to create a coherent European fisheries policy,” (Wise, 1984: 90) acknowledged 
that the difficulties brought about by market liberalization had to be answered with 
market and structural policies which harmonized conditions of competition and made it 
easier for weaker parts of the fishing sectors in the respective member states to adapt to 
liberalized markets. As such, the Commission put forward a proposal for an 
“interrelated CFP with provisions virtually touching all aspects of the fishing industry 
from the extraction of its basic natural resource to its consumption” (Wise, 1984: 107) 
that went far beyond dealing with the liberalization of markets and answering France’s 
demands for community aid for its fisheries sector. The equal access principle, for 
instance, was not only proposed by the Community in order to implement the principle 
of non-discrimination and by that to advance integration in the Community but it also is 
“the product of the idea that the liberalisation of access to fishing grounds is the quid 
pro quo for the liberalisation of trade in fisheries products and the opening up of 
national markets which has resulted from the establishment of the EEC.” (Churchill, 
1987: 132)  
The negotiations were characterized by classic Community log-rolling, where the 
Commission, as prescribed by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 93), played an active 
role by proposing package deals and so made use of its power of influence. Lequesne 
(2004: 19) also shares this view. 
 
During the negotiations, two coalitions emerged: France and Italy, who pushed for 
extensive Community financing of the common structural policy, a more protectionist 
external trade regime as well as exceptions to the equal access principle and Germany, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, who took opposite positions on these 
issues. In the end, a “classical Community compromise in which there was something 
which each government could ‘sell’ to domestic opinion as victory” (Leigh, 1983: 26) 
was achieved. Conceição-Heldt (2004) somewhat supports this view and links the 
outcome of the negotiations to their nature of integrative rather than distributive 
bargaining: A favourable outcome for all member states was reached because the two 
divergent sets of interests were converged by package deals linking two aspects of the 
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policy, the structural policy and common market organization. This supply and demand 
based view, that supranational bargaining follows national preference formation is 
essential to the idea of liberal intergovernmentalism.  
 
Applying the logic of liberal intergovernmentalism, the neo-functionalist view of the 
evolvement of the first CFP is somewhat challenged. Under liberal-intergovernmentalist 
reasoning, it is the demand for integration in the Member States that is societal rather 
than political that brings governments to the bargaining table on a supranational level. 
Exactly that was the case with the first Common Fisheries Policy: The prosperity of 
many coastal areas in France, where fishing is traditionally important, was under threat 
since its fishermen could not withstand the pressure from market liberalisation. Despite 
the fact that a deadline was given in Article 40 (1), and despite the fact that for 
agricultural goods, a common policy has been in effect for a number of years, the first 
proposal for a CFP was not made until after France demanded such a policy, which the 
country did solely with the interventionist and protectionist intention to secure 
Community funds for its fishing industry and to implement high tariff barriers for third 
countries.  
 
Looking deeper into the aspect of policy demand, or rather the lack of, Farnell and Elles 
(1984: 10) analyze that „…one reason for this indifference was the relatively minor role 
which fishing played in the economy of the original Six and its international character. 
Nearly 90 per cent of the fish produced by the original Six were taken outside what were 
then Community waters, mainly in what are now British or Norwegian waters.“ (Farnell 
& Elles, 1984: 10) While this is certainly true, Germany and the Netherlands knew that 
any type of common regime in the sector involving financial support would not benefit 
them since both countries not only, as stated above, had a competitive fishing industry 
but also because they were net contributors to the Community budget. Recalling 
Moravcsik’s (1993: 488) argument that it is the “magnitude, distribution and certainty 
of net expected costs and benefits to private groups” that are crucial for the policy 
preferences that national governments set it is easy to understand both France’s push for 
a CFP and the reluctance of most other member states to go along with it.  
 
Also, it is important to recall that the reason why the deadlock was finally overcome had 
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to do with the fear of potential negative policy externalities that might have occurred 
had the four applicant countries been given a chance to have a say in CFP negotiations. 
The fact that the agreement, which was reached literally in the last possible moment, on 
the same day that negotiations with the applicant countries started, was still somewhat 
hastened despite over four-year long negotiations, leaves serious doubt that the result 
for each Member State was more than a zero-sum outcome. Hence the only success for 
the Six was that a fait accompli was created that had to be accepted in the upcoming 
accession negotiations.  
 
Finally, one must also recognize that the Commission to a large extent failed in its role 
as policy entrepreneur in its attempt to create a true European policy for the sector. 
While the first proposal of the Commission in 1968 certainly can be classified as a 
comprehensive Common Fisheries Policy, many aspects were not adopted because they 
were sacrificed in the negotiation process (e.g. a social policy) or they were not 
supported at all by any member state.  
 
An example for the latter is the issue of resource conservation. Early proposals did 
foresee an Article 6 addressing the issue, requiring the Council to “define the principles 
and means of common action to be pursued in the sphere of international relations for 
all the problems relating to the sea and particularly those concerning access to fishing 
grounds and those of the conservation of the biological resources of the sea.” (JOCE 
C91/1 of 13 September 1968, translated and reproduced in Wise, 1984: 98) But none of 
the member states were ready to cease sovereignty on this issue. The Six argued that the 
Community had no power beyond the 12-mile limit, so resource conservation as defined 
by Article 6 would be legally impossible. The Commission, however, responded that it 
would be logical to act on Community level in international efforts to conserve fish 
stocks since the resource that the policy attempts to manage would largely come from 
waters beyond the 12-mile zone. Wise (1984: 106) regards this view taken by the Six as 
somewhat hypocritical since member states were ready to cease sovereignty on the 
access issue but not on the conservation issue and concludes: “Again one can see how 
perceptions of national interest moulded legal interpretations of the Rome Treaty!” 
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Whether the Six might have not supported such an Article 6 because they did not see 
any benefit for them or not, the limited area of jurisdiction over the seas in the late 
1960s is certainly a viable explanation for why no demand for a common policy on the 
conservation of fish stocks occurred. When discussing policy demand one also has to 
keep in mind that the reasoning behind a conservation policy is the possibility of the 
depletion of fish stocks as explained by the Tragedy of the Commons due to the 
overexploitation of the resource. In the late 1960s, however, neither has there been such 
a case of overexploitation in the waters that the Six employed as fishing grounds, nor 
has there been substantial research on the Commons – Hardin’s Article has only been 
published in 1968! In fact, as Symes (1997a: 139) pointed out, “initial moves to 
establish a common framework in the early 1970s coincided with a period when 
fisheries in the North Sea and adjacent waters were enjoying an unprecedented boom in 
stock abundance among several important food species.”  
 
While the lack of domestic demand for Community involvement in resource 
conservation has been demonstrated, the issue has probably also fallen under the radar 
because the Treaty did not pay any regard to the nature of the resource either. Instead, in 
its respective provision it emphasizes upon market management. It is therefore not 
incomprehensible why the initial stimulus for the CFP was a market issue and why 
markets were a major focus of the first CFP. In that light, Churchill (1987: 45) rightfully 
argues that “with the benefit of hindsight, looking at the whole history of the evolution 
of the Common Fisheries Policy, the wisdom of the drafters of the EEC Treaty including 
fisheries with agriculture may be doubted.” 
 
All in all, however, the general importance of the two regulations establishing the 1970 
Common Fisheries Policy is limited. Symes (1997a: 141) correctly claims that their 
significance “lay not in their detailed provisions concerning structural development and 
market organization but in defining the basic principles of a common fisheries policy 
and thus establishing an acquis communautaire that all new member states 
subsequently must adopt.”  
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4. EXTERNAL EVENTS REDEFINING THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF 
THE CFP: THE 1970S 
 
In the following decade, three major events, each 
of which shall be discussed separately, shaped 
the evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy: 
First, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
joined the Community while Norway declined 
membership following a negative referendum; 
second, Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing 
zones to 50 and later 200 nautical miles, thereby 
setting a trend in the North Atlantic; third, fish 
stocks in the North Atlantic started to deplete 
considerably.  
 
The negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, 
Norway and the United Kingdom about 
accession to the Community started on 30 June 
1970, the very day agreement on the first 
Common Fisheries Policy was reached. Given 
that this agreement took the applicant countries 
by surprise and also considering the larger relative economic importance of fisheries in 
these countries, especially in Denmark7 and Norway, it is understandable that the CFP 
became a major issue in the negotiations with the candidate countries. The nature of 
their objections to regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70, however, differed to a certain 
extent, although all candidate countries saw the equal access rule as a threat to their 
domestic fisheries sector.  
 
Opposition in Norway was the fiercest, and it is safe to say that concerns about the 
protection of coastal fisheries contributed to the negative outcome of the referendum in 
1972.  
                                                
7 Not including Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Faroe Islands did not join the EEC because of the CFP and Greenland left the 
Community in 1982 because of the same issue after a referendum in 1982.   
CFP DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1970S 
 
• ACCESSION OF DK, IRE, UK 
(1973): ACT OF ACCESSION 
TRANSFERS POWER OF 
RESOURCE CONSERVATION TO 
THE COMMUNITY (BY 1979 AT 
LATEST) 
 
• HAGUE RESOLUTION (1976): 
COMMUNITY EXTENDS FISHING 
ZONES TO 200 MILES; 
COMMITMENT TO A 
COMPREHENSIVE CFP; THIRD 
PILLAR: EXCLUSIVE 
COMMUNITY COMPETENCE TO 
ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
• THE ECJ CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY 
THROUGH SEVERAL 
JUDGEMENTS, MOST NOTABLY IN 
THE KRAMER AND IRISH 
FISHERIES CASES 
 
Figure 5: Summary of important facts on CFP 
developments in the 1970s 
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Ireland also saw its costal fisheries threatened but also saw the opportunity to modernise 
its fleets and infrastructure via the EAGGF. But Ireland's demands were modest 
compared to those of Norway and the UK, as it merely demanded exemptions from the 
equal access rule with guarantees for inshore fisheries if those exemptions were not 
permanent.  
In Denmark, however, after having secured derogations on the equal access rule for the 
Faroe Islands, Greenland and West Jutland, geographical conditions were the main 
reason why the equal access provision was not seen as a major threat.  
In the United Kingdom, first concerns about the non-existence of a conservation policy 
arose. British inshore fishermen worried that the presence of foreign vessels, which used 
finer meshed nets, would diminish inshore fish stocks. Britain therefore wanted to keep 
the 12-mile zone although this was against the acquis communitaire. (Young, 1973: 99) 
Contrary to Norway, however, the UK government insisted that fisheries politics should 
not become a cause for delaying an overall agreement with the Community, especially 
because the UK saw access to Norwegian waters as an upside of the equal access 
provision. Ultimately, however, Norway’s decision not to ratify the Accession Treaty 
deprived Britain of the benefit it expected from gaining access to Norwegian waters. 
 
The compromise, which was agreed upon by Denmark, Ireland and the UK, was 
embodied in Articles 100-103 of the Accession Treaty. Article 100 contains a ten 
yearlong derogation of the equal access principle up to six miles off the coasts of the 
Community’s member states and an extension to twelve miles in certain areas: 
 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2 of regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 on the 
establishment of a common structural policy for the fishing industry, the member states 
of the Community are authorized, until 31 December 1982, to restrict fishing in waters 
under their sovereignty or jurisdiction, situated within a limit of six nautical miles, 
calculated from the base lines of the coastal member state, to vessels which fish 
traditionally in those waters and which operate from ports in that geographical coastal 
area (…) 
2. The provisions laid down in the preceding paragraph and in Article 101 shall not 
prejudice the special fishing rights which each of the original member states and the 
new member states might have enjoyed on 31 January 1971 in regard to one or more 
other member states: The member states may exercise these rights for such time as 
derogations continue to apply in the areas concerned. (…) 
3. If a member state extends its fishing limits in certain areas to twelve nautical miles, 
the existing fishing activities within twelve nautical miles must be so pursued that there 
is no retrograde change by comparison with the situation on 31 January 1971. 
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Article 101 lists the areas in which the six miles limit specified in Article 100 is 
extended to twelve miles. It mainly concerns areas with strong, traditional coastal 
fisheries. Article 102 gives the Community the clear mandate to enforce conversation 
measures:  
 
From the sixth year after accession at the latest, the Council, acting on a proposal 
from the Commission, shall determine conditions for fishing with a view to 
ensuring protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of the biological 
resources of the sea.   
 
Article 103, a review clause, was drafted under heavy pressure from the acceding 
member states and gave them the prospect of the derogations to the equal access 
provision to be extended after 1982:  
 
Before 31 December 1982, the commission shall present a report to the council 
on the economic and social development of the coastal areas of the member states 
and the state of stocks. On the basis of that report, and of the objectives of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission, shall examine the provisions, which could follow the derogations in 
force until 31 December 1982.  
 
Furthermore, regulation 2142/70 was amended to grant producer organizations, which 
had a monopolistic stand in a countries, sole recognition and to incorporate a new 
method of calculating the withdrawal price, taking the concerns of rural areas into 
account. These provisions, however, were concessions to Norway, which ultimately 
declined ratifying the Accession Treaty. (Wise, 1984: 131f) 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Communities on 1 
January 1973. With that, the provisions of the Accession Treaty not only incorporated 
the commitment of the Community to develop the CFP into a more comprehensive 
policy but also seemed to institute the derogations regarding the equal access rule as a 
rather permanent than temporary measure. Also, the ground was paved for a common 
policy in the area of resource conservation, shifting the power from the Member States 
to the Community by 1 January 1979.  
 
Before that date, however, an unanticipated event occurred that completely changed the 
scope of fisheries management in Europe: On 15 July 1973, Iceland declared the zone 
up to 200 nautical miles from its coast to be under Icelandic authority.  
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Following Norway’s decision not to join the Community, British fishermen started to 
fish increasingly in the open seas around Iceland. Concerns about consequences for the 
Icelandic fishing industries due to resource depletion caused the Icelandic government 
to undertake this drastic measure. This also marked the start of the Third Cod War 
between Iceland and the UK. Norway followed suit and tried to work towards a 
universal creation of 200-mile fishing zones through UNCLOS. The EC, as a result, 
were unable to further develop the CFP. The war ended in 1976 with Iceland retaining 
its extended fishing zone after it threatened to close down the strategically important 
NATO-base in Keflavík. (Leigh, 1983: 65ff) 
 
The Community, being under enormous pressure to act, responded with the Council 
Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile 
fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977, generally referred to as 
the Hague Resolution. (COM(76) 500 final)8  
 
The first major aspect of this resolution is the extension of fishing zones to 200 nautical 
miles off the North Sea and North Atlantic coasts and with that the establishment of a 
link between external policy decisions and the adoption of common rules for fishing 
within the new Exclusive Economic Zone9 of the Community. The goal was to create an 
environment that made it clear to third countries that fishing in Community waters 
required forming agreements with the Community as a whole. The majority of member 
states and the Commission argued that this environment could be created without 
having reached prior agreement about the principles of a comprehensive Common 
Fisheries Policy.  
 
It was first and foremost Ireland that did not agree with that approach. Whereas all other 
member states agreed by early October 1976 that fishing rights of third countries should 
be governed on Community level by giving the Commission the power to negotiate 
agreements, Ireland sought for a wider exclusive coastal band than 12 miles. Ireland 
also demanded that when a Community-wide quota system is being introduced as 
                                                
8 Interestingly the Hague resolution was only published more than four years later in the Official Journal and the annexes, discussed 
below, have remained unpublished, but are reproduced in several cases before the ECJ.  
9 From this point on, the term Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) instead of fishing zone or waters under the jurisdiction of a state 
seems appropriate. It was defined in Part V of the third UNCLOS (1982), ratified in 1994, as an area extending 200 nm from the 
baseline, in which a costal state has the sole right to exploitation of all natural resources.  
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conservation measure, it would have to take into account that the country’s fisheries 
were still under development. Also, Ireland demanded financial assistance to set up 
control facilities for the new 200-mile-EEZ around the country. Given the geographical 
conditions, this would cover roughly a quarter of the whole EEZ of the Community. 
(Farnell & Ellis, 1984: 26f)  
 
The UK shared Ireland’s demands but it “nevertheless wished to see the Community 
empowered to defend the interests of its deep sea fishing fleet as soon as possible. It was 
vital for the United Kingdom that fishing rights be secured off Iceland and Norway and 
that the withdrawal of non-Community fleets from what would become British waters be 
negotiated rapidly. In contrast, Ireland’s fishing interests were much more parochial.” 
(Farnell & Elles, 1984: 27)   
 
The agreement on the extension of the exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles 
was reached at the Hague summit at the end of October 1976:  
 
With reference to its Declaration of 27 July 1976 on the creation of a 200-mile fishing 
zone in the Community, the Council considers that the present circumstances, and 
particularly the unilateral steps taken or about to be taken by certain third countries, 
warrant immediate action by the Community to protect its legitimate interests in the 
maritime regions most threatened by the consequences of these steps to extend fishing 
zones, and that the measures to be adopted to this end should be based on the 
guidelines which are emerging within the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. 
It agrees that, as from 1 January 1977, Member States shall, by means of concerted 
action, extend the limits of their fishing zones to 200 miles off their North Sea and 
North Atlantic coasts, without prejudice to similar action being taken for the other 
fishing zones within their jurisdiction such as the Mediterranean. 
It also agrees that, as from the same date, the exploitation of fishery resources in these 
zones by fishing vessels of third countries shall be governed by agreements between 
the Community and the third countries concerned. 
It agrees, furthermore, on the need to ensure, by means of any appropriate Community 
agreements, that Community fishermen obtain fishing rights in the waters of third 
countries and that the existing rights are retained. 
To this end, irrespective of the common action to be taken in the appropriate 
international bodies, it instructs the Commission to start negotiations forthwith with 
the third countries concerned in accordance with the Council's directives. (…) 
(COM(76) 500 in: OJEC C105 of 7 May 1981)  
 
Churchill (1980: 9ff) noted three interesting particularities about the Hague resolution: 
First, due to the legal character of Council resolutions not being legally binding, it 
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merely called for Member States to extend their fishing zones. Second, the agreement 
specifically mentioned that only the North Sea and North Atlantic coasts would be 
subject to it. Third, and fairly obvious, the fishing limit for all member states would be 
of uniform width.  
 
The demands of Ireland and the UK were matched not in the resolution itself but in a 
number of Annexes. The most important one, Annex VI, states: 
 
If no agreement is reached for 1977 within the international fisheries Commission and 
subsequently no autonomous Community measures could be adopted immediately, the 
Member States could then adopt, as an interim measure and in form which avoids 
discrimination appropriate measures to ensure the protection of resources situated in 
the fishing zones off their coasts. Before adopting such measures the Member State 
concerned shall seek the approval of the Commission, which must be consulted at all 
stages of the procedures.  
 
This Annex granted Member States the right to resort to national conservation measures 
if no common measures were introduced. Whereas it was apparent that the Commission, 
as the guardian of Community interests, was to approve any national measure, it 
ultimately remained the task of the Member State and later the ECJ to decide what 
would happen if a measure that was proposed was not adopted by the Commission. Any 
national measures undertaken until then, were, according to Churchill (1980: 16), 
subject to the following conditions: First, they had to be non-discriminatory as required 
by Article 7 EEC on non-discrimination and Article 2 (1) of Regulation 2141/70. 
Secondly, according to Article 2 and 3 of Regulation 2141/70, the Commission and 
other Member States had to be informed of such measures. Thirdly, according to Article 
100 (1), fishing within the exclusive coastal band must not be less restrictive than at the 
time of the 1973 Accession. Finally, the objectives and the functioning of the CFP 
cannot be jeopardized by such measures. Annex VI ultimately became the instrument 
for the Community to implement conversation policies until 1983. (Leigh, 1983: 76)  
 
Annex VII acknowledged the lack of agreement on the principles of a Common 
Fisheries Policy and also expressed the will of the Council to take special needs of 
regions heavily dependent on fisheries into account when a comprehensive Common 
Fisheries Policy would be implemented. This became later known as the Hague 
Preferences. The validity of Annex VII, and implicitly the validity of all annexes to the 
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Hague resolution were later questioned, mainly because of the fact that they remained 
unpublished. (Conceição-Heldt, 2004: 102; ECJ judgement C-4/96 of 19 February 
1998)10 
 
The Hague Resolution allowed the Community to take the necessary steps to follow the 
trend of an extended EEZ. It also took steps to shift the power to enter agreements with 
third countries from the level of member states to a supranational level, a 
comprehensive CFP still seemed impossible, mainly, but not only due to major 
disagreements on conservation issues, as discussed below. The extended EEZ and the 
depletion of fish stocks in this zone, however, put the Community under enormous 
pressure to reach agreement on this issue rather sooner than later since essentially, the 
CFP has still not been perceived in terms of extended fishing zones.  Farnell and Elles 
(1984: 34) describe the dilemma fisheries politics in the Community was in by the end 
of 1976 in the following way:  
 
The commitment to a common policy towards the outside world [as reflected by the 
Hague resolution] was not matched by any commitment to the common management of 
fishery resources (…). The difficulties of the next few years were to centre around the 
fact that the link between these two sides of the Community’s fisheries policy remained 
incomplete, leaving the Commission, on the one hand, to press for the link to be turned 
into reality, and certain member states, on the other hand, to resist being forced by logic 
alone into an internal settlement which they did not like. 
 
This dilemma was especially severe since several fish stocks in the North Sea and North 
Atlantic started to deplete considerably. For example, EEC catches of cod and herring, 
two of the most important species in the North Atlantic, fell by 33 per cent and 44 per 
cent respectively. This of course also affected trade in fisheries with third countries: In 
the first year of the enlarged Community, around 700 000 tons of fish products were 
imported but the number rose to around 1 100 000 in 1980. (ICES, 1978: 23; Farnell & 
Ellis, 1984: 161)  
 
The extension of the EEZ now made this a Community problem since the fishing fleet 
that has traditionally roamed the North West Atlantic has been confined to the 
Community’s own waters that themselves have been subject to intensive fishing for 
                                                
10 The question of validity has in fact not been answered by the ECJ. In the judgment to case 4/96, the ECJ avoided a clear answer 
by declaring that the validity of the adoption was in fact not relevant for the questions raised by the case.  
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years. Resource depletion, however, already started in the early 1970s before the 
extension of the EEZs and in fact the trend to extend the EEZs has been started because 
of concerns about resource depletion in Iceland and Norway. But the EEZ-extension and 
the provisions of the Hague resolution and the 1973 Act of Accession Community 
action in this area were inevitable.  
 
The Commission, in the light of the actions of Iceland and Norway, and in the light of 
another upcoming UNCLOS conference anticipated the extension of EEZs. Already 
envisioned were basic principles of a common conservation policy in a communication 
to the Council nine months before the Hague summit:  
 
Given the present state of scientific knowledge and international practice, the 
fixing of an annual catch rate (ACR) seems the most effective means of 
guaranteeing optimum yield from a stock. 
In addition, the maintenance of a stock in optimum yields conditions implies a 
particular age breakdown of the fish composing that stock. The fixing of an ACR 
must therefore be accompanied by measures of a technical nature (mesh of nets, 
fishing seasons…) designed to prevent the taking of fish belonging to age 
categories requiring priority protection and to safeguard the natural process of 
reproduction. (COM(76) 59) 
 
Annual catches would be fixed each year by the Council, acting on a proposal by the 
Commission, who would base its proposals on scientific advice from a newly set-up 
Scientific and Technical Committee for Fishing. A Community reserve of 5% designed 
to meet exceptional situations and a fixed quantity corresponding to catches in coastal 
waters would be subtracted from the annual catches. The rest would be allocated as 
quotas between the Member States by the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission. (ibd.) 
 
Although the Commission emphasised its intention to have a comprehensive internal 
CFP including resource conservation in effect by the beginning of 1977 by issuing more 
concrete proposals throughout 1976, it became clear at the Hague summit that rapid 
agreement was not a priority of any of the Member States. There was rather the 
“willingness on all sides to consider the problems associated with the creation of such a 
policy and to arrive, in the longer term, at a solution in which the vital interests of the 
few would be recognised by the many.” (Farnell and Ellis, 1984: 71) A comprehensive 
Common Fisheries Policy was eventually adopted almost seven years later, as will be 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
47 
discussed in the section below.   
 
Interim conservation measures have been taken by the Community as early as 1977 and 
annual catch rates, further referred to as total allowable catch (TAC), have been 
proposed by the commission for every year between 1978 and 1982 but have only once, 
in 1980, been adopted. The lack of a conservation policy, together with the provisions 
and deadlines set in the Act of Accession and the Hague resolution, created an 
unprecedented legislative chaos in the area of fisheries conservation.  
 
This situation, however, augmented the importance of the ECJ. In the decade between 
the accession of the three new Member States in 1973, and the adoption of a 
comprehensive Common Fisheries Policy in 1983, the European Court of Justice, being 
“in the unenviable position of working on a subject matter where there were few 
definitive legal texts and even fewer precedents in case law on which to base its final 
judgement,” (Farnell and Ellis, 1984: 137) clarified the principal aspects of Community 
competence relating to fisheries. The first major case was the Kramer case. (ECJ 
judgement Joined Cases C-3, 4 and 6/76 of 14 July 1976) Proceedings had been 
instituted in Dutch courts against fishermen who were accused of contravening laws set 
in accordance with a NEAFC recommendation to limit certain catches.  The real 
question to be answered was whether NEAFC should have been concluded by the 
Community alone on the basis of exclusive competence in the field of conservation on 
the international level. Extending its view set out in the ERTA case (ECJ judgement 
Case C-22/70 of 31 March 1971), whereby under the Common Commercial Policy the 
Community also had the ipso jure competence to enter into international agreements for 
the field in question, the Court now accepted that the Community had the power to enter 
into international agreements even though no common policy has been adopted in the 
field. In the judgement, the Court specified that such power does not only derive from 
Article 210 of the Treaty specifying that the Community has legal personality “but may 
equally flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaty, from the Act of Accession 
and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by Community 
institutions.” (ECJ judgement Joined Cases C-3, 4, and 6/76 of 14 July 1976)  
Implicitly is a crucial wording here as the Commission initially argued that Article 113 
EEC on the Common Commercial Policy expressed that the Community had the 
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competence to negotiate international agreements on quotas and fishing limitations as 
these matters have an economic aspect which would bring them within the sphere of the 
Common Commercial Policy. But the ECJ rejected this argument implicitly by saying 
that the Community’s treaty-making powers in relation to fisheries were based on 
implied powers. (Churchill, 1987: 169)  
More concretely, the Court has also nullified the strongest objection to a Community 
conservation policy in the 1970 CFP negotiations, namely the question of jurisdiction 
regarding conservation measures on the high seas: 
  
It should be made clear that, although Article 5 of Regulation No. 2141/70 is 
applicable only to a geographically limited fishing area, it none the less follows 
Article 102 of the Act of Accession, from Article 1 of the said Regulation and 
from the very nature of things that the rule-making authority of the Community 
ratione materiae also extends – in so far as the Member States have similar 
authority under public international law – to fishing on the high seas. The only 
way to ensure the conservation of the biological resources of the sea both 
effectively and equitably is through a system of rules binding on all the states 
concerned (…) It follows from the very duties and powers which Community law 
has established and assigned to the institutions of the Community on the internal 
level that the Community has authority to enter into international commitments 
for the conservation of the resources of the sea.  
 
The ECJ reminded Member States that although they had concurrent competence at the 
time in question to assume commitments within international frameworks such as 
NEAFC regarding conservation measures, this competence would become an exclusive 
Community competence once the Council adopted common measures and at latest by 
the beginning of 1979, as laid out in Article 102 of the 1973 Act of Accession. (ECJ 
judgement Joined Cases C-3, 4, and 6/76 of 14 July 1976) Also, as a specific application 
of Article 5 of Regulation 2141/70 (Churchill, 1987: 100), the Court clarified that any 
national actions must not jeopardise the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy.  
 
Another important case was Commission vs. Ireland (ECJ judgement Case C-61/77 of 
16 February 1978), where the Commission brought an action under Article 169 EEC for 
a declaration that Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. Confirming 
the Council’s view expressed in Annex VI of the Hague Resolution, the ECJ, through 
the basic tenets established in the Kramer case, reiterated the fact that Member States 
were entitled to adopt unilateral conservation measures providing that they were non-
discriminatory and compatible with Regulation 101/76 since the Council had failed to 
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adopt rules regarding resource conservation.   
This view was subsequently confirmed in the cases French Republic vs. United 
Kingdom (ECJ judgement Case C-141/78, 4 October 1979) and Anklagemyndigheten vs. 
J. Noble Kerr. (ECJ judgement Case C-287/81 of 20 November 1982) In the Van Dam 
case (ECJ judgement Joined Cases C-185/78 to 204/78 of 3 July 1979) and the case 
Commission vs. United Kingdom (ECJ judgement Cases C-32/79 of 10 July 1980, C-
804/79 of 5 May 1981 and C-100/84 of 28 March 1985), the Court even stated that in 
1977 and 1978, the period after the adoption of the Hague resolution but before the 
passing of the deadline stipulated in Article 102 of the Act of Accession, Member States 
not only had the right to adopt conservation measures but in certain circumstances also 
had the duty to do so.11 This is one of the rare cases where the European Court of Justice 
actually prescribes regulation through its rulings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 “From the point of view of law the duty of Member States having jurisdiction in this fishing zone may be deducted from the legal 
provisions when read together. Thus both Article 102 of the Act of Accession and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 101/76 (…) in the 
same way as Annex VI to the Hague resolution and the Council declaration of 31 January 1978, are based on the twofold 
assumption that measures must be adopted in the maritime waters for which the Community is responsible so as to meet established 
conservation needs and that if those measures cannot be introduced in good time on a Community basis the Member States not only 
have the right but are also under a duty to act in the interests of the Community. Although the two Council resolutions mentioned 
above emphasize above all the requirement that national conservation measures should not go beyond what is strictly necessary, at 
the same time they imply (…) recognition of the need for and the lawfulness of conservation measures justified from the biological 
point of view and designed so as to be not only to the particular advantage of the Member State concerned but in the collective 
interests of the Community.” (ECJ Case 32/79, 10 July 1980) 
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5. THE STRUGGLE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY 
 
THE SUM OF MEMBER STATES’ DEMANDS ADDED UP TO MORE THAN THE TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF FISH AVAILABLE. IN THE BAD OLD DAYS WHEN THIS SITUATION AROSE IN 
THE FISHERY COMMISSIONS IT LED TO THE INFLATING OF TACS, FOLLOWED BY 
OVERFISHING. IN THE COMMUNITY, THE EXCESS OF DEMAND OVER SUPPLY LED TO A 
PROLONGED DEBATE ABOUT THE CRITERIA FOR DISTRIBUTING QUOTAS AMONG 
MEMBER STATES AND ABOUT THE SHARING OUT OF SPECIFIC STOCKS. 
(LEIGH, 1983: 90) 
 
 It is safe to argue that the Community has not 
met the three major developments in the 1970s 
with sufficient response. Neo-functionalism as 
a concept had been in a crisis at that time and 
the state of fisheries governance on the 
European level must have proven its critics 
right. Although the Commission was trying to 
push integration in the sector further and with 
the 1973 Act of Accession and the Hague 
resolution finally accomplished what it had not 
in 1970, namely bringing the competence for 
resource conservation formally onto the 
Community level, the resistance of Member 
States on this and other issues of fisheries 
management resulted in national demands 
being voiced as strong as never before and in 
leaving the CFP as a half-finished project.    
 
Especially the countries acceding in 1973, although having had to accept the equal 
access principle as part of the acquis, retained hopes for major changes in the structural 
policy. This was especially seen in the run-up to the Hague summit, when Ireland 
without extensive exceptions from the equal access provisions for the country there 
would be no agreement on the other provisions of the Hague Resolution. And for 
Britain, the context was a more general one:  
 
 
THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE CFP (1983) 
 
• THIRD PILLAR: COMMON 
CONSERVATION POLICY 
 
• CONSERVATION POLICY DESIGNED AS 
SYSTEM OF TOTAL ALLOWABLE 
CATCH (TAC) AND QUOTAS THAT 
ARE DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN 
MEMBER STATES ACCORDING TO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVE STABILITY 
 
• NEGOTIATIONS LASTED FROM 1976 
UNTIL 1983. AS THE LUXEMBOURG 
COMPROMISE WAS STILL UPHELD, 
UNANIMITY WAS REQUIRED. MOST 
MEMBER STATES WERE VETO 
PLAYERS AT DIFFERENT TIMES 
 
• IRE, UK FAVOURED A MORE 
RESTRICTIVE EQUAL ACCESS 
PRINCIPLE; FR (AND OTHERS) 
FAVOURED UNRESTRICTED 
APPLICATION. THE COMPROMISE 
REAFFIRMED THE STATUS QUO. 
 
Figure 6: Summary of important facts on the 
first comprehensive CFP 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
51 
In the recurrent tension between the UK and its partners during the transitional period 
and beyond, these commitments [in the Act of Accession] became powerful symbols, a 
test of British good faith. Inflexibility (…) became charged with a significance quite out 
of proportion to the economic interests at stake. While the British tended to regard 
fisheries as a piece of unfinished business left over from the Accession negotiations, 
about which the rest of the Community would have to show some ‘realism’, most other 
states assumed the negotiations on matters or principle were already over, and were 
indignant that they should be reopened. (Farnell and Ellis, 1984: 192) 
 
Neither the views of the Commission nor internal or external pressures on the 
Community as a whole seemed to impress the Member States. It is unsurprising that the 
Vice-President of the Commission called the fisheries issue “the most difficult and 
complex this Commission has had to deal with.” (The Guardian, 25 September 1976) 
The importance of domestic interests was so prevalent that even within the 
Commission, early proposals for a comprehensive Common Fisheries Policy prior to the 
Hague Summit were adopted after debates in which national concerns dominated. 
“Given the obligation of the Commission to consider overall Community interests, it 
was embarrassing for the Commission’s vote on these proposals to be split along 
national lines.” (Leigh, 1983: 72) When the Commission as the Guardian of the 
Treaties demonstrated domestic and not supranational allegiance, the assumptions of 
neo-functionalism need to be seen at least as problematic.  
 
Considering this background, it is unsurprising that for many Member States, the Hague 
resolution served the purpose of getting their national interests acknowledged through 
its annexes so they would need to be taken in consideration in the upcoming revision of 
the policy.   
 
The equal access provision is only the first example: The derogations and exceptions 
from equal access, in 1970 a concession made by Germany and the Netherlands to meet 
France’s demands, were now extended, the exact provisions are found in Annex I to the 
resolution. While the CFP was based on this principle, it now appeared “to be flying in 
the face of the international trend towards the ‘territorialisation’ of coastal seas, a 
trend to which new Member States such as the United Kingdom and Ireland had 
become converts.” (Farnell and Ellis, 1984: 192) Originally intended to implement the 
principle of non-discrimination as stipulated in Article 7 EEC in the Community Sea, it 
began to erode more and more. As Member States saw it as increasingly conditional, 
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exceptions and derogations became de-facto permanent as to the point where the 
question if it is a suitable measure for guaranteeing non-discrimination arose (see 
below).  
The second example is resource conservation: Annex VII of the resolution, the Hague 
preferences, is a concession to primarily Ireland and the UK, giving preferential 
treatment regarding quota allocation to regions where local populations are especially 
dependent on fisheries and related industries. 
 
As such, the situation of fisheries management in the Community by the end of the 
1970s can be explained by applying intergovernmentalist logic, especially when 
discussing resource conservation. The fact that at the time of the Hague summit no 
agreement on a comprehensive CFP was reached, shows that there is nothing inevitable 
about European integration. Competing claims to scare resources led Member States to 
choose non-agreement instead of cooperation. This argument is especially strong when 
considering that the Community after 1976 had unprecedented power in the area of 
resource conservation since it was “potentially the world’s most effective fisheries 
conservation organization.” (Leigh, 1983: 76) Contrary to previous international 
fisheries commissions it actually “possessed the authority to adopt regulations which 
were directly applicable in the member states and enforced through the courts” (ibd.)  
 
The choice of national governments to make this power of the Community a highly 
conditional one needs to be further explored from a combined biological, economic and 
social perspective. Partly due to the state of fish stocks at that time but also in principle, 
a proper conservation policy automatically meant a reduction in catches which, given 
technical advancements and general overcapacities, required sacrifices that national 
governments were unwilling or even unable to make, especially in times of an economic 
downturn. Furthermore, the fishing industry was in many countries concentrated in 
peripheral regions “in which even the role of the national authorities may be questioned 
by the local population,” (Farnell and Ellis, 1984: 191) let alone the role of a 
supranational authority.  
 
Furthermore, it became more and more obvious that fisheries conservation is more 
complicated, especially politically, than managing the CAP, where producers are able to 
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adjust their production at will. Added to the political complexity of the subject was the 
technical complexity. In fact, the language of the debate “far exceeds other areas of 
Community responsibility.” (Ibd.) Also, because of the “inexact nature of marine 
biology as a science, the Commission’s claims that there was a ‘conservation crisis’ – 
and its proposal for doing something about it – could be brought into question.” (Ibd.)  
 
Supranational bargaining follows national preference formation. Following this liberal 
intergovernmentalist axiom, it is no surprise that agreement was not reached. Under 
such a regime, all parties on the level of the Member States stood to lose in the short 
term – with the notable exception of the fish. Under these conditions, the Commission’s 
desire implement a proper resource conservation policy rather rapidly has to be regarded 
as rather delusionary.  
 
To solve the dilemma explained above and to establish the link between the different 
aspects of the CFP, the Commission first introduced a proposal for a comprehensive 
Common Fisheries Policy in September 1976. From this point on, all proposals as well 
as the 1983 CFP, and its subsequent reviews followed three fundamental objectives: 
 
First, in the medium and long term, to optimize exploitation of the living resources in 
Community waters (…). Secondly, to maintain as far as possible the level of 
employment and income in coastal regions that are economically disadvantaged or 
largely dependent on fishing activities. Thirdly, to intensify in the immediate future 
efforts aimed at adapting Community fishing fleets to catch potential. (Churchill, 
1980: 19) 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy that went into effect in 1983 includes provisions for the 
following topics: Access, technical conservation and control measures, structural policy, 
the common market organization and relations with third countries and thereby 
establishing a conversation and management policy as the last pillar of the CFP which 
introduced a TACs (total allowable catches) and national quota system. (Leigh 1983: 80, 
Conceição-Heldt 2004: 21) 
 
The details of technical conservation measures as well as the structural policy and the 
common market organization in the 1983 CFP will now be discussed briefly here, first 
because of their technical complexities, and second, because negotiations on these 
matters had been “eclipsed by the debate over access and quotas.” (Leigh, 1983: 110) 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
54 
 
Regulation 171/83 details technical conservation measures. An interesting provision of 
this regulation is Article 18, delegating power to the Committee for Fisheries Resources 
established through Article 13 of Regulation 170/83 when “the conversation of fish 
stocks calls for immediate action”. If the Committee does not favour such action, it can 
still be taken, provided that the Council does not take a different decision by a qualified 
majority vote within a month. This procedure extends the Commission’s powers while 
equipping Member States with safeguards. Furthermore, Article 18 (2) allows member 
states to adopt non-discriminatory national measures of conservation in a very specific 
case, “where the conversation of certain species or fishing grounds is seriously 
threatened and where any delay would result in damage which would be difficult to 
repair.”  
 
The structural policy was codified in regulation 2908/83 and the main point was the 
implementation of the Multiannual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) that set objectives 
for developments in terms of fishing capacity, e.g. fleet reduction objectives. Holden 
(1996: 56) emphasizes that the structural policy has never been the reason for much 
dissent because “almost since the inception of the structural and market policy they 
have caused few problems, essentially because they provide financial support to the 
fishing industries of all Member States, which facilitates agreements.” Furthermore, the 
package of structural measures contained a new system of subsidies for removing 
vessels from national fleets and a new system for the provision of grants for the 
construction and modernisation of vessels.  
 
The most interesting part about the Common Market Organization in the 1983 CFP is 
that the Community adopted a system which was “more flexible, and, hence, more 
responsive to the needs of producers,” (Leigh, 1983: 114) and with that it was 
“tempering its originally liberal approach to the market in fishery products in order to 
give security to Community producers.” (Farnell & Elles, 1984: 133)  
 
At this point it is important to point out that just because the CFP has been a 
comprehensive fisheries policy since 1983, it does not necessarily mean that it is also a 
coherent policy. It rather comprises four separate policies referring to markets, 
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structures, external affairs and conservation. A lack of clear objectives is therefore 
unsurprising. Cunningham (1980: 235) links this difficulty to the question of the 
policy’s objectives and arrives at another conclusion:  
 
Until a concise set of objectives is established, it will be more or less impossible to 
devise management schemes. The reason why the EEC is having such trouble doing so 
is perhaps that it does not really know what it wishes to achieve. 
 
This view also makes the question of the CFP in the context of the European integration 
process even more interesting. For the 1983 CFP, the main neofunctionalist claim that 
integration proceeds incrementally as the consequences of previous commitments on a 
supranational level spill over into other fields and into a widened scope and higher level 
of collective actions can neither be entirely dismissed nor fully accepted.  
 
On the one hand, the creation of a Community sea in the 1970s caused by and together 
with completely unforeseen events made the Community realize that it can no longer 
manage its fisheries without expanding the scope of the policy and the area within 
which it was valid. The creation of the last two pillars can therefore be seen as examples 
par excellence for functional and especially geographical spillover. On the other hand, 
Member States did not let themselves be carried by the tide of earlier decisions. Instead 
of accepting the political implications of earlier commitments, they gave way to 
politicising the most minor of issues, if not in respect to fisheries then in the general 
economic context. The Commission became the victim of “creeping nationalisation, 
unable to exercise its power of initiative and up-staged by a new quasi-institution, the 
European Council.” (Leigh, 1983: 205) 
 
Symes and Crean (1995: 399f) emphasise on the following distinction:  
 
…Between the Commission as the Community’s civil service formulating a largely 
technocratic, apolitical, European view, and the Council of Ministers which provides the 
political arena within which vigorously contested negotiations are fought out, with each 
member state’s fisheries minister expected to represent and defend national fishing 
interests… 
 
Therefore, success or failure for a member state is not grounded in taking the adequate 
decisions in order to tackle fundamental management problems but in how much of the 
national interest was either preserved or conceded. This conclusion not only supports 
intergovernmentalist reasoning but also demonstrates how Member States act as parties 
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whose aim is to maximise their own short-term profit, therefore contributing to the 
Tragedy of the Commons. The Commission, on the contrary, focuses on preventing the 
Tragedy through collective action.  
 
Still, one might wonder why it was possible that a TAC and quota system was adopted 
at all. The argument of geographical spillover caused by the unexpected trend to extend 
fishing zones to 200 nautical miles and leading to the creation of a vast Community 
EEZ has already been brought forward. But to a larger extent, Member States ultimately 
acted cooperatively because in a TAC system, they could, through concerted effort, gain 
from increasing the overall resource made available to them together – i.e. an inflation 
of TACs. At the same time, they would act competitively on the distributive level when 
it comes to quotas. (Conceição-Heldt, 2004: 69) It is this behaviour that contributed 
significantly to the CFP’s failure to prevent the depletion of the common-pool resource, 
which will be explored in more detail later in this paper. In order to prevent such 
behaviour to successfully tackle the challenges posed by the Tragedy of the Commons 
through a TAC system, a shift in allegiances from the national to the supranational level 
would have been necessary. Instead, the distributive nature of the issue ultimately 
fostered nationalist rather than communautaire attitudes.  
 
The liberal intergovernmentalist notion focussing on national agenda setting therefore 
once more serves as a viable explanation of the evolution of the 1983 CFP to the same 
extent as it can be linked to its failure and to the emerging argument that a Community 
dominated by domestic interests is not able to prevent the Tragedy of the Commons.  In 
the same way, the view can be supported that through a neo-functionalist approach to 
European integration, it is theoretically possible to introduce measures through 
collective action that are able to tackle the Tragedy. And also in the same way, it must 
be concluded that neo-functionalism does not serve as a viable theory explaining the 
evolvement of the 1983 CFP. Apart from what has already been mentioned, the 
strongest argument for that is certainly the fact that the Commission did not fully utilize 
its possibilities. Although the Commission, with the support of the ECJ, set up an ad 
hoc conservation system through national measures after no agreement on a 
conservation policy was reached at the Hague summit, both academics and stake 
holding actors claim that the Commission has not managed to act accordingly to its role 
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as Guardian of the Treaties. Danish Deep Sea fisheries Association chairman Poul 
Torring commented that the 1983 CFP, just like the Common Agricultural Policy, is a 
"fundamental contradiction to the aims of the EEC, because it has less to do with free 
trade and market regulation than with social welfare." (Financial Times of 28 January 
1983)  
 
The question of why agreement was ultimately reached is very often crucial to the 
understanding of the evolution of a policy. Unlike the first CFP, it is not possible to 
isolate a single factor responsible for the Council finally reaching agreement in January 
1983. It is easier, however, to identify the forces preventing agreement. Conceição-
Heldt (2002: 69ff) identifies Denmark, Ireland and the UK as veto players at different 
times12. Their interests were dominated by their time horizon, which was influenced by 
electoral considerations. Also, in all four countries both the “domestic salience and the 
level of politicization” (Conceição-Heldt, 2006: 77) were high since the fisheries sector 
in these countries is on the regional level economically and socially very important. 
Similarly, the influence of interest groups there is considerable. Non-agreement in an 
intergovernmentalist fashion was seen as the most viable alternative and the 
Commission and the other Member States, by means of threats, counteroffers and side-
payments, answered it. At this point, it is important to remember that although a 
qualified majority would have sufficed to adopt regulations on fisheries governance, the 
practice of the Luxembourg Compromise with regard to fisheries issues had been 
upheld well into 1983. 
 
But if one must pinpoint a decisive factor as to why the Council overcame an almost 
seven-year long stalemate, two factors can be identified: First, the expiration of the 
provisions of the 1973 Act of Accession by the end of 1982 would have led to even 
bigger legalistic uncertainties. The European Court of Justice, in the period between the 
Hague Summit and the adoption of the 1983 CFP, was probably the only institution that 
successfully advanced European integration through overruling national measures. It is 
likely that Member States were not keen on seeing more of that. Second, once again the 
approach of another Community enlargement, this time concerning Spain and Portugal, 
played a role. “The prospect of open access by the Spanish fleet to all French waters 
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was sufficiently chilling to make the idea of exclusive coastal waters decidedly 
attractive to the French authorities.” (Lequesne, 2004: 124) The Community was faced 
with what Lequesne (2004: 20) described as a “doubling of numbers”, since with the 
accession of Spain and Portugal the total fleet tonnage of the Community would 
increase by 65 per cent and the production of fish and shellfish by 45 per cent.  
 
Some authors, however, differ in their opinions whether enlargement was a decisive 
factor for the Council to reach agreement. Farnell and Ellis (1984: 201) draw parallels 
to the 1970 CFP and say that Member States “had appreciated the dangers of enlarging 
the Community to Twelve without a solid basis on which to conduct their fishery 
relations. In doing so, they have re-defined the principle of ‘equal conditions of access’ 
and have recognised the needs of coastal communities as a fundamental guideline for 
future policy.” A similar view is taken by Conceição-Heldt. (2004: 83) Wise (1984: 
247), on the other hand, claims that the prospect of Spain and Portugal joining the 
Community was only a “more minor element encouraging movement towards reform of 
the policy in 1983.”  
 
But to fully understand the problematic stalemate between 1976 and 1983, one also has 
to look at the reason for it, which, as previously mentioned, is found on two fronts: the 
equal access debate and the resource conservation debate. These areas will be explored 
further in the two following subchapters.  
 
1. RENEGOTIATING “EQUAL” ACCESS 
In terms of access, the Community was facing a situation where, if nothing was done, 
the derogations laid out in the Treaty of Accession of UK, Denmark and Ireland would 
expire by the end of 1982, with the consequence that fishing would be permitted up to 
the baselines and only be restricted by Community conservation measures. Similar to 
negotiations on the first CFP, two blocks formed: Ireland and the United Kingdom on 
the one hand were still unsatisfied with the provisions of the Act of Accession and still 
disappointed that they had failed with their attempt to secure limitations of a permanent 
nature at the Hague summit. Pressured by their domestic industries, Ireland initially 
                                                                                                                                          
12 It is safe to argue that France must be added to this list as well. 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
59 
demanded an exclusive coastal band of 50 nm and the UK pushed for a flexible 
exclusive variable band that would range between 12 and 50 nm off the baselines 
around the coasts. In 1977, the British minister for agriculture and fisheries, John Silkin, 
termed this demand dominant preference. The other member states sought to keep their 
historic rights in the waters around Ireland and the UK and rejected the idea of 
exceptions from the equal access provision even after 1982. 
The Commission acted as an intermediary between the two blocks and also specifically 
between the UK and France who became the most insistent advocators of their 
respective demands. Ireland abandoned its claim for an exclusive 50-mile zone and 
accepted a compromise suggested by the Commission, who included the codification of 
historic rights within a band of twelve miles governed by fishing plans. Beyond that, 
strict licensing and inspection systems giving preference to local vessels should 
reinforce fishing plans. While this did not mean explicit exclusivity in the way that 
Ireland and the UK demanded, this solution could be seen as a workaround in order to 
ensure compatibility with the Treaty and to reach a consensus with other Member 
States. 
By January 1978, the United Kingdom found itself politically isolated on this issue. 
Negotiations only progressed when the Conservative government in the UK came to 
power in 1979 and John Silkin was out of office. The tone of the negotiations shifted 
from a debate on principles to a debate on detailed provisions, especially on which 
historic rights were to be kept and on the possibility of a twelve-mile exclusive zone. 
The UK rephrased their demands to an adequate zone of exclusive access and 
preferential arrangements beyond, meaning that historical rights of other member states 
within the 12-mile band should be reduced to a minimum and a box around Shetland 
and the Orkney Islands for ships exceeding a certain length that are not based in these 
islands should be established. 
In May 1980, the Council of Foreign Ministers made a declaration on the CFP calling 
for decisions to be taken so that a CFP could be in effect on 1 January 1981. Article 3 
resembled a commitment to equal access while at the same time calling for the 
possibility of exceptions: 
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Furthermore, Article 103 of the Act of Accession shall be applied in conformity 
with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, with the Act of Accession, inter alia Articles 100 to 102, 
and with the Council Resolution of 3 November 1976, and in particular Annex 
VII thereto. (OJEC C158/2 of 27 June 1980) 
At the end of 1980, just as it seemed that the four year long deadlock in the issue finally 
came to an end, France surprisingly rejected any compromise, thereby demanding the 
full implementation of the equal access provision. Leigh (1983: 85) gives the following 
explanation for this unexpected turn: “Most observers concurred in attributing the 
collapse to French electoral considerations. The Presidential election was only four 
months away and the government felt vulnerable to criticisms of weakness from the 
Left.” 
The deadlock therefore continued as the Commission became less active on the issue, 
partly because other aspects like conversation measures or agreements with third 
countries were negotiated at that time and partly because of the unexpected death of the 
Commission Vice-President Finn Olav Gundelach, who had been very active putting 
forward earlier proposals on the access issue. 
After the French Presidential elections, negotiations were moved to a bilateral level: 
Talks, initiated and assisted by the Commission, were held between Britain and France. 
In 1982, the standpoints of both countries appeared more flexible. Britain would not 
insist on the elimination of historic rights of other member states within the six to 
twelve-mile band and would settle for a reduction and redefinition of these rights. In 
turn, France would not insist on an uncompromising application of the equal access 
provision:  
Both the United Kingdom and France had at last recognized that they would be better 
off holding on to what they already had in terms of fishing rights than risking chaos by 
pressing for more. In return for this new realism, each side was willing to concede to the 
other the minimal security, which it needed for particular groups of fishermen. (…) The 
French government may have been reluctant to abandon its defence of the equal access 
principle, but it was now taking a wider view of the question of fishing rights, and 
weighing up the implications of Spain’s accession to the Community.  (…) In respect of 
Spain, France was in the same position as the United Kingdom in respect of France, the 
possessor of coastal waters in which others could claim extensive traditional fishing 
rights. (Farnell and Elles, 1984: 123) 
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Talks between the UK and France also progressed because Denmark would take over 
the Council Presidency in July 1982 and the Community was eager to reach an 
agreement on a CFP before that date, especially considered that, as seen below, 
Denmark and the Community could not agree on a quota regulation. Farnell and Elles 
(1984: 124) go as far as to say that “the deadline set for the Council in the Treaty of 
Accession had in effect been brought forward by six months.” Danish opposition 
regarding quota proposals was the reason that this virtual deadline passed without an 
agreement neither on the access issue nor on a Common Fisheries Policy. Also, the 
country linked agreement on the equal access issue to satisfaction of its quota demands. 
The UK and France, however, reached a compromise before that date that encompassed 
a further derogation of the provisions of Article 100 of the Act of Accession until the 
end of 1992 and a generalization of the limit stipulated in this provision up to twelve 
nautical miles. The zone between six and twelve miles could be open to other Member 
States’ vessels under certain conditions. The UK was also successful in its demand of a 
special zone around the Orkney Islands and Shetland. Denmark complained that it 
would not obtain licenses for vessels longer than 26 meters to fish for edible demersal in 
the Shetland box, which seemed especially discriminating as other member states 
traditionally fishing in this area obtained such licenses. (Leigh, 1983: 87) As a result, 
the Commission proposed that the eastern extent of the box would be reduced in one 
degree of longitude. 
After the deadline set in the Treaty of Accession passed, Denmark claimed that the 
principle of equal access now applied unconditionally and it would not be possible to 
override it by national measures even if the Commission approved them. Danish MEP 
Kent Kirk, also a fishing vessel owner, deliberately fished in the British 12-mile band 
after the UK adopted a fishing ban in that zone to bring the access issue to the European 
Court. (ECJ judgement Case 63/83 of 10 July 1984)13  
                                                
13 The Court confirmed in the judgement to this case that after 1 January 1983, such a measure was indeed illegal and furthermore 
emphasised that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect as enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Therefore, the Court dismissed the UK’s arguments, stating that the 
provisions of Regulation 170/83 of 25 January 1983 retaining the derogations defined in the Act of Accession could not “validate ex 
post facto national measures of a penal nature which at the time of their implementation were incompatible with Community law.” 
(ECJ Case 63/83, 10 July 1984) 
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The relevance of the Kirk case for the evolution of the CFP is somewhat limited. In the 
closing phase of negotiations, the access issue went more into the background. 
Agreement on a comprehensive Common Fisheries Policy was reached on Council 
Regulation 170/83 establishing a Community system for the conservation and 
management of fishery resources regulated the access issue in Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 
stated the following:  
1. As from 1 January 1983 and until 31 December 1992, Member States shall be 
authorized to retain the arrangements defined in Article 100 of the 1972 Act of 
Accession and to generalize up to 12 nautical miles for all waters under their 
sovereignty or jurisdiction the limit of six miles laid down in that Article. 
2. In addition to the activities pursued under existing neighbourhood relations 
between Member States, the fishing activities under the arrangements established 
in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be pursued in accordance with the arrangements 
contained in Annex I, fixing for each Member State the Geographical zones within 
the coastal bands of other Member States where these activities are pursued and the 
species concerned. 
 
Paragraph 1 thereby extends the derogation of the exceptions from the equal access 
provision stipulated in the Act of Accession for another ten years. Paragraph 2 laid 
down a detailed regulation for vessels from certain Member States in certain areas 
within the 12-mile band that have access to fish certain species – this is the redefinition 
of the historical rights.  
Article 7 established the Shetland box, for which a licensing system was applied for 
vessels larger than 26 meters around Shetland and the Orkneys. Danish demands for 
licenses remained unfulfilled; however, the eastern border of the Shetland box was set 
one degree in longitude westwards of the originally proposed limit. Nevertheless, not 
counting the historic rights that were in principle already established earlier, the United 
Kingdom with the Shetland box managed to gain the only exception from the equal 
access principles in the 1983 CFP. Finally, Article 8 calls for the access issue to be 
reviewed before the end of 1991 so that after ten years, the Council can decide on 
adjustments. Ten years later, based on a report on the economic and social situation of 
the coastal regions the Council should make a general decision on the derogations from 
the equal access principle and on provisions that could follow these arrangements. 
 
It had not been the initial plan of the Commission to enshrine the status quo to that 
extent. The Commission’s first report laying down the characteristics of a 
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comprehensive CFP (COM(76) 59 final) for instance sought to retain the principle of 
equal access. However, as a consequence of the EEZ-extension to 200 miles, the 
Commission suggested that in waters between “the 6 and 12 mile limits, other than 
those referred to in Article 101 of the Act of Accession, to vessels which fish 
traditionally in those waters and which operate from ports in that geographical coastal 
area” (ibd.) in order to protect inshore fishing and to gradually eliminate historic rights. 
While this proposal represents an extension of an existing exception from the equal 
access principle, it did not infringe upon the principle of non-discrimination on national 
grounds.  
 
As already discussed above, Britain and Ireland showed significant resistance to this 
idea. Ireland gave up its opposition on the issue after the judgement of the ECJ in the 
Irish Fisheries case (ECJ judgement Case 61/77 of 16 February 1978), which 
terminated the country’s unilateral action and was ultimately satisfied with the proposed 
fishing plans. Britain perceived its national interests threatened on various occasions in 
a much stronger way. The country accepted the equal access principle in the accession 
negotiations calculating that it would gain overall from access to Norwegian waters – 
this prospect vanished after Norway turned down Community membership. A defeat in 
the Third Cod War and by far the biggest losses in third-country waters after the EEZ-
extension to 200 miles contributed to the position of the UK, which was basically an 
outright rejection of the Commission’s proposals and a push for more national fishing 
zones.  
 
The insistence on the issue was enforced by national political considerations: Although 
only 0.1 per cent of Brits were fishermen, the Labour government elected in 1974 put a 
special emphasis on fisheries, since nine of its seats in the House of Commons were 
won in regions heavily dependent on fisheries with a margin of less than six per cent. 
Also, the Labour party speculated that a firm stance on the fisheries issue could lead 
them to gain at least five extra seats in such regions. (Wise, 1984: 201) 
 
The continental Member States, led by France, defended the equal access principle and 
also the preservation of the historic rights. France’s insistence on the latter had mainly 
been grounded in the fact that the country was the main beneficiary of these rights, 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
64 
especially off the British coasts. France’s position was supported by not only 
Community principles, but also pure logic and economic facts: According to a study by 
British United Trawlers (1976: 14), the catch in the 12-mile zone was potentially higher 
than all catches by the UK in all waters. Wise (1984: 166) asked rightfully: “Why 
should continental fishermen be evicted from their traditional fishing grounds to make 
space for British distant-water vessels expelled from theirs around Iceland and 
elsewhere?” Given the economic and legal context of EEC membership this was 
unacceptable. 
  
Electoral considerations in France, too, prevented any possible compromise. Fisheries 
became an issue in the presidential election after François Mitterand accused his 
opponent, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, of not defending French fisheries against Britain. 
(Leigh, 1983: 93)  
 
While Britain did not prevail with its demands for larger national fishing zones and 
ultimately was satisfied with the Shetland box and a reduction in historical rights, it 
would be wrong to say that the Commission succeeded in defending Community 
principles. National jurisdiction over the territorial seas within the 12-mile limit was 
reasserted for the next 20 years. The provisions in regulation 170/83 were “more than a 
temporary suspension of the basic principle of equal access. This was the first series of 
checks and balances that were to confirm the CFP as a conservative instrument 
designated to protect the status quo rather than a radical new design for international 
fisheries management.” (Symes, 1997a: 142)  
 
Symes and Crean (1995: 405) argue, that the Commission, although explicitly a vocal 
supporter of the equal access principle, has implicitly maintained a position closer to 
rights of establishment, especially in maintaining the tenet of relative stability. As such, 
the principle of relative stability led to a situation where the 1983 CFP became a 
framework that enshrined the status quo. The principle became a new modus operandi. 
As a consequence, each Member State could expect its fishing industry to keep a 
position relative that of other Member States.  
 
 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
65 
2. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION DEBATE 
 
To reach agreement on a conservation and management policy was in no way easier 
than on the revised structural policy. The starting point for negotiations was the Hague 
resolution. Even before the Hague summit, it was clear that a conservation policy 
should be based on a system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for Community waters 
and an internal distribution of the TACs that would take the Hague preferences as well 
as losses of Member States after the establishment of the 200nm EEZ into account. 
(Jensen, 1999: 23)  
 
Discussing whether a TAC system is the most viable fisheries management principle for 
the Community exceeds the scope of this paper. At no point, however, an alternative 
system was seriously under consideration.  
The Commission decided to base its resource management approach on TACs that are 
established for the principal stocks of the Community. The numbers are based on 
scientific data obtained from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) and the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Commission. The 
Commission thereby followed the practice of NEAFC, whose attempts for resource 
conversation in the past have been unsuccessful. In the beginning, the Commission 
stuck closely to the ICES recommendation, which Farnell and Elles (1984: 155) 
described as an “inflexible conservationist approach.” Only in 1981, the Commission 
moved away from the ICES numbers, correcting them upwards. 
 
The TACs, however, had to be broken down into national quotas in order to avoid a run 
on fish stocks on a first-come-first-serve basis that otherwise was likely to occur. Other 
technical measures and restrictions were to compliment the TAC and quota system. 
(Leigh, 1983: 89)  
 
It is important to remember that fish stocks are rarely located exclusively within the 
Community’s EEZ. Whenever they migrate between the Community’s fisheries zone 
and the waters of third countries, TACs are set through negotiations with the countries 
concerned or within international fisheries commissions. For the calculation of the 
TACs, the Commission opposed using a formula in order to be able to react more 
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flexible to situations. Also, the Commission laid down three rather conflicting criteria 
according to which quotas were to be allocated:  
 
First, respect for historic performance in order to avoid unnecessary changes or 
ruptures in the existing fishing pattern; secondly, they must be consistent with the 
requirements of regions particularly dependent on fisheries; thirdly, they must help to 
solve the problems caused by recent changes in the fishing pattern of Member State’s 
fishing fleets. (Churchill, 1980: 21)  
 
 
Although the Commission had made proposal for TACs for every year between 1978 
and 1982, they have been adopted only once, in 1980. Since 1979, the proposals for 
TACs were based on advice from the Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries, 
which itself based its advice on ICES recommendations.  
 
The fact that it took the Community almost seven years to reach an agreement can be 
partly explained by the fact that the distribution of quotas is a highly political question 
as it deals with the distribution of resources between the Community’s Member States. 
Fundamental changes were therefore made early in the negotiations. Initially, the 
Commission intended to base quotas upon a weighted average of the catches in previous 
years, taking the Hague preferences into account. However, it soon accepted the 
argument that several Member States like the UK and Germany suffered from severe 
losses due to the extension of the EEZ to 200 miles because waters they used to fish in 
were now under the jurisdiction of third countries, particularly Iceland, Norway, Canada 
and the USSR. (OJEC C278 of 18 November 1977)  
 
Another criterion was brought into the negotiations by the United Kingdom. The UK 
argued that contribution to resources should be taken into account when distributing 
quotas. Since 60 per cent of the Community’s catch was taken in the EEZ of the UK, it 
should also receive a comparable share of the quotas. However, this idea was rejected 
because national contribution to resources would not be compatible with basic 
Community principles as well as the equal access principle. Also, some fish stocks 
migrate throughout their life. Fish often start their life in waters of one member state 
and get caught after maturity in the waters of another member state. (Leigh, 1983: 90) 
 
The UK subsequently reduced its demands from 60 per cent to 45 per cent and in 1978 
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accepted to negotiate on the basis of the 31 per cent proposed by the Commission but 
refused at the same time to give up its demands on the ‘dominant preference’ in the 12 
to 50 mile band on the access issue. After the Conservatives regained power in the UK 
and Prime Minister Margret Thatcher managed to negotiate an interim solution on the 
amount of her country’s contributions to the Community’s budget, the eight other 
member states pressured the UK to reach an agreement on the CFP by the end of 1980. 
(Leigh, 1983: 93)   
 
Towards the end of the negotiations, it was Danish and not British demands that proved 
to be an obstacle to agreement. Denmark started to reject the idea of quotas in general 
and argued that since “quotas arbitrarily restricted the activity of fishermen who might 
be more efficient than others for whom quotas were being reserved, they were 
fundamentally anti-economic. The Community should (…) confine its management role 
to fixing total allowable catches for the most sensitive stocks (…) leaving fishermen 
from different member states to compete freely within the overall catch limit.” (Farnell 
and Elles, 1984: 116)  
 
A Commission proposal in June 1982 found broad acceptance amongst the other 
member states, which can be seen as considerable breakthrough since the Commission 
also implied that this distribution valid for 1982 could also serve as precedence to quota 
distribution in subsequent years. Denmark took over the presidency of the Council on 1 
July 1982 and rejected the proposal as a basis for further negotiation. Instead of the 23.4 
per cent stipulated there, the country demanded 30 per cent of TACs. Two factors 
contributed to this: First of all, economics. The importance of fisheries in terms of 
national income for Denmark was more than 5 times higher than for the average other 
Member State. Due to a lack of regulations in the preceding years, the proposed quotas 
were exceeded between 300 and 1000 per cent for certain stocks. At the same time, the 
CFP had provided funds for the Danish fisheries sector and now Denmark saw an 
adequate supply necessary to utilize the improved industrial infrastructure. 
 
The economic issue was intertwined with the second factor, the Market Relations 
Committee in the Danish parliament. The usance in Denmark is that a minister’s 
acceptance of a proposal concerning market issues is pending on the approval of this 
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Committee, in which the opposition led by the Social Democrats had a majority at that 
time. Several concessions left the Committee unmoved and were only seen as a sign that 
further concessions made by the Community were possible. (Leigh, 1983: 96f) 
 
The Community explored the option of approving the CFP package by a qualified 
majority vote. Denmark, as a result, invoked the Luxembourg compromise, a move that 
was supported out of principle by France, Greece and the United Kingdom. In the end, 
the Commission called upon its member states to implement its proposals on a national 
level. After the end of the Danish presidency it became clear that the Social Democrats 
would not be able to retain opposition to a settlement much longer. The task shifted to 
finding “a formula which, without altering the proposals agreed by the nine member 
states, would enable the Social Democrats to withdraw their opposition.” (Leigh, 1983: 
98) The Community was only ready for limited concessions regarding mackerel stocks, 
structural aids and agreements with Sweden and Norway. The Danish Market Relations 
Committee finally gave up its resistance and the Council approved TACs and quota 
proposals on 25 January 1983 as an integral part of the CFP package.  
The legal basis for conservation measures was incorporated in Articles 1-5 of 
Regulation 170/83, before the provision on access, underlining the importance of the 
matter. Article 1 acknowledges that, stipulating:  
 
In order to ensure the protection of fishing grounds, the conservation of the 
biological resources of the sea and their balanced exploitation on a lasting basis 
and in appropriate economic and social conditions, a Community system for the 
conservation and management of fishery resources is hereby established. 
 
Although the Commission moved away from the ICES recommendations in its later 
proposals, Article 2 calls for conservation measures to be “formulated in the light of the 
available scientific advice.” Furthermore, a Scientific and Technical Committee for 
Fisheries was established that, according to Article 12, “shall be consulted at regular 
intervals and shall draw up an annual report on the situation with regard to fishery 
resources, on the ways and means of conserving fishing grounds and stocks and on the 
scientific and technical facilities available within the Community.” 
The second paragraph of Article 2 is concerned with technical conservation measures 
and lists allowed groups of conversation measures applicable to single species or groups 
of species: 
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a) The establishment of zones where fishing is prohibited or restricted to certain periods, 
types of vessel, fishing gear or certain end-uses 
b) The setting of standards as regards fishing gear 
c) The setting of a minimum fish size or weight per species 
d) The restriction of fishing effort, in particular by limits or catches 
 
Article 3 introduces the system of total allowable catches (TACs). Interestingly, TACs 
do not have to be set for all species but rather only for species or groups of species 
where “it becomes necessary to limit the catch”.  
Article 4 introduces the distribution of the TACs between member states, guided by the 
principle known as relative stability:  
 
1. The volume of the catches available to the Community referred to in Article 3 
shall be distributed between the Member States in a manner which assures each 
Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each of the stocks 
considered. 
2. On the basis of the contents of the report referred to in Article 8, the Council, 
acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 43 of the Treaty, 
shall enact provisions effecting the adjustments that it may prove necessary to 
make to the distribution of the resources among Member States in consequence of 
the application of paragraph 1. 
 
Article 5 allows for quotas to be exchanged between member states. Article 11 requires 
measures to be adopted by the council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission. Finally, Article 13 establishes a management Committee for Fishery 
Resources that consists of representatives of the Member States and is chaired by a 
representative of the Commission.  
 
But the TAC system was off to a bad start. Gaston Thorn, then president of the 
Commission, declared the fishing war over (Financial Times, 26 January 1983: 1) too 
soon, as new conflicts were already visible on the eve of the decision. Danish officials 
in a precautionary statement said that if the EEC was unable to guarantee extra quotas in 
third-country waters, extra fish should be provided as a special measure specifically in 
waters west of Scotland. The British fisheries minister immediately rejected this idea. 
Further disagreement between Denmark and the UK arose about the 2,000 extra tons of 
cod promised to Denmark in the compromise: While the UK claimed that this quota is 
only guaranteed for three years, Denmark insisted that this guarantee is valid for an 
indefinite period. (Ibd.) 
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Also, negotiations on the distribution of herring catches blocked agreement on 1983 
quotas for all types of fish after the six-year long ban on herring fisheries was lifted. 
"Danish ambitions" (Financial Times, 4 October 1983: 3) were seen as the main cause 
of the emerged deadlock but in practice, all member states but the UK rejected at least 
one of the countless compromise proposals, fearing to alienate their domestic fishing 
industries. (Ibd)  
 
Continuing Danish opposition and the fact that 1983 also marked the year of the 
Stuttgart Declaration marked the departure of the Community from the Luxembourg 
Compromise in the area of fisheries.  When Denmark invoked the Luxembourg 
Compromise in June 1983 to oppose one of the Council decisions related to the herring 
issue, the other Member States did not give in to Danish demands and adopted the 
decision by a majority vote.  
 
Nonetheless, the viability of the CFP was questioned only a few months after it was 
introduced as Ireland's Fisheries Minister Paddy O'Toole commented: "We probably 
expected too much of the Common Fisheries Policy in the euphoria of getting 
agreement in January." (The Globe and Mail, 6 October 1983: 2) By mid-October, the 
Community had to face the possibility that an agreement on TACs for 1983 might not 
be reached. A Commission spokesperson warned that "total anarchy" in Community 
fishing grounds in 1984 would be the consequence since "there would be a legal void in 
the common fisheries policy. No TACs or quotas will apply automatically." (Financial 
Times, 21 October 1983: 10) However, an agreement was finally reached by mid-
December 1983, seven months after the ban on herring was lifted and only two weeks 
before the year for which the quotas were applicable ended. After 1983 the situation 
improved as agreement on TACs and quotas was reached either at the end of the 
preceding year for which they were set or at the beginning of the year.  
 
To look at the actual effectiveness of the quota system, one has to keep in mind that the 
sheer distribution of resources is in the centre of the issue. The Commission’s initial 
proposals did not take any national interests into account. Additionally, politically 
sensitive questions were avoided, for instance no recommendation was given on the 
reference period to be used to calculate the key for quota proportions. Initially, the 
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Commission took a conservationist approach and for its TAC proposals stuck to the 
scientific advice issued by ICES. But starting with the run-up to the Hague summit, the 
role of the Commission somewhat changed and it became an intermediary in the 
negotiations. Demands of Member States varied and other than in the equal access 
debate, the resource conservation debate was not one of Community principles but one 
dominated by the Member States’ economic considerations, which is also the reason 
why an inflating of TACs could not be prevented although the debate about 
distributional criteria dominated the negotiations.  
 
COUNTRY 1973-1978 AVERAGE 1982 QUOTAS DIFFERENCE 
Belgium 1.9% 2.1% +0.2% 
Denmark 23.6% 24.6% +1.0% 
France 13.8% 13.1% -0.7% 
Germany 16.4% 13.0% -3.4% 
Ireland 1.5% 4.3% +2.8% 
Netherlands 7.0% 7.2% +0.2% 
United Kingdom 36.0% 35.8% -0.2% 
Figure 3: Applicable countries’ relative share of total TACs for seven demersal species (cod, haddock, saithe, whiting, redfish, 
plaice, mackerel) for 1982 compared to the 1973-1978 reference period.  Source: Wise (1984: 238).  
  
The above table shows that, interestingly enough, the relative quota shares for 1982 
agreed upon in January 1983 don’t differ much from the average catches in the years of 
1973 to 1978, which the Commission used as a reference period in the proposal that first 
contained numbers on TACs and Quotas. (COM(78) 5 final) Notably, Ireland’s relative 
share almost tripled because of the Hague preferences and Germany’s share was 
reduced due to very limited losses in third country waters. But despite the depletion of 
stocks in the North Sea and North Atlantic, total TACs for these reference species were 
only reduced by 8.6 per cent, which indicates that upholding the principle of relative 
stability was prioritized over the biologically necessary reduction of total TACs, setting 
a precedence for inflating the total TACs.  
 
The reason why the Commission focussed on a TAC and quota system in the first place 
can be explained by utility maximizing considerations – the centralized approach 
allowed the Commission to be the sole institution to define and enforce measures. All 
information required for the operation was to be processed in Brussels. Therefore, an 
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asymmetry was created in a sense that the Commission had more information available 
than the Member States. Much of the negotiations on the 1983 conservation policy as 
well as subsequent quota and TAC negotiations support Tullock’s view (1981: 190) that 
when an agenda-setter’s (i.e. the Commission’s) knowledge of players’ (i.e. Member 
States’) preferences is complete and all Member States vote in line with their domestic 
preferences, the Commission is the only strategist. Hence, the Commission “acted not 
only as a mediator between parties, but also as a manipulator following its preferences 
when trying to move the parties towards an agreement.” (Conceição-Heldt, 2004: 82)  
 
This raises the question if the system introduced with the 1983 CFP was at all viable for 
the conservation of fish stocks. This question can be answered by comparing the catches 
and agreed TACs to the scientifically recommended TACs and by looking at the 
evolution of the Spawning Sustainable Biomass (SSB) of fish stocks. Similarly to 
Karagiannakos (1996), four demersal stocks in the North Sea, NEAFC Region IV will 
be used for this analysis since “their analytical TACs are among the best scientifically 
estimated in EU waters” and because these stocks are “economically significant for a 
number of fleets in several Member States and represent more than three quarters of the 
catch of demersal species covered by TACs taken in EU waters during the 1981-91 
period.” (Karagiannakos, 1996: 237) To complement this analysis, demersal stocks for 
NEAFC Region VIa, comprising waters West of Scotland belonging to the EEZ of the 
UK but also to a limited extent to Ireland and the Faroe Islands.   
 
NEAFC IV SET OVER RECOMM. TAC CATCHES OVER SET TAC DELTA SSB 1983-1992 
Cod 12.37% -6.18% -52.59% 
Haddock -3.16% 41.9% -63.07% 
Saithe 5.97% -17.47% -52.63% 
Whiting 24.38% -1.56% -31.02% 
 
NEAFC VIA SET OVER RECOMM. TAC CATCHES OVER SET TAC DELTA SSB 1983-1992 
Cod 9.05% -21.64% -54.55% 
Haddock 60.54% 56.63% -83.22% 
Saithe 14.86% -3.93% -80.70% 
Whiting 47.33% -28.31% -65.41% 
Figure 4: Declining fish stocks between 1983 and 1992. Source: ICES (1990) and ICES (1992)  
 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
73 
The SSB of all reference species, except for whiting, had reached a historical low in 
both of the reference areas in the early 1990s. The SSB of whiting is slightly below the 
mean of a 1972 to 1991 reference period. (ICES, 1992) 
 
These statistics clearly show that during the time period in which the 1983 CFP was in 
effect, the spawning stock biomass of demersal species in these important areas 
depleted dramatically. Also, the TACs set for this decade generally exceeded the 
biological recommendations. “Within the political process, the advice is often simply 
ignored or its alleged ambiguity is used as a pretext for compromise.” (Symes, 1997: 
146) The latter argument points out important shortcomings of a purely biological 
approach to TACs and quotas. Although the advice issued by marine biologists aims at 
tackling the problems posed by the Tragedy of the Commons, it too is subject of some 
criticism for very high levels of uncertainty, rather limited scope and its relative 
isolation from the fishing industry. (Daw and Gray, 2005: 193) 
 
All in all, the TAC system does not seem to contribute significantly in reaching its 
objective. Karagiannakos (1996: 247) concluded that catches follow more the biological 
condition of stocks than recommended or agreed TACs. The numbers above also show 
that fish stocks have depleted in the reference period although the set TACs did not or 
not exorbitantly exceed the recommended TACs and at the same time, catches remained 
behind the set TACs, as the saithe stocks show.  
 
Apart from political considerations, there are four other factors that contribute to the 
low effectiveness of the TAC system, many of which were tackled after the first review 
in 1992:  
 
First, Member States have failed to comply with quota regulations. However well 
designed conservation measures may look on paper, they are obviously of little value 
unless effectively enforced. Quotas were heavily overfished in the first two years of the 
functioning of the CFP, which is why the Commission began proceedings under Article 
169 against all of the seven Member States that received a share of the TAC. These 
proceedings were soon discontinued, however, and instead a latter was sent to all 
Member States demanding the observance of quotas. (Churchill, 1987: 120) Proper 
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enforcement was still lacking: The Commission reported in June 1986 that all Member 
States to which the TAC system applies showed serious deficiencies in both application 
and observance of the Regulation. (COM(86) 301) The enforcement Regulation was 
later improved and consolidated as Council Regulation 2241/87 but enforcement was 
still only very limited and exclusively concerned conservation regulations. Also, the 
first responsibility for monitoring fishing lay with the Member States. Sanctioning 
possibilities were limited and a tightening of regulations was not considered before the 
1992 revision. Holden (1996: 159) claims that the Community was well aware of the 
fact that Regulation 2057/82 was intentionally flawed:  
 
The reason for which the Council was able to agree was because the regulation gave no 
effective powers to the Commission. The political objective was to establish a system of 
control and enforcement without conceding any competence to the Commission. That 
this means that the system would be largely, if not totally ineffective, was almost 
certainly the objective of most states. 
 
Second, the interdependency between fish stocks and the long-time development of fish 
stocks do not find any acknowledgement in the TAC system. Until 1992, the 
Community has not foreseen the possibility of multi-species and multi-annual TACs 
(MSTACs and MATACs respectively). Symes (1997: 143) connects the problem of 
single-species TACs to the principle of relative stability: Since TACs and quotas are set 
for individual species and separate ICES areas, the effect of relative stability is 
inevitably distorted since species have tended to decline at different rates responding to 
rather variable changes in stock abundance.  
 
Third, other conservation measures necessary and foreseen were only reduced very 
reluctantly as the Council on various occasions did not accept necessary amendments to 
Regulation 171/83 proposed by the commission. (Churchill, 1987: 121)  
 
Fourth, the first two MAGPs did not succeed in a major reduction of fleet capacity. 
Whereas the first MAGP, in effect from 1983 to 1986, aimed at freezing capacities at 
1983 levels, the second MAGP, in effect from 1987-1991, envisaged a reduction of 2% 
in terms of engine power and 3% in terms of tonnage. However, even these modest 
goals were not met as fleet capacity actually increased. There was no proper 
Community-wide fleet register at that time and the structural policy was inherently 
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contradicting since both the reduction of capacity and the building and modernisation of 
vessels had been subsidised. The structural policy therefore did not eliminate the 
economic incentives generating overcapacity, as its objective “was not that of the 
conservationist view. The general objective was to secure fishermen a stable income.” 
(Jensen, 1999: 27) 
 
The apparent failure of the CFP to conserve fish stocks also raises the question if the 
objectives of the policy resemble a proper commitment to the issue. In principle, the 
1983 CFP and followed three fundamental objectives:  
 
First, in the medium and long term, to optimize exploitation of the living resources in 
Community waters (…) Secondly, to maintain as far as possible the level of 
employment and income in coastal regions that are economically disadvantaged or 
largely dependent on fishing activities. Thirdly, to intensify in the immediate future 
efforts aimed at adapting Community fishing fleets to catch potential. (Churchill, 1980: 
19) 
 
These objectives address all three paradigms of fisheries management using the 
framework by Charles (1992): the conservation paradigm, the rationalization paradigm 
and the social/community paradigm. Therefore, the adoption of the 1983 Common 
Fisheries Policy marked the point from which on the Community’s fisheries 
management can be regarded as encompassing all areas of fisheries management.  
 
In the preamble to Regulation 170/83, the Council finds that “in view of the over-fishing 
of stocks of the main species, it is essential that the Community, in the interests of both 
fishermen and consumers, ensure by an appropriate policy for the protection of fishing 
grounds that stocks are conserved and reconstituted.” Article 1, however, does not use 
the same purely conservationist focus, saying that rules and measures shall be adopted 
for the fishing industry “to promote harmonious and balanced development of this 
industry within the general economy and to encourage rational use of the biological 
resources of the sea and of inland waters.”  
 
This apart, the introduction of a resource conservation system did not change the overall 
objectives laid down in regulations 2140/70 and 101/76 respectively. The CFP seeks to 
promote “harmonious and balanced development of the industry within the general 
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economy and to encourage rational use of the biological resources of the sea and of 
inland waters.” Specific measures taken must “promote the rational development of the 
fishing industry within the framework of economic growth and social progress and (…) 
ensure an equitable standard of living for the population which depends on fishing for 
its livelihood” by contributing to “increased productivity through restructuring of 
fishing fleets” and adaptation of production and marketing conditions to market 
requirements.” (Council Regulation (EEC) 101/76 art 9) Early CFP legislation was 
modelled closely after the CAP. That this is problematic when looking at the nature of 
fish as common-pool resource has already been demonstrated earlier. The problematic 
became only apparent, however, with the adoption of the 1983 Common Fisheries 
Policy since the general goals of the policy still remain rather vague. Therefore, in 1983 
the CFP became a framework that rather implicitly, and not explicitly, sought to balance 
social issues against biological considerations. While the objectives are more clear in 
those policy areas of the CFP that concern only one of the paradigms of fisheries 
management – such as the framework for a TAC system is a purely biological one and 
the market organization is a purely social one – there are issues like the reduction of 
overcapacity or quotas where biological and social and economic considerations seem 
difficult to reconcile. It is at that point left to the reader to interpret whether this 
difficulty stems to a larger part from the pure nature of the matter or from the previous 
history of the CFP. While it was already mentioned above that Churchill (1987) supports 
the former view, Symes (1995: 31) advocates the latter by pointing out the implicit and 
incremental development of the goals of the CFP.  
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6. THE ACCESSION OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND THE 1992 
REVIEW 
 
 Regardless of the question whether Spain’s and 
Portugal’s intention to join the EU contributed to reaching 
an agreement on the CFP, the doubling of numbers quoted 
above was reason enough for Member States to be wary of 
a full accession of the Iberian countries to the Policy.   
But it was more than the sheer size of their fleets that 
caused the ten Member States to react reluctantly, since 
Spain’s fleet needed modernisation on an enormous scale. 
Furthermore, both countries had bilateral agreements with 
third countries that had to be transferred to the 
Community. (Lequesne, 2004: 347) 
As a result, member states were unwilling to grant Spain 
and Portugal full access to Community waters and initially 
proposed transition periods between eight and 15 years. 
(Financial Times of 15 March 1985) The proposal was 
favoured by the biggest fishing nations of the Community, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Germany and the UK, but the 
Italian presidency managed to negotiate a compromise 
between those hardliners, Spain and Portugal and the rest 
of the Community. Although Spain and Portugal were allowed to join the CFP, the Act 
of Accession provided a framework of restrictions for the two new member states. 
Article 166 stipulated:  
 
The regime defined in Articles 156 to 164, including the adjustments, which the Council 
will be able to adopt pursuant to Article 162, shall remain in force until the date of 
expiry of the period laid down in Article 8(3) of Regulation (EEC) No. 170/83.  
 
The cornerstones of this regime are severe limitations for the number of vessels in 
Community waters and total exclusion Spanish vessels from the so-called Irish Box, a 
zone in the Irish Sea much like the Shetland Box, and much of the North Sea. Since the 
expiry date of Regulation 170/83 was the end of 2002, these limitations would apply for 
17 years and represent “a transitional system unequalled in the history of EC 
THE 1992 CFP REVIEW 
 
• STATUS QUO REGARDING 
THE PRINCIPLE OF 
EQUAL ACCESS ONCE 
MORE REAFFIRMED 
 
• MULTI-ANNUAL 
MANAGEMENT 
OBJECTIVES, A 
COMPREHENSIVE 
CONTROL AND 
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
AND A FIRST STEP 
TOWARDS A 
COMMUNITY LICENSING 
SYSTEM WERE AMONGST 
THE MOST IMPORTANT 
MEASURES INTRODUCED 
 
• DECISION MADE BY A 
QUALIFIED MAJORITY 
WITH SPAIN VOTING 
AGAINST THE PACKAGE 
AS THE COUNTRY 
PROTESTED AGAINST ITS 
TERMS OF ACCESSION TO 
THE CFP AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVE 
STABILITY 
 
Figure 9: Summary of important 
facts on the 1992 CFP review 
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enlargement.” (Lequesne, 2004: 21) Additionally, Article 162 of the 1985 Act of 
Accession called for an evaluation of the transitional system by 1992 with subsequent 
adjustments to the transition regime possible to be in effect by 1996.  
 
The framework described above had serious repercussions in the following years. 
Spanish fishermen frequently registered their vessels in the UK with the consequence 
that fish caught by these vessels now fell under the British quotas. This practice is 
known as quota hopping. The Thatcher government sought to put an end to this practice 
by passing the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act, under which the previous vessel 
registration system was abandoned and replaced by a system where a vessel could only 
be registered if it fulfilled certain criteria proving the vessel had a “genuine and 
substantial connection” (1988 Merchant Shipping Act, Part II, 14, 3 (b)) with the UK, 
thereby making it practically impossible for fishermen outside of the UK to register 
their vessels in the country. Since the new system would completely replace the 
previous one dating from 1894, vessels already registered had to re-register under the 
new system.  
 
When Factortame Ltd., a UK fishing company managed by Spanish nationals, was not 
able to register their vessels under the new system, the company saw that the 1988 
Merchant Shipping Act conflicted with Community law. Proceedings brought against 
the British Secretary of State for Transport by Factortame and other companies were 
referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 EEC. The result was a 
series of five cases before the ECJ, of which the first two, Factortame I (ECJ judgement 
Case C-213/89 of 19 June 1990) and Factortame II (ECJ judgement Case C-221/89 of 
25 July 1991) are seen as landmark decisions in both UK and EU law, confirming that 
in areas of Community competence, EU law is superior to national law. For the 
Common Fisheries Policy, Factortame II is of specific importance since the ECJ found 
that the nationality requirements in the 1988 Merchant Shipping act are a breach of the 
Treaty of Rome, particularly Article 52 EEC on the Freedom of Establishment but also 
Article 221 EEC. The tenor of the ruling was that although member states can stipulate 
certain conditions for the registration of vessels, such conditions have to be compatible 
with Community law. (ECJ judgement Case C-221/89 of 25 July 1991) 
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The Factortame cases are not the only repercussions of the limitations imposed on 
Spain and Portugal in the 1985 Act of Accession. The two member states, in a series of 
cases before the ECJ (Judgements joined cases C-63/90 and C-67/90, C-70/90, C-71/90, 
C-73/90 of 13 October 1992), challenged the Council’s interpretation of the principle of 
relative by applying under Article 173 (1) EEC for the annulment of provisions 
regarding quotas in Greenlandic, Faroese and Swedish waters. The reasoning of Spain 
and Portugal is best described by the example of the distribution of Community fishing 
rights in Greenlandic waters: Before the introduction of the 200nm EEZ, Spain and 
Portugal had significant catches in Greenlandic waters. When Greenland left the 
Community in 1985, the Community kept part of the fishing rights in Greenlandic 
waters in exchange for financial support. The respective agreement guaranteed 
Greenland a level of minimum catch within its fishing zone with the implication that 
financial support would not be reduced even if the Community’s fishing rights were due 
to a lower availability of resources. Portugal and Spain argued that their catches in 
Greenlandic waters before 1977 should be considered by the principle of relative 
stability and a dismissal of the catch distribution for 1990 under the CFP was demanded. 
The argument was that first, accession of new member states is a necessary condition 
for reinterpreting the relative stability of catch distributions in third country waters and 
second; that due to the fact that quotas were largely increased in the respective waters in 
1999, the principle would not be violated by including Spain and Portugal in the 
distribution especially because the Community has not utilized its quotas there. (Jensen, 
1999: 30) The ECJ dismissed all cases, arguing that Spain and Portugal had accepted the 
acquis communitaire:  
 
Article 2 of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal provides that, from the date of 
accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions 
of the Communities before accession are to be binding on the new Member States and 
are to apply in those States under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in the 
Act of Accession itself. In those circumstances, pursuant to Article 2 of the Act of 
Accession, the existing Community rules must be applied, in particular the principle of 
relative stability as laid down by Regulation No 170/83 and interpreted by the Court. 
(ECJ judgement Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 of 13 October 1992)  
 
Furthermore, the principle of relative stability was reaffirmed:  
 
The requirement of relative stability in the allocation among the Member States of the 
catches available to the Community, in the event of limitation of fishing activities under 
Article 4(1) of Regulation No. 170/83, must be understood as meaning that in that 
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distribution each Member State is to retain a fixed percentage. (…) The principle of 
relative stability of fishing activities cannot be interpreted as placing the Council under 
an obligation to effect a fresh distribution whenever an increase of a particular stock is 
established, where that stock was already covered by the initial allocation. (Ibd.)  
 
The transitional regime under the 1985 Act of Accession was also affirmed by a planned 
review mandated by Article 162 of the Act conducted in 1992. The review also 
proposed a framework to integrate Spain and Portugal into the new mechanisms 
introduced by the 1992 revision of the CFP. (COM(92) 2340 final)  
 
Spain’s dissatisfaction with the transitional regime continued and in 1994, Spain linked 
the issue to the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden to the Community. 
For Norway, the fisheries sector is both economically and structurally of considerably 
higher importance than for the Twelve and hence the country demanded a series of 
concessions and exceptions for joining the CFP. Additionally, the countries in the 
negotiations with Norway were “pushing the EU to subject Norway to the same 
transitional regime” and together with Ireland insisted on “obtaining extra fishing 
quotas in Norwegian waters.” (Agence Europe 7.3.1994) Eventually, the Commission 
amended the proposal for new arrangements with Spain and Portugal from 1996 
onwards as foreseen in Article 162 of the 1985 Act of Accession to achieve closer 
integration into the Common Fisheries Policy at this date instead of waiting until 2003.  
 
Changes came also with the Maastricht Treaty, although they were of a more theoretical 
nature. Article 3 reinforced the principles of the Common Fisheries Policy. It also 
marked the first occasion where fisheries were mentioned somewhat separately from 
agriculture in a Community treaty. Nonetheless, the provisions authorising the CFP in 
the TEC remain the same until today.  
Article 3 (1) e) of the Maastricht Treaty authorizes a common fisheries policy as an 
activity of the Community for the purposes outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty. These 
goals are to:  
 
…Promote, throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social 
protection, (…) a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic 
performance and e high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
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As with the provisions in the Treaty of Rome, these goals seem to address more the 
common market of private goods (using the classification of Musgrave, 1959) and do 
not take the specific nature of fish into account. Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty seems 
to emphasize on social peace first and foremost. The conflict in objectives already 
described had now been reproduced in a second article in the Treaty.  
 
Also, since the Maastricht Treaty fisheries subsidies are not financed anymore through 
the EAGGF but through a separate fund, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG); now one of the four Structural Funds of the EU.   
 
In the same year the Maastricht Treaty went into effect, a review of the Common 
Fisheries Policy was conducted. A 1991 report from the Commission on the CFP it was 
acknowledged that the mechanisms introduced in 1983 to prevent overfishing were 
inadequate. These mechanisms are characterised by a lack of enforcement possibilities, 
the failure to take interdependencies between fish stocks into account, a lack of political 
will, the complete lack of a social policy and lack of coherence between different 
measures. While not making any concrete policy proposals, the Commission suggested 
that the principle of relative stability, the derogation from the equal access principle 
within the 12-mile limit and the Shetland box should be maintained. (SEC(91) 2288 
final)  
 
What is especially interesting about the latter is that these three points are the only 
arrangements to be adjusted in 1992 according to Regulation 170/83. However, these 
arrangements were further prolonged until the major review of the CFP scheduled for 
2002.  
 
The Commission used the opportunity of a scheduled interim review, however, to tackle 
some of the problems expressed by its 1991 report on the policy. (SEC(91) 2288 final) 
First of all, a closer integration of the hitherto to a large extent independent strands of 
the policy, accompanied by a more refined set of objectives was attempted. The 
previous basic regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) 170/83) was repealed and replaced 
by Regulation 3760/92. Only Spain voted against the regulation at the Council meeting 
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in December 1992 because it did not succeed with making the system of relative 
stability more flexible so the country would be able to use certain quotas not utilized by 
other Member States.  
 
The objectives of the CFP, as defined by Article 2 of the Regulation, were now as 
follows:  
 
As concerns exploitation activities the general objectives of the Common Fisheries 
Policy shall be to protect and conserve available and accessible living marine aquatic 
resources, and to provide for rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis, 
in appropriate economic and social conditions for the sector, taking account of its 
implications for the marine eco-system, and in particular taking account of the needs of 
both producers and consumers. 
 
Overall, these objectives do not resemble a departure from the course of the policy since 
the late 1960s.   
 
Second, the Regulation introduced a number of new management instruments. Article 8 
(3) allowed the Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 43 EEC 
to establish management objectives on a multiannual and multi-species basis, thereby 
introducing MATACs and MSTACs. However, until the expiration of the Regulation in 
2002, the Council has never made use of this possibility, and has not responded to a 
discussion paper published by the commission on how to further proceed in this matter. 
(Hegland, 2004: 31) Also under Article 8, the Regulation introduced the possibility to 
limit fishing effort, i.e. the product of capacity and activity, through limiting the days-at-
sea to regulate the exploitation rate. Article 5 stipulated that a Community-wide 
licensing system should be introduced by the beginning of 1995 at latest. From then on, 
all Community fishing vessels were required to have a fishing license attached to the 
vessel.  
Article 12 prescribed the introduction of a control and enforcement system applicable to 
the entire sector. So far, Regulation 2241/87 applied exclusively to issues regarding 
conservation. It was replaced by Regulation 2847/93 which extended control and 
enforcement mechanisms to all areas of the sector, i.e. also to the market organization 
and the structural policy. Detailed procedures were laid down for inspecting and 
monitoring fishing vessels, gear and catches; monitoring through EU Inspectors and 
taking measures in case of non-compliance.  
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Motivated by the Gulland report that recommended a 40% reduction in fishing effort for 
all marine stocks, the third MAGP had more ambitious goals than its predecessors. It 
ran from 1992 until 1996 and aimed at a 20% reduction in tonnage and 15% reduction 
in engine power compared to 1991 levels. 55% of necessary cuts had to be achieved 
through fleet downsizing. Furthermore, sanctioning possibilities and reporting systems 
were introduced to ensure that the third MAGP would finally be a success. 
 
The 1992 interim review of the CFP was not the last step in the evolution of the CFP 
before the 2002 reform. In the following years, a number of developments were 
noticeable, none of which significantly changed the policy. They shall, however, be 
mentioned briefly here in order to set the context for the 2002 reform.  
 
First, the European Parliament, whose role prior to the 1992 reform was negligible, 
became a factor in the policy-making process. Under Article 37 TEC on the CAP it is 
only necessary to consult the parliament and even that obligation has been circumvented 
in the past as described above. But the EP looked for other ways to intervene, such as 
through the annual budgetary process or through debates on the structural funds. Since 
1994, the EP had a full committee on fisheries and has been since then the “sole EU 
institution, which uses its reports and hearings to bring an alternative expertise to bear 
on the proposals of the DG FISH.” (Lequesne, 2005: 363) The Fisheries Committee 
gradually acquired expertise and independently issued opinions and reports. Much of 
the activity in the Committee, at least in the beginning, can be attributed to the first 
Committee president, Miguel Arias Cañete from Spain and the Spanish Committee 
members who used it as a forum to make their case on Spain’s full integration into the 
CFP heard. (Steel, 1998: 40)  
The EP was also the only institution ever that called for a clear separation of fisheries 
and agriculture. In its Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on the European union 
(OJEU C151 of 19 June 1995) it stated the following: 
 
Powers in the field of fisheries need to be dealt with independently of those in the field 
of agriculture. The Common Fisheries Policy should be re-examined in accordance with 
the founding principles underlying the institution of the common policy, i.e. 
conservation and relative stability. 
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Second, in the late 1990s the TAC regime had undergone some developments. Most 
importantly rules for flexibility in the year-to-year management of quotas (Council 
Regulation (EC) 847/96) were introduced. Also, new TACs were adopted both for up to 
that date unregulated species and areas. The policy of reducing paper fish14 was 
reinforced.  
 
Third, with the Stuttgart Declaration and the Single European Act ending the time of the 
Luxembourg Compromise and with the enlargement of the Community, unanimity was 
no longer a de facto requirement and so a qualified majority now took decisions on the 
CFP in the Council more and more frequently. The most important case in the 1990s 
was the banning of drift nets in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean15 that was 
opposed by Ireland and France. (Lequesne, 2005: 363) 
 
Third, in the wake of the Factortame judgements and the prospect of a full accession to 
the CFP by Portugal and Spain, parts of the British fishing industry with political 
support by single MPs and MEPs launched the Save Britain’s Fish campaign. (Symes 
and Crean, 1995: 408) This initiative eventually became a permanent coalition, to this 
date the only significant movement in a Member State advocating a withdrawal of a 
country from the CFP.  
 
Fourth, the Council through the adoption of the FIFG Implementation Regulation 
(Regulation 2792/99) for the first time adopted a structural measure on the condition 
that public funding must not contribute to an increase in fishing capacity. If MAGP 
targets have not been met, Member States would have to withdraw capacity. 
(SEC(2001) 418) 
 
Fifth, the conversation of resources in the Mediterranean and the Baltic became an issue 
in the second half of the 1990s. For the Mediterranean, discussions have been more 
extensive than for the Baltic region because technical conservation measures have 
overall been very complicated and not successful. (SEC(2001) 418) The integration of 
                                                
14 Paper fish describe fish that only exist “on paper”, i.e. TACs and quotas significantly in excess of actual fishing possibilities. 
These are mostly precautionary TACs.  
15 See Regulation 2413/98. This marked also the first time that a specific fishing technique has been banned under the CFP 
framework.  
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the Mediterranean into the CFP was only more concretely considered during the 2002 
reform.  
 
Last but not least, through the introduction of new management systems and a 
Community-wide licensing system, the technical aspects of the CFP and enforcement 
schemes became a major focus. Regulation 2847/93 was amended several times. Added 
were, for instance, measures aimed at inspecting and monitoring those activities that 
have been limited through fishing-effort.  
The regulation also led to the implementation of a satellite-based surveillance of all 
vessels over 24m through a vessel monitoring system (VMS) and to a creation of a 
Community fleet register. In the late 1990s, the Regulation was further amended to 
include effort zones and transparency measures. The fishing effort regime was also 
further improved. (SEC(2001) 418) The control regime was strengthened as well 
through the improvement of monitoring after landing, the monitoring of third country 
fishing vessels in Community waters and stronger cooperation between the Member 
States and with the Commission. Although harmonization of penalties could not be 
achieved, Regulation 2740/99 specified a list of the types of behaviour that seriously 
infringe the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy. (Ibd.)  
 
The changes in the policy during the 1990s may have been of relevance for the future of 
the CFP but due to their evolutionary nature, the depletion of fish stocks continued. The 
ICES did not quantify their proposals for TACs for all years during the 1990s, which is 
why no coherent statistics can be shown here. But to follow up on the development of 
the four demersal species in NEAFC zone IV and VIa, for 2002 the ICES only 
considered Saithe to be within safe biological limits. Cod depleted severely: In NEAFC 
zone VIa, its SSB was 41.05% lower than in 1992, 81.86% lower than in 1983 and 
85.63% lower than in 1966, the year that the negotiations for the first Common 
Fisheries Policy started. For NEAFC zone IV, the numbers are similar: Here, using the 
reference years above, cod stocks have depleted by 45.43%, 75.74% and 83.71% 
respectively. (ICES, 2002)  
 
The CFP was thoroughly evaluated by the Commission prior to the 2001 reform in a 
process that, unprecedented, sought a broad dialogue with a multitude of stakeholders. 
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Three reports were released together with the Commission’s first-ever Green Paper on 
the future of the CFP.  
 
That the state of the stocks is alarming at best was confirmed by the Report on the State 
of the Resources and their Expected Development (SEC(2001) 420 final), which relied 
heavily on data from the ICES. In the Report on the Implementation of the Community 
System for Fisheries and Aquaculture over the Period 1993-2000 (SEC(2001) 418), the 
Commission summarized the developments also outlined above and argued:  
 
The Community framework for fisheries (…) has not always managed to provide 
answers to the various challenges that emerged during the last ten years. Stock 
conservation, for example, has been a weak point. The basic management tools were 
available but there was insufficient political will to make use of them. 
 
As the 1983 CFP, reviewed in 1992, approached its expiration, the Commission also 
used this report to reflect on the TAC system, defending its principles but also 
acknowledging its failure, which it attributes to poor technical measures and 
enforcement on the one hand and the worsening consequences of the annual pattern of 
the TAC negotiations on the other. Furthermore, the Commission states that the data 
collection necessary for the implementation of the CFP had been inadequate and that the 
relationship between scientists and fishermen is critical as the latter accuse the former of 
not taking their knowledge seriously into account. (ibd.)  
 
The third report published by the Commission was the Report on the Economic and 
Social Situation of Coastal Regions. (SEC(2001) 419) It came to the conclusion, that 
from an economic and financial point of view, the Community fleet is characterised by 
high capital intensity, extremely high value added per job, poor financial profitability 
and insufficient utilisation of equipment. The Commission concluded that although a 
reduction in fishing effort is in principle sufficient to meet conversation goals, economic 
profitability must not be ignored which is why fleet reduction is essential. It furthermore 
noticed a worrying trend of Member States to increase their aid to modernise fleets and 
decrease their aid for fleet reduction.  
On the social dimension, the Commission noticed a decrease in employment in the 
sector in virtually every Member State. In half of the regions heavily dependent on 
fisheries, the dependence was reduced but in a third of them it increased. The 
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Commission emphasized that a diversification of the economies of these regions is 
essential.  
 
Although the CFP did not undergo any drastic changes before the 2002 reform, there 
were some modest advancements in its deepening. The Commission succeeded in 
establishing a Community vessel register, improving the control regime, tying 
conditions for aid to compliance with MAGP goals and, at least in theory, introducing 
multi-annual management options. It is likely that most of that progress was only 
possible because the Commission left the modus operandi established in 1983 
untouched. That does not, however, indicate a revival of neo-functionalism because 
national interests did dominate the negotiations on these measures. But all in all, 
political integration in the sector between the adoption of the 1983 CFP and the 2002 
reform was very limited. During that time period, fisheries on a supranational level were 
relatively far away from being an area of high politics.  
 
One noteworthy exception is the 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden that 
Spain successfully threatened to veto to fully join the CFP. The Community of Ten was 
rightfully worried about Spain’s accession on the eve of the adoption of the 1983 
Common Fisheries Policy. Within a decade of its accession, Spain managed to take the 
central stage. Both in relative and absolute measures, it received the most amount of aid. 
It continued to voice its opposition against the relative stability and the 12-mile limit. 
Also, in the EP, it initially dominated the Fisheries Committee after its creation.  
 
The Fisheries Committee is interesting from another point as well as it is a symbol of 
the emancipation of the CFP. Initially a neglected part of agriculture in the Treaty of 
Rome, it has become more distinct and also more technical, especially with the 1992 
interim review. The drafters of the Maastricht Treaty realized that and did not mention 
fisheries together with agriculture like their “forefathers”. Similarly, the FIFG was 
created. This emancipation was, however, more a result of the growing complexity and 
technicality of the policy. But a full emancipation from the CAP that would also 
facilitate a revision of the fundamental objectives of the CFP would mean a change in 
the Treaty, i.e. removing fisheries from Article 37 TEC (ex-Art. 38 EEC) and create a 
new section for it. Apart from the aforementioned resolution of the EP on the 
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functioning on the TEU, however, there has been no mentioning of such an intention.  
 
Under the light of everything that has been said so far, it is unsurprising that the 
Commission came to the conclusion that with the ripening of the policy came a ripening 
of the problems:  
 
The problems that the CFP is facing are in many respects similar to what they were in 
1992 but since they were not properly addressed they are more acute now such as stocks 
being outside safe biological limits and fleet overcapacity. 
 
This conclusion meant nothing less that if the Commission intended to address the 
Common Fisheries Policy’s shortcomings, it would have to re-open the Pandora’s Box 
that it had sealed in 1970 and 1983 and thereby discuss the foundations of the TAC and 
quota system as well as the principle of public aid.  
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7. THE 2002 REFORM  
 
I AM NOT INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE DESTRUCTION OF 40% OF FRANCE’S FISHING 
VESSELS.  
(FRENCH FISHERIES MINISTER JEAN GLAVANY; EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICE, 28 
APRIL 2001) 
 
The Commission embarked on the ship 
toward the 2002 reform before the start of the 
new millennium. During the years of 1998 
and 1999, it carried out a broad consultation 
with a variety of stakeholders through 
questionnaires and regional meetings. 
(COM(2000) 14 final) The Commission 
identified 18 issues that emerged in the 
process, which where then tackled by the 
reforms or at least subject to discussion. Due 
to the scope of this paper, a selection and 
consolidation of these issues is necessary. The 
2002 reform will hence be analyzed by 
looking at three specific topics:  
 
• The continuation of the derogations on 
equal access in Regulation 170/83 set 
to expire by the end of 2002; 
• fleet policy and public aid for the 
fishing sector; 
• and the system of Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) and quotas (including the 
principle of relative stability and the 
Hague Preferences).  
 
The first issue to be discussed is the equal access principle. Contrary to 1970 and 1983, 
this was not a major source of dissent during the reform process. However, different 
opinions were visible already in 1997, when the European Parliament took the role of a 
THE 2002 CFP REFORM 
 
• STATUS QUO REGARDING THE 
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS ONCE 
MORE REAFFIRMED 
 
• THE AMIS DE LA PÊCHE (FR, GR, IRE, 
IT, PT, ES) SUPPORTED A STRONGER 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF 
THE CFP AND SUCCESSFULLY 
WEAKENED THE COMMISSION’S PLAN 
TO ELIMINATE SUBSIDIES AND REDUCE 
CAPACITY (STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY 
DE, SE; ALSO UK, NL, BE AND 
OTHERS) 
 
• A NEW FLEET POLICY PARTLY PHASING 
OUT PUBLIC AID FOR FLEET 
MODERNIZATION; A LONG-TERM 
APPROACH, THE STRENGTHENING OF 
THE UNIFORMITY OF CONTROL AND 
SANCTIONS AND THE INTRODUCTION 
OF REGIONAL ADVISORY COUNCILS 
(RACS) WERE AMONGST THE MOST 
IMPORTANT POINTS OF THE 2002 
REFORM 
 
• ADOPTION OF THE PACKAGE WITH A 
QUALIFIED MAJORITY, AS GERMANY 
AND SWEDEN, WHOSE PREFERENCES 
DIVERGED FROM THE AMIS DE LA 
PÊCHE THE MOST, COULD NOT AGREE 
TO THE COMPROMISE 
 
Figure 10: Summary of important facts on the 
2002 CFP reform 
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first mover and adopted, out of its own initiative, its Resolution on the Common 
Fisheries Policy after the year 2002. (European Parliament, A4-0298/1997) In the 
explanatory statement, MEP Carmen Fraga Estévez (EPP-ED, Spain) argued that any 
new regime “should not take the form of a fresh derogation but of a means by which the 
basic principles of the Treaty are to be implemented.” The adopted resolution, however, 
called for the provisions in effect to be extended. The EP changed its mind 15 months 
later and called for an extension of national zones to 24 miles. (Hegland, 2004: 75 and 
EP, A4-0018/1999) 
 
In its consultation with stakeholders, the Commission found that there were “virtually 
no demands for the establishment of a free access regime ‘up to the beaches’” and only 
“some demands for the strengthening of the current regime in favour of the coastal 
fishermen,” (COM(2000) 14 final) i.e. an extension of the exception to 24 miles. 
Obviously, fishermen from the countries that acceded after 1983 complained about 
discriminatory restrictions on access to the North Sea. The Shetland box was also 
criticised, even from within the UK, for being the result of politics and not science. 
(Ibd.)   
 
The EP adopted a resolution on the consultation report and once more changed its mind: 
It now called on the Commission to reflect on the derogation of the 6/12-mile zone and 
“to ensure that, in the event of controversy, the status quo is maintained.” (European 
Parliament, A5-0332/2000)  
 
In line with the majority of Member States and stakeholders, the Commission, in its 
Green Paper published in March 2001 (COM(2001) 135 final: 24), advocated for the 
access regime to the 6 to 12 mile limit and to the Shetland Box to be rolled over. This 
position is not surprising from a strategic point of view since there were more 
controversial issues and unarguably more pressing issues that the DG Fish focussed its 
energy on but it is surprising when considering the Commission’s role and when 
looking at the argumentation presented:  
 
The basic objectives of the 6-to-12-mile coastal zone regime were to protect fisheries 
resources by reserving access to small-scale coastal fisheries activities which in general 
put less pressure on stocks in these zones (…) and to protect the traditional fishing 
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activities of coastal communities, thus helping to maintain their economic and social 
fabric. (…) Modification of the 6-to-12-mile regime would disrupt the long-standing 
balance of the policy. (COM(2001) 135 final)  
 
Given the evolution of the CFP as presented above, it is clear that the Commission’s 
argument that the objectives of this regime were of a conservationist nature does not 
hold up. The principle of equal access is a founding principle of the policy and has been 
applied since 1970. Exceptions and derogations have existed since 1970 and 1973 
respectively, long before the conservation regime went into effect.  
 
The Commission’s line of argument on why to keep the Shetland Box and North Sea 
restrictions is more ambiguous but basically derives from a conservationist point of 
view, which, in this case, is coherent.  
 
In June 2001, most of the fisheries ministers in the Council agreed with the 
Commission’s proposal with the notable exception of Spain. Portugal called for an 
extension of the 6 to 12 mile limit to 50 miles for very outlying regions such as the 
Azores and denounced restrictive access to the North Sea. (Agence Europe, 19 June 
2001)  
 
The Commission did not take the preferences of the countries on the Iberian Peninsula 
into account and, in its first proposal, suggested that the restriction of the equal access 
principle should be made permanent, also leaving the historical rights intact. 
Furthermore, the Shetland Box and all other access rules in place not concerning the 12-
mile band were to be retained but reviewed in 2003, when the Commission was to 
assess “the justification for these rules in terms of conservation and sustainable 
exploitation objectives.” (COM(2002) 185 final) Only after Ireland, supported by the 
UK, protested against the Commission’s proposal to scrap the Irish Box, the 
Commission accommodated both the British Isles and Spain by proposing to extend the 
derogations for another ten years instead of making them permanent. This idea was 
accepted.  
 
Article 17 of the adopted new basic regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 2731/2002) 
contains the general rules on access to waters and resources using a very similar 
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wording as Regulation 170/83. The new arrangements were valid until 31 December 
2012. Before that date, the Council has to decide on provisions following the 
arrangements. The provisions regarding the Shetland Box were adopted unmodified 
from the Commission’s first proposal and can be found in Article 18 of the basic 
regulation. (Council Regulation (EC) 2731/2000)   
 
The second area to be analyzed, subsidies and fleet policy, became the core issue of the 
negotiations on the 2002 reform of the policy as the Commission, even after realising in 
the consultations with stakeholders that “in many Member States there was support for 
structural measures and aid for the renewal of fleet, (…)” (COM(2000) 14 final) 
indicated support for substantial changes in its Green Paper. It represented a line of 
thought linking conservation failure to overcapacity. Concretely, it suggested that aid 
policy often undermined the objectives of any measure to reduce capacity and 
furthermore, subsidies for vessel construction and modernisation have not been 
accompanied by a sufficient reduction in capacity. The Commission points to two 
independent reports claiming that “the necessary reductions of fishing mortality for the 
prudent management of stocks should be about 40% and in many cases much higher.” 
(COM(2001) 135 final: 11) It stressed the negative economic effects of overcapacity on 
the profitability of the fishing fleet, concluding that a drastic reduction of the overall 
level of capital employed is necessary and proposed stricter fleet reduction programs.  
Additionally, “Member States will probably need to revise their priorities for structural 
aid to the fishing fleet, by, for example, reducing the share of aid for modernisation or 
construction of fishing vessels and increasing that of aid for decommissioning or laying-
up” and it “may be necessary for the Community to consider whether and under what 
conditions investment aid for the fishing fleet will be phased out, in order to eliminate 
its counter-productive effects on fishing capacity (…)” (COM(2001) 135 final)  
 
The Green Paper of the Commission resulted in somewhat hostile reactions from 
Member States after discussions in the Fisheries Council on 25 April 2001. While 
Germany, Denmark and the UK supported the content document, France, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium felt that the socio-economic 
perspective was not considered enough. More detailed criticism came from the 
Netherlands, who argued that the EU should properly administer its TAC and quota 
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system instead of restructuring the fishing fleet. The UK and Denmark subsequently 
pushed for the abolition of aid for the construction and modernisation of vessels. The EP 
criticised the Green Paper claiming that it did not take into account the social dimension 
of fishing and that while the very critical analysis is correct, the proposed changes are 
only of a minor nature. In the plenary, however, sufficient support to call for the 
MAGPs to be scrapped was not found. (Agence Europe, 18 January 2002)  
 
In expectation of first proposals by the Commission in March 2002, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain formed an informal group titled Amis de la Pêche 
(AdlP) that adopted their own conclusions on the future of the Common Fisheries 
Policy. Their aim was to put the social and economic aspects of the CFP into the 
foreground of the reform. While their proposals also focussed on the TAC system, 
fisheries in the Mediterranean and other issues, fleet policy and state aid was the area 
where the interests of this group diverged most from the ideas of the Commission. They 
argued that under certain circumstances, an increase of power and tonnage of vessels 
that were to be modernised should be allowed and advocated a Community-wide 
mechanism for fleet withdrawal that should be voluntary but based on attractive aid 
financed fully by the EU. Although they opposed financial support through the FIFG for 
a total increase in fishing effort, they advocated the continuation of aid for renewal and 
modernisation of fleets. (Agence Europe, 11 February 2002)  
 
The adoption of first proposals for the revised CFP was delayed several times. The 
delays are shrouded in mystery but it is widespread argued that some possibly illegal 
behind the scenes intervention from Commissioners from southern Member States 
opposed to the cancellation of state aid caused the delay. Furthermore, on 24 April 2002, 
Seffen Smidt, the Director-General of the DG Fish and head behind the Green Paper and 
reform proposals, was dismissed. (Hegland, 2004: 89) 
 
The Commission finally adopted its first set of proposals on 28 May 2002, which 
contained an end of aid to the building of new vessels starting by the end of 2002. Also, 
aid for modernisation should only be permitted when it does not lead to the creation of 
new capacity. Instead, subsidies should be used increasingly for the scrapping of 
vessels. (COM(2002) 187 final) As expected, the AdlP voiced opposition to the 
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proposal. The Danish Presidency failed with its strategy to reach agreement before the 
December meeting and so the annual TAC negotiations were being dragged into the 
process. The European Parliament supported the view of the AdlP.  
 
At the end of a five-day long marathon meeting in December 2002, agreement was 
reached. Public aid was to be phased out, but not immediately. Rather, during a two-
year long transition period, subsidies would still be permitted for small and medium-
sized vessels and a strict entry-exit regime had to be followed. Finland joined the AdlP 
group on the subsidies issue just before the decisive Council meeting in December. In 
order to get a qualified majority for a compromise, a new element was introduced: 
Member States carrying out fleet renewal using public subsidies would have to reduce 
their total fleet by three per cent until the end of 2004. This persuaded the UK and the 
Netherlands to agree to the proposal, leaving only Sweden and Germany voting against 
the package. This was the first time a major revision of the Common Fisheries Policy 
had been adopted by a qualified majority and not unanimously. The revised structural 
policy was codified in Regulation (EC) 2369/2002.  
 
After the equal access principle and the subsidies issue, the third subject that will be 
analyzed in more detail is the conservation policy. From the beginning of the TAC and 
quota system in the late 1970s, criticism arose because these measures were not seen as 
viable conservation tools due to the lack of proper enforcement and insufficient 
scientific advice. And also since that time there has been no consensus on a thorough 
review of the conservation system. The consultation of stakeholders by the Commission 
only confirmed that picture. No clear consensus on a replacement for the prevailing 
regime was found. As what is colloquially referred to the privatisation of fisheries 
started to be an ongoing trend, some fishermen from the Netherlands and Spain were in 
favour of a EU-wide system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). This would mean 
that an individual or entity would be granted the right of a percentage of the TAC that 
can be sold or leased. While a majority of the participants did not support an ITQ 
system at that time, they supported the system of relative stability as a necessary evil but 
argued that allocation keys might have to be reviewed to reflect actual fishing patterns. 
(COM(2000) 14 final) 
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It is therefore not surprising that the Commission’s suggestion for the TAC and quota 
system in its Green Paper were not very revolutionary: The Commission recognized the 
shortcomings of the annual setting of TACs from a conservationist point of view and 
suggested a multi-annual, multi-species and ecosystem-oriented management regime. 
Furthermore, the precautionary principle should be taken into account when laying 
down multi-annual management plans. From the Commission’s point of view, the multi-
annual approach should help to avoid abrupt changes in TAC volumes and the 
postponement of sensitive decisions. It also stressed the importance of multi-species and 
ecosystem-oriented fisheries management. (COM(2001) 135 final) 
 
Regarding the principle of relative stability, the Commission left the subject untouched 
but vaguely indicated possible changes in the future: “When the structural problems of 
the fisheries sector have been addressed (…), it may be possible to reconsider the need 
to maintain the relative stability principle and the possibility of allowing market forces 
to operate in fisheries as in the rest of the EU economy.” (COM(2001) 135 final) 
 
The Council’s reaction to the Commission’s ideas was, with nuances, generally positive. 
(European Information Service, 28 April 2001) This changed, however, after the 
Commission adopted its first proposal for the basic regulation. (COM(2002) 185 final) 
This proposal removed all references to TACs and quotas but re-introduced them using 
different terminology. TACs were to be set by multi-annual management plans that 
should include a number of targets against which stock recovery or maintenance should 
be assessed, in particular population size, long-term yields, fishing mortality rate and 
the stability of catches. For stocks for which such a multi-annual management plan was 
adopted, the Council was to decide on catch limits for the first year but these limits 
could subsequently be decided by the Commission in assistance with it’s Committee for 
Fisheries and Aquaculture, meaning a drastic shift of power from the Council to the 
Commission. Also, the Commission proposed to give itself the power to decide on 
emergency measures for a duration of up to one year “in the event of a serious threat to 
the conservation of living aquatic resources, or to the ecosystem resulting from fisheries 
activities (…) at the substantiated request of a member state or on its own initiative.” 
(COM(2002) 185 final) Quotas were since 1992 referred to as fishing opportunities and 
the Commission essentially proposed to keep the current system. (COM(2002) 185)  
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Opposition to the Commission’s plans came mainly from the AdlP countries as they felt 
that the proposed system neglected a socio-economic dimension. While they support the 
Commission’s push for multi-annual management, they insisted that all conservation 
measures should be decided by the Council of Ministers. Their criticism of the 
Commission’s extended powers was somewhat shared by most Member States, except, 
interestingly enough, the United Kingdom. Similarly, the AdlP also felt that multi-
annual management plans should only exist for stocks outside safe biological limits 
whereas for other stocks, multiannual TACs should be adopted. The AdlP’s view on the 
Hague Preferences was ambiguous since on of its members, Ireland, insisted to keep 
them contrary to the other Member States in the coalition. (Agence Europe, 31 July 
2002)  
Only at a later point the position of some countries became more clear as France, Spain 
and Portugal insisted that the Hague Preferences were not an integral part of relative 
stability and that they were opposed to their “systematic and excessive implementation 
when we are confronted (…) with drastic reductions in TAC on some species.” (Agence 
Europe, 16 October 2002)  
 
Ultimately, not much of the Commission’s ambitious plans could be found in the new 
basic regulation adopted on 20 December 2002. (Council Regulation (EC) No 
2371/2002) The AdlP succeeded with their push for different provisions for stocks not 
endangered. Article 5 of the regulation introduced recovery plans with the objective to 
“ensure the recovery of stocks to within safe biological limits” which the Council 
should adopt “as a priority” for overexploited stocks. Instead of recommendations 
being based on scientific opinion, as suggested in the Commission’s first proposal, it 
was not merely to be taken into account. Furthermore, economic factors were now to be 
considered well as the Council should decide targets and timeframes considering 
besides the conservation status and biological characteristics of the stocks also the 
characteristics of fisheries in which stocks are caught as well as the economic impact on 
fisheries concerned.  
Article 6 introduced management plans for stocks at or within safe biological limits. 
Apart from the fact that there is no obligation to adopt them as with recovery plans, they 
only differ from them through not including limitations on fishing effort.  
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Article 20 emphasized that decisions on TACs and quotas were still a responsibility of 
the Council and maintained the Hague principles:  
 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, 
shall decide on catch and/or fishing effort limits and on the allocation of fishing 
opportunities among Member States as well as the conditions associated with those 
limits. Fishing opportunities shall be distributed among Member States in such a 
way as to assure each Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each 
stock or fishery.  
 
Ultimately this means that although multi-annual plans eliminated the annual TAC-
setting (log-rolling included) in its previous form, power remained with the Member 
States.  
 
As mentioned above, the three issues just presented were not the only ones dealt with 
during the 2002 reform process. Most importantly, an emergency measure for scrapping 
fishing vessels, the scrapping fund, has been established through Regulation 2370/2002 
to help Member States with additional reductions in fishing effort under the new 
recovery plans. In terms of control and enforcement, the Commission itself was enabled 
to carry out inspections without being accompanied by inspectors of the respective 
Member State. It is furthermore also empowered to deduct quotas as a penalty from 
Member States that exceed their fishing opportunities. Cooperation between Member 
States was reinforced and the use of the satellite-based surveillance system (VMS) 
extended to smaller vessels. Environmental concerns were also integrated and 
agreements with third countries revised.  
 
The 2002 reform has been the first full review of the comprehensive Common Fisheries 
Policy adopted in 1983. But it can be argued that the Commission saw the 2002 reform 
only as the first step of a complete overhaul of the CFP. By leaving many of the 
politically highly sensitive issues, like the principle of relative stability and the 6 to 12 
mile limit untouched, more energy could be diverted to the reduction of overcapacity 
through a revised structural policy. Hegland (2004: 75) suspects that this was indeed the 
Commission’s strategy. In a way, it was probably the choice between the lesser of two 
evils: Subsidising overcapacity was ultimately seen as more harmful than keeping the 
exceptions from the equal access principle and the quota system for another decade.  
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That does not mean, however, that the Commission operated only on one front to 
improve the conservation policy. It recognised the fact that the annual ritual through 
which TACs were set was counterproductive to any conservation goals and correctly 
identified, if only implicitly through its proposals, that in order for the conservation 
policy to be successful, the power to set TACs should not be in the hand of the Member 
States. If its initial proposals would have been adopted, Member States would lose the 
power to set TACs to a large extent, although they would still define the broad direction 
of multi-annual management plans through setting concrete limits for the first year. This 
proposed mechanism was probably the first viable attempt to tackle the depletion of fish 
stocks on a European level. By transferring more power to the Commission, the degree 
to which national interests could dominate conservation policy decisions would have 
been greatly reduced. 
Member States have, however, acted in the exact way described by the Tragedy of the 
Commons by putting their short-term interests first. Especially the AdlP but also most 
other countries were opposed to the new responsibilities of the Commission. Only from 
the United Kingdom came moderate support for the Commission’s plans: Although the 
UK is usually weary of ceasing sovereignty to the EU level, the fact that it has been the 
most outspoken advocate of a stricter conservation regime since its accession to the 
Community and the fact that it has suffered the most from implicit consequences of the 
policy such as quota hopping meant that it would actually have benefited from the 
stronger role the Commission intended to assume in conservation and also enforcement 
policy.  
 
Seldom can neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism be so well contrasted: 
If the initial proposals of the Commission had been adopted, political spillover would 
have led to a transfer of further powers to the Commission. But Member States, 
irrespective on their stance on subsidies, united against these suggestions, afraid that 
they would all loose out if they couldn’t decide over this distributional matter 
themselves. 
 
Similarly, national interests also prevailed in the negotiations on the structural policy. 
Contrary to previous negotiations, however, the link between the structural and 
conservation policy was established. The Commission emphasized that the CFP’s 
SCHWEIGER, LUKAS (2009). THE EU COMMON FISHERIES POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE OF A COMMON GOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.  
99 
failure to reduce overcapacity is partly responsible for overfishing and the depletion of 
fish stocks, a fact that also has been proven most notably by Boude, Boncoeur and 
Bailly (2001) but also earlier authors focussing on economic principles. Frost and 
Andersen (2006: 742) sum it up best: “Public aid promotes over-supply of capital by 
artificially reducing the costs and risks of investment. Each subsidised fishing vessel 
reduces the productivity and profitability of every other vessel in the fishery 
concerned.” The Commission was supported mainly by Germany and Sweden, both 
countries with strong green parties in or supporting the government at that time that are 
net contributors to the EU budget and also supported the WWF’s campaign for a strict 
conservation policy. Austria and Luxembourg as landlocked countries were also in 
favour of scrapping public aid. Support came also, in nuances, from the UK, Denmark, 
Belgium and the Netherlands.  
 
Holding a comfortable blocking minority were the AdlP countries, also supported by 
Finland on the subsidies issue. For them, it was not only about keeping public aid but 
rather about focussing on socio-economic aspects in general. They wanted the CFP to 
take into account the economic, social and territorial dimension of fisheries as well as 
finding greater acceptance of CFP rules amongst fishermen. (European Information 
Service, 6 February 2002)  By openly criticising the Commission’s approach as too 
conservationist, they deliberately ignored the link between overcapacity and stock 
depletion and were seen as coalition for fishermen and not fish.  
Their insistence on the continuation of subsidies can be easily understood by looking at 
the amounts they were granted for the 2000-2006 period: 46% of aid for fleet 
modernisation and renewal was granted to Spain meaning that almost half of the funds 
under these measures went to a single Member State. Also, the AdlP countries and 
Finland spend significantly more money on modernisation and renewals than other 
Member States with the exception of Denmark. (European Information Service, 27 
November 2002)  
 
Although subsidies were not immediately scrapped, all countries except for Germany 
and Sweden supported a compromise through which they were to be phased out. On the 
first glance it might seem like a modest victory for both sides. But behind the AdlP’s 
agreement to the compromise was the intention to put the issue on the table again for the 
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period after 2006 as they saw public aid as a permanent feature of the policy. (Hegland, 
2004: 87)  
 
As in the 1983 negotiations, when Commissioners at a certain point voted against 
adopting the Commission’s proposals, domestic interests also became an issue within 
the Commission. The dismissal of Stefen Smidt, Director-General of the DG Fish and 
the delay of the Commission’s proposal resulted in several speculations. Accusations of 
illegal instructions of Commissioners were widespread, especially after the fisheries 
minister from Spain said on national television that the AdlP instructed their 
Commissioners to obstruct the reform, which not only was said to cause the delay but 
would also be a violation of the Treaty. Commissioner Franz Fischler, being questioned 
by the EP, rejected any allegations that he had been influenced or put under pressure 
about the content and the postponement of the proposals for the new CFP. That Smidt 
was removed on the request of Spain could not be proved but “there was circumstantial 
evidence enough to make the whole affair look suspicious.” (Hegland, 2004: 89 and 
Agence Europe, 24 May 2002) Also, part of the reason why the Commission was ready 
to make certain concessions to the AdlP countries might have been a lack of interest by 
Commissioner Fischler himself, who is said to be much more interested in agriculture 
than in fisheries. Last but not least it is questionable why the Commission did not use 
the threat of withdrawing proposals if it was unsatisfied with negotiations in the 
Council. The legal vacuum that would have been created then could have put the 
Commission in a better bargaining position from a conservationist point of view.  
 
Once more, the objectives of the CFP were rewritten. The weaknesses of the CFP as a 
policy that is based on the provisions for the CAP in the Treaties, however, remains, 
although the objectives were phrased with a larger emphasis on environmental and 
conservation concerns. Article 2 (1) stipulates: 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that 
provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions. For this purpose, 
the Community shall apply the precautionary approach in taking measures designed to 
protect and conserve living aquatic resources, to provide for their sustainable 
exploitation and to minimise the impact of fishing activities on marine eco-systems. It 
shall aim at a progressive implementation of an eco-system-based approach to fisheries 
management. It shall aim to contribute to efficient fishing activities within an 
economically viable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture industry, providing a fair 
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standard of living for those who depend on fishing activities and taking into account the 
interests of consumers. 
 
Concrete improvements have been made to reflect the importance of resource 
conservation, namely the commitment to sustainable exploitation, defined by Article 3 
(c) of the basic regulation as “the exploitation of a stock in such a way that the future 
exploitation of the stock will not be prejudiced and that it does not have a negative 
impact on the marine eco-systems” as well as the precautionary approach.16  
 
The Commission realized, however, that only a Treaty change could lead to a complete 
revision of the objectives of the CFP and indicated in April 2000 that this is a real 
possibility as part of an overall reform. (European Information Service, 8 April 2000) 
However, this idea has not been pursued further.  
Interesting was also the role of the European Parliament in the 2002 reform process. It 
had been much more vocal than during previous negotiations which is reflected by a 
number of amendments. What had been noticeable was a bias in favour of the socio-
economic approach the AdlP were taking, mainly due to the hold of Spain on the EP’s 
fisheries committee. According to Hegland (2004: 90) this actually obstructed 
parliament from playing a significant role since its opinion was not seen as representing 
a cross-section of the Community. Ultimately, Parliament in the decisive phase of the 
negotiations was practically ignored.  
The reasons why agreement was reached in 2002 differ somewhat from those in 1970 
and 1983. Hegland (2004: 88) identifies four of them:  
 
1) Failure to get agreement on the basic regulation before the end of the year would 
widely be considered a crisis for the entire constitutional framework of the CFP; 
2) The term of the Danish Presidency was seen as a window of opportunity compared to 
the two next presidencies, Greece and Italy, which were both part of the AdlP group; 
3) The CAP was up for reform in 2003 and it is likely that the Commission(er) did not 
want to work on two major reforms at the same time; and 
4) A main concern of the Commission was the issue of aid, which needed to be settled 
as soon as possible.  
 
All four reasons were quite significant looking at the history of the CFP. Hegland 
further believes that the Commission was under larger pressure to successfully end 
negotiations than the AdlP countries, which is a view than can only be partly shared. 
                                                
16 Defined by article 3 (i): “… the absence of adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or 
failing to take management measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species and non-target species and their 
environment.” 
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While it is purely speculative, it could be argued that the Commission could have used 
the expiration of the equal access provision to on the one hand drive a wedge between 
the AdlP countries since Spain, contrary to its partners in the coalition, was opposed to it 
and on the other hand used it as a leverage to get support for some of its ideas in the 
Green Paper that were ultimately not accepted by the Council.  
 
Last but not least it is important to briefly look at the repercussions of the reform and 
the events in the evolution of the policy after 2002. While many programs have been 
adopted that were mandated by the legislation adopted in 2002, four developments were 
somewhat defining for the further evolution of the policy and the scheduled 2012 
reform:  
 
1) The Irish Box was maintained but reduced to a quarter of its size and a new list 
of vessels authorized to fish in it was adopted, taking the 1998-2002 period as 
reference. Spain, still unhappy with the existence of the Irish Box, brought the 
issue in front of the ECJ, which rejected the country’s arguments. (ECJ 
judgement Case C-442/04 of 15 May 2008) Also, the Shetland Box was 
maintained until further evaluation was carried out. (Agence Europe, 14 October 
2003; Agence Europe, 14 September 2005)  
2) As predicted by the AdlP countries already in 2002, the issue of public aid was 
again on the table. The Commission proposed that a European Fisheries Fund 
(EFF) should replace the FIFG after its expiration by the end of 2006 and focus 
on four priorities: Adjusting the EU fishing fleet; support for fish-farming, 
processing and marketing; support for collective actions of limited duration and 
support for the sustainable development of coastal areas facing socio-economic 
problems as the result of the developments in the sector. (European Information 
Service, 25 June 2005) Many of the former AdlP countries, now joined by Malta 
and Cyprus after the enlargement of the European Union in 200417, criticised the 
Commission’s intention to end public aid for modernising fishing fleets except 
for safety improvements. (Agence Europe, 21 September 2004) The arguments 
and positions were very much the same as during the debate in 2002. Ultimately, 
                                                
17 The 2004 enlargement, however, has been of rather marginal importance than the previous ones. None of the Member States 
joining in 2004 have a considerable deep-sea fishing fleet and most fishing took place in the Baltic Sea. (see also Lequesne, 2005: 
356) 
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the EFF puts more emphasis on sustainability, resource conservation and 
environmental protection than the FIFG did. But while subsidies for the 
constructions of new vessels were phased out, they remained for the 
modernisation of vessels under similar conditions agreed upon at the 2002 
reform. (Council Regulation (EC) 1198/2006, globalsubsidies.org of 20 March 
2009) Once more, the evolution of the CFP was characterised by the 
continuation of the status quo.  
3) The de-facto independence of fisheries policy-making from agriculture increased 
after the 2002 reform. First, as a result of the EU enlargement in 2004, a separate 
commissioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs was installed. Also, the 
Directorate General in charge of fisheries and maritime affairs was restructured 
in 2008. The new DG MARE now constitutes of three regionally divided 
directorates in charge of managing the CFP as well as the EU Integrated Marine 
Policy in the respective areas, as well as a horizontal directorate facilitating 
policy development and coordination, a directorate for external affairs and a 
directorate in charge of legal issues, resources, communications and relations 
with stakeholders.  
4) The proposed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does 
not change the objectives of the CFP, but renames Title II of the TEC from 
Agriculture to Agriculture and Fisheries. Furthermore, Article 2 confirms that 
conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP would be an 
exclusive competence of the Union whereas agriculture and fisheries in general 
would be an area of shared competence between the Union and the Member 
States. But more importantly, according to Article 294 TFEU, fisheries would 
become an area of co-decision, thereby giving the European Parliament effective 
powers in shaping the CFP. The negative outcome of the referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty in Ireland on 12 June 2008, however, has so far prevented these 
provisions to go into force.  
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8. THE 2013 REFORM: THE CFP’S LAST CHANCE?  
 
The Commission, on 22 April 2009, published a Green Paper on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, marking the start for the next reform, likely to be in effect by 2013. The 
Commission identified five main structural failures of the CFP: the problem of 
overcapacity, imprecise policy objectives unable to provide guiding for decision-
making, a decision-making system focussing on short-term perspectives, insufficient 
responsibility for the fishing industry and a lack of political will to enforce compliance 
rules. (COM(2009) 163 final)  
 
These shortcomings are not new, indeed, they have for most parts existed since the 
Treaty of Rome or at least since fish stocks started depleting in the 1970s. The 
Commission seems once more to want to use the event of the derogation of the 
provisions on the 6 to 12 mile limit to also push through a broader reform of the policy.   
Apart from dealing with the structural failings above, it also attempts to include 
measures to further improve management and to improve the policy framework. A 
consultation has been launched that will last throughout 2009.  
 
The solutions, however, are already on the table. A definite end of public aid for the 
industry is almost inevitable, but it might come at the price of more extensive programs 
to make coastal areas able to deal with changes that accompany it, first and foremost 
enabling fishermen who lost their jobs to reassess their situation, be able to receive 
further education and find new employment. Symes and Phillipson (2009) posed the 
question as to what became of social objectives in the Common Fisheries Policy and 
rightfully noted that the matter of self-esteem and self-help is very important when it 
comes to achieving social sustainability. And when it is from a point of profitability and 
resource conservation not possible to sustain level of employment in some fisheries 
communities, such programs would be of enormous importance. The Commission 
therefore must be able to secure funds for dealing with the short-term social and 
economic consequences of its proposals in order to be able to get the approval of the 
former AdlP countries in the Council. And it must also be ready to spend more money 
on vessel scrapping programs.  
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That the solutions are on the table is also something demonstrated by Cardinale and 
Svedäng (2008), who showed that fisheries science is not to blame for the waste of 
formerly large marine resources but instead produced numerous suggestions how to 
improve the state of stocks. Managers and politicians do have the necessary scientific 
information to avoid the collapse of fish stocks.  
 
Although the reduction of overcapacity is and should be the top priority since it is 
necessary to adjust the fleet size to the catch it is allowed to fish, the findings of this 
paper clearly indicate that the depletion of fish stocks is also the result of a decision-
making system that facilitates resource depletion. Overcapacity just exuberates this 
problem and removes part of the political incentives to inflate TACs over biological 
recommendations, but an elimination of overcapacity does not necessarily mean that 
overfishing would be history. The Community could also encourage Member States to 
use new approaches to finance a reduction in overcapacity that at the same time reduces 
incentives causing it. Jensen (2002), for instance, suggested that taxation, for instance in 
form of a tax on fishing vessel’s insurance value.   
 
The Commission’s initial proposals for the multi-annual management plan were 
probably the first systematically viable attempt to tackle the problems posed by the 
tragedy through strengthening its powers in the area of conservation. Similar reasoning, 
of course, also applies to the area of control and enforcement.  
 
Of course, it could also be of advantage to increase the involvement of stakeholders and 
the general public in the policy-making process. A survey conducted in France, Italy, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium showed that 75% of the population never heard 
of the Common Fisheries Policy. (Agence Europe, 28 May 2008) 
 
As already explained throughout the paper, the problem of ambiguous objectives cannot 
be solved unless fisheries are completely separated from agriculture in the Treaty. 
Unfortunately, the window of opportunity provided by the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty 
was not utilized for that purpose.  
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The reform of the CFP could also be a springboard for Norway and especially Iceland to 
join the EU. The CFP’s failure combined with the high importance of the sector in both 
countries has made them wary of such a move. But the new Icelandic Prime Minister, 
Jóhanna Sigur!ardóttir, has announced to introduce a bill to the Icelandic parliament 
mandating the government to start accession negotiations with the EU. Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn indicated that Iceland might join as early as 2011 (The Guardian 30 
January 2009), together with Croatia, since it already adopted a large part of the acquis 
through membership in Schengen and the EEA. If that is the case, the country will 
definitely play a significant role in the upcoming CFP reform process. While fisheries 
are still seen as the crux of the matter in potential negotiations, the fact that relative 
contribution of fisheries to the Icelandic GNP has been decreasing continuously and that 
the widespread claim that fisheries interest groups have been the main reason for 
Iceland’s reluctance to join the EU ("órhallsson, 2004) are an indicator that a 
compromise on the Common Fisheries Policy between Iceland and the EU is possible.  
 
Lastly, the Community could learn from Iceland since it is one of the few countries that 
already introduced a system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). ITQs, as a 
privatization of the resource, have been proven to prevent collapses of fish stocks and to 
recover declining ones. (The Economist, 18 September 2008) The introduction of more 
market-based systems for fisheries management in the Community is generally long 
overdue.  
 
If the next reform of the Common Fisheries Policy will bring the sector closer to the 
Commission’s vision of sustainable fish stocks and a financially independent fisheries 
sector (COM(2009) 163 final) remains to be seen. The author shares the diagnosis made 
by the Commission in 1991:  
 
The Commission is convinced that the success of this policy depends entirely on the 
expression of a genuine political will so that (…) the fisheries sector will behave in a way 
consistent with the achievement of the European ideal. (COM(91) 2288) 
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9. CONCLUSION  
 
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE CFP – HORIZONTALITY, NON-DISCRIMINATION 
AND RELATIVE STABILITY – HAVE MORE TO DO WITH REINFORCING THE CONCEPT OF 
EUROPEAN UNITY AND CO-OPERATION THAN WITH EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF A 
SERIOUSLY DEPLETED, HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND UNSTABLE RESOURCE. THE CFP (…) 
SEEKS, THEREFORE, TO REINFORCE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY WITHIN THE 
COMMUNITY – A PRECEPT, WHICH TRANSLATES UNEASILY INTO A POLICY FRAMEWORK 
AND REGULATORY SYSTEM. AS A RESULT, THE ENSUING SYSTEM IS SINGULARLY ILL 
SUITED TO THE PARTICULAR CONDITIONS OF EUROPE’S FISHERIES. (…) CERTAIN 
ASPECTS OF ORGANISATION OF FISHERIES POLICY IN THE EC ACTUALLY FOSTER THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALIST RATHER THAN COMMUNAUTAIRE ATTITUDES WITHIN 
THE INDUSTRY. THIS IS TO BE HELD TRUE BOTH OF THE METHOD FOR NEGOTIATING 
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN BRUSSELS AND OF THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING OF THE CFP.  
(SYMES AND CREAN, 1995: 409)  
 
After the evolution of the policy has been presented, everything that has been said so far 
is connected in order to give a concise answer to the initially posed research question: 
How did the EU Common Fisheries Policy as a Community tool for the management of 
a common-pool resource evolve in the context of European integration? 
 
The evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was analyzed using three different 
theories that corresponded to the different units of analysis according to Howlett and 
Ramesh (2003: 20ff): Neo-Functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism as 
European Integration theories on the largest level of social structures; the three 
paradigms of fisheries management (conservation, economic and social/community) 
according to Charles’ framework of fisheries management focussing on the aggregate 
collection of individual actors; and the concept of Common Goods explaining behaviour 
and motivations of individual actors.  
 
On the structural level, the main verdict is that the Common Fisheries Policy is a 
conservative policy in a sense that through its reforms, the status quo was reaffirmed. 
The most apparent example is the conservation policy: the system of Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) and quotas distributed between Member States according to the principle 
of relative stability, introduced in 1983, have from the beginning failed to serve as 
proper conservation tools because the trend of depleting fish stocks in the waters they 
apply to has not been reversed. Despite that fact, they have remained relatively 
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unchanged. The Commission also decided to forego the opportunity to reform the 
system as part of the 2002 reform in order to maintain political stability.   
The rules regarding the 6 to 12 mile limit suffer from a similar fate, where arrangements 
that were initially designed to be of temporary duration have become de facto 
permanent. Symes (1997a: 141f) shares this view, giving the following analysis on the 
extension of the provisions on the 6 to 12 mile limit in 1992:  
 
This was the first of a series of checks and balances that were to confirm the CFP as a 
conservative instrument designed to protect the status quo rather than a radical new 
design for international fisheries management.  
 
But one of the major problems of today’s CFP had been created before a conservation 
regime even existed: Community subsidies for the sector, especially for the construction 
and modernisation of vessels, have existed since 1970 as a result of the compromise that 
was necessary for France to agree to the equal access principle18.  
 
This conservative approach is a strong indicator that the liberal intergovernmentalist 
view of European integration is viable to explain the evolution of the CFP, especially 
the first and the fourth pillar of the CFP, the structural policy and the conservation 
policy. From the very beginning, benefits certain member states anticipated for their 
domestic industries were important reasons why aspects of the CFP were put onto the 
policy-making agenda. Similarly, preferences formed on the domestic level dominated 
most negotiations on the policy. This is especially true for negotiations on distributive 
matters, such as TACs, quotas or public aid and to a lesser extent for negotiations on 
matters linked to those issues, such as enforcement and control, which can have indirect 
distributive elements. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism also presents its case when looking at aspects of neo-
functionalism that cannot be found in the CFP. One example is the absence of political 
spillover in the 2002 reform, when even the Member States that agreed with the 
Commission’s proposals at large rejected the transfer of additional power to the 
Commission.  
Second, the formation of public actors on the supranational level: Except for the EU-
wide lobbying group Europêche that was formed in the 1970s, organization of 
                                                
18 One should however refraim from the simplification to depict France as scapegoat to explain the failure of the CFP as reality is, as 
usual, complex than that.    
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fishermen at the European level has been relatively weak. This is also due to the 
heterogeneity and fragmentation of the sector in the Member States. (Lequesne, 2005: 
360f)  
When looking at integrative aspects of the policy, however, then the tables are turned. 
The most important example is the third pillar of the CFP, the transfer of power to enter 
agreements from the national to the supranational level through the Hague Resolution, 
which is a spillover from the Community adoption of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). This is only one of the examples discussed in this paper of why neo-
functionalism cannot be dismissed as an explanation for the evolution of the policy.  
One also needs to look closer at the other pillars of the CFP. Taking the conservation 
policy as an example, liberal intergovernmentalism clearly serves as the better 
explanatory theory at the level of policy-making. But on the level of agenda setting, 
things are less clear. While none of the Member States was enthusiastic about a 
common conservation regime, they realized at the same time that for the vast size of the 
enlarged Community Sea, the situation back then posed not only immense legal 
difficulties but also problems regarding manageability. 
 
Enlargement of the Community also played an important role in the evolution of the 
CFP. Agreement on the 1970 CFP was partly reached because the Six wanted to present 
the four candidate countries Denmark, Norway, Ireland and the UK with an acquis 
communautaire that they had to accept so they would not be able to be part of the 
negotiations on the initial policy. Also in 1983, there is some evidence that the looming 
accession of Spain and Portugal pressured the Community into reaching agreement on a 
common conservation policy. The most important accession, however, was the one of 
Spain and Portugal, who only fully joined the CFP after a 20 yearlong transition period. 
Both countries used the dissatisfaction with this arrangement and their opposition to the 
principle of relative stability to oppose the 1992 review and to threaten to veto the 
accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. With an inefficient fisheries sector 
that relies heavily on financial support from the Community, Spain has also become the 
largest recipient of funds through the European Fisheries Fund.  
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CFP NO. OF 
MEMBER 
STATES 
IMPORTANT COALITIONS MAJORITY 
REQUIREMENT 
VOTED 
AGAINST 
1970 
 
6 FR, IT only agreed to the 
equal access principle after 
DE, NL, BE, LUX were 
ready to agree on exceptions 
and on Community funding 
for the sector. 
de jure: QMV 
de facto: 
unanimity 
(Luxembourg 
Compromise) 
- 
1983 10 IRE, UK favoured a more 
restrictive equal access 
principle; FR (and others) 
favoured unrestricted 
application. The 
compromise reaffirmed the 
status quo. 
de jure: QMV 
de facto: 
unanimity 
(Luxembourg 
Compromise) 
- 
1992 12 -   QMV ES 
2002 15 Amis de la Pêche (FR, GR, 
IRE, IT, PT, ES) supported a 
stronger socio-economic 
perspective of the CFP and 
successfully weakened the 
Commission’s plan to 
eliminate subsidies and 
reduce capacity (strongly 
supported by DE, SE; also 
UK, NL, BE and others) 
QMV DE, SE 
       Figure 11: Overview of important coalitions and voting for the four major CFP packages 
 
Spain was also one of the driving forces behind the Amis de la Pêche (AdlP, translated: 
Friends of Fisheries), the group of countries that successfully lobbied against the 
Commission’s radical plans to eliminate subsidies and decrease overcapacity.  
As it can be seen from the table above, coalitions have played a notable role throughout 
the history of the CFP. Strong domestic preferences combined with the practice of the 
Luxembourg compromise, which, until 1983, made it necessary for the Council to reach 
agreement unanimously, led to stalemates and endless negotiations. Qualified majority 
voting and an enlarged Community therefore were probably the main reasons why the 
negotiations on the 1992 review and the 2002 reform, each lasting under a year, were 
considerably shorter than the ones on the first CFP between 1966 and 1970 and the first 
comprehensive CFP between 1976 and 1983.  
 
One must not overlook the contribution that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
made towards advancing the Common Fisheries Policy. In the late 1970s, the legal 
provisions on fisheries governance in the Community were confusing at best and little 
precedence existed. Nonetheless, the Court had consistently ruled to clarify Community 
competences through a rather strict application of Community principles. In the Kramer 
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case (ECJ judgement Joined Cases C-3, 4 and 6/76 of 14 July 1976), the ECJ confirmed 
the Community’s exclusive treaty-making power in the area of fisheries at latest from 
1979 on. Also, the invalidation of discriminatory national measures through the rulings 
in both the Irish Fisheries (ECJ judgement Case C-61/77 of 16 February 1978) and 
Factortame II (ECJ judgement Case C-221/89 of 25 July 1991) cases was crucial for the 
political debate at the time, as further debate on these measures or a different ECJ 
decision most likely would have led to further protracting progress in the evolution of 
the CFP.  
Some ECJ cases related to fisheries also proved to be important to the European 
integration process in general. Through the Kramer case, the ECJ extended its view on 
implied treaty-making power it had laid out in the ERTA case. The judgement to the 
Factortame I case (ECJ judgement Case C-213/89 of 19 June 1990) confirmed the 
primacy of Community law over national law and the judgement to Factortame II 
clarified the definition of the freedom of establishment.   
ECJ jurisprudence in the field of fisheries therefore not only strengthened the 
Community’s competencies and regulatory capacity not only regarding the CFP but also 
when it comes to Community principles – a fact which caters to the neo-functionalist 
argument that the ECJ is a very important institution advancing European integration as 
the ECJ’s case law can generate a dynamic, which, together with relevant treaty 
provisions and secondary legislation gradually leads to a deepening of integration in a 
sector and not uncommonly to spillovers.  
 
If one wants to pass judgement on the explanatory viability of the two grand theories of 
European integration, the lesson learned by the example of the CFP is that neither one 
can be dismissed.  
 
After looking at the structural level, the policy will now be analyzed using the 
paradigms of fisheries management. Three groups can be identified in the evolution of 
the Common Fisheries Policy, each of which corresponds to one of the paradigms of 
fisheries management described by Charles (1992). The first group, whose policy 
preferences lie closest to the rationalization paradigm, has traditionally encompassed 
Germany and the Netherlands. These countries have been critical of subsidies for the 
fisheries sector since the late 1960s, when Germany and the Netherlands only agreed 
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channelling funds from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) to the sector because that was necessary to find a compromise with France 
and Italy. As the Community expanded, several other countries can also be counted as 
members of this group. This could be seen in 2002, when Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and others also spoke out against subsidies.  
 
This group’s preferences can be described as close to the Commission’s in many 
aspects, something that has been also been visible during the negotiations on the 2002 
reform. However, one cannot assume that this group is not acting driven by national 
interests or even see this as a symbol of a neo-functionalist way of European 
integration.  Most notably, this group has refused the transfer of additional powers to the 
Commission in 2002. Also, these countries have always had a comparatively more 
efficient fleet.  
The Commission, in its role as the Guardian of the Treaties, generally supports the 
reasoning of rationalisation through its effort to create a common market for fisheries 
products and its fight against protectionism and for the European ideal. But with the 
advent of a common conservation policy, however, the depletion of resources moved to 
the centre of the Commission’s attention. In 2002, it was clearly visible that 
rationalization was merely a tool to reach conservation goals rather than a goal in itself. 
When stocks are heavily overfished, resource conservation is a top priority for actors 
striving for rationalization as well as conservationists.   
 
Clearly different preferences can be found when looking at the third group, which 
always devoted most attention to the socio-economic aspects of the CFP. Interests of 
fishermen and social coherence always come first for actors in this group, who are 
friends of fishermen rather than friends of fish. France initially led it, when it fought 
together with Italy for Community funds from the EAGGF in the late 1960s and against 
the equal access regime. Later, France found in Spain an even more vocal heir to the 
throne. Their characteristics and interests were most visible when France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain formed the AdlP coalition, a partnership that managed 
to significantly defend its interests in the 2002 reform of the policy. This also shows that 
the dominance of this group has practically been unbroken. The few ambitious reform 
attempts in the early proposals for the 2002 reform have been largely averted and the 
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issue of aid, on different levels and in different forms, has not been properly resolved 
for over 40 years.  
 
It is important to point out that no actor fits one hundred per cent into a single group, as 
this would be a simplification of reality. But the framework still gives a good overview 
to understand the dynamics and positions throughout the evolution of the CFP.  
 
When asking if the CFP has been a suitable policy to tackle the Tragedy of the 
Commons then, after everything that has been discussed in this paper, the answer must 
be a clear no. In fact, it is an example par excellence for how the lack of coercion leads 
to the depletion of a resource. Hardin (1968) argued, that coercion that is mutually 
agreed upon is capable of preventing this situation, and at the first glance, one might 
consider the CFP as a common policy to fit the definition. But looking closer at the 
evolution of the CFP, one finds a history not of mutual coercion but of compromises 
whose content has been the least common denominator that Member States, defending 
their interests, were willing to agree on. They thereby acted the same way as the 
individual herder in Hardin’s parable.  
 
When one attempts to connect the three levels of analyses, then the abductive 
conclusion arises that there is a connection between the liberal-intergovernmentalist 
logic of integration and the dominance of the social/community paradigm and the 
prevalence of the Tragedy of the Commons. But it is rather dangerous to jump to such a 
conclusion. Even if the rationalization paradigm had been the dominating one 
throughout the evolution of the CFP, this would not have necessarily meant that 
integration would have proceeded in a neo-functionalist way or that the Tragedy of the 
Commons could be prevented.  
 
Still, the main conclusion remains that the evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy 
has mainly been driven by Member States’ domestic interests and not by European 
ideals. With the policy’s ambiguous objectives stemming from its common ancestry 
with the Common Agricultural Policy and with its strong short-term focus on the socio-
economic perspective it has failed to accomplish its most crucial task – to make sure 
that there are enough fish.  
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ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
 
This paper seeks to analyze the evolution of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as a Community 
tool for the management of a common-pool resource in the context of European Integration. The 
theoretical framework, comprising different levels of analysis, employs European integration theories 
(Neo-Functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism), paradigms of fisheries management 
(conservation, economic and social/community) and the concept of common goods. 
Spillover contributed to the two pillars of the original policy, the structural policy and the common market 
organization, being complemented by a resource conservation regime and a common external policy. 
Also, the European Court of Justice has played a significant role in confirming the supremacy of 
Community law in this field. At the same time, domestic interests in several Member States led to the 
extenuation of the Commission's proposals and to perennial stalemates, especially in negotiations on 
distributive matters. Furthermore, since the adoption of the first CFP in 1970, overdue reforms were not 
undertaken and others enshrined the status quo through repeatedly renewing derogations and thereby 
making them de facto permanent. Looking at the CFP, neither neo-functionalism nor liberal 
intergovernmentalism can hence be fully accepted or rejected. 
Pertaining to the concept of common goods, the CFP has evidently failed to prevent the Tragedy of the 
Commons as most major fish stocks in Community waters are far below the level of 1983 when the 
common conservation regime went into effect. This trend has been exacerbated by the tendency of the 
policy to be designed along the lines of the social/community paradigm and by its ambiguous objectives 
stemming from its shared heritage with the Common Agricultural Policy.  
Whereas important steps have been undertaken in past reviews, the next reform scheduled to be in effect 
in 2013 must tackle the issue of overcapacity. The integration of Iceland, Europe's second largest fishing 
nation, into the CFP could pose a further challenge for the policy.  
 
 
ABSTRACT (DEUTSCH) 
 
Diese Arbeit analysiert die Entwicklung der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (GFP) der EU als Instrument 
für das Management eines Allmendegutes im Kontext der Europäischen Integration. Der theoretische 
Rahmen besteht aus verschiednen Analyseebenen und bedient sich der Europäische Integrationstheorien 
(Neofunktionalismus und Liberaler Intergouvernementalismus), der Paradigmen der Fischereiwirtschaft 
(ökologisch, wirtschaftlich und sozial) und dem Konzept der Allmendegüter.  
Spillover hat wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass die beiden Pfeiler der ursprünglichen GFP, die 
Strukturpolitik und die Gemeinsame Marktorganisation, durch eine Bestandsbewirtschaftungspolitik und 
exklusive Kompetenz bezüglich internationaler Beziehungen ergänzt wurden. Darüber hinaus hat der 
Europäische Gerichtshof eine signifikante Rolle darin gespielt, die Vormachtstellung des Europarechts in 
diesem Feld zu bestätigen. Gleichzeitig haben aber nationale Interessen in einigen Mitgliedsstaaten zur 
Verwässerung der Vorschläge der Kommission und zu mehrjährigen Pattsituationen in Verhandlungen 
geführt. Darüber hinaus wurden seit dem In-Kraft-Treten der ersten GFP im Jahre 1970 wichtige 
Reformen aufgeschoben. Daher kann man, wenn man die Entwicklung der GFP betrachtet, zum Schluss 
kommen, dass weder Neo-Funktionalismus noch Liberaler Intergouvernementalismus bestätigt werden 
können.  
Bezüglich des Konzeptes der Allmendegüter ist festzustellen, dass die GFP es nicht geschafft hat, eine 
Tragik der Allmende zu verhindern, da die wichtigsten Fischbestände der EU weit unter dem Level von 
1983, dem Jahr, als die Bestandsbewirtschaftungspolitik in Kraft trat, sind. Dieser Trend wurde verstärkt 
durch die Tendenz der GFP eher das soziale Paradigma der Fischereiwirtschaft zu bedienen; sowie durch 
ihre uneindeutigen Zielsetzungen, welche den gleichen Ursprung wie die der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik 
(GAP) haben.  
Obwohl in der Vergangenheit bereits wichtige Fortschritte erzielt wurden, so muss die für 2013 geplante 
Reform die Reduktion der Überkapazität bewältigen. Die Integration Islands, Europas zweitgrößter 
Fischereination, in die GFP stellt eine weitere Herausforderung da.    
 
